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ABSTRACT
Foreclosure, Federal Financial Institutions, and the Fortunes of Detroit’s Middle- and
Working-Class Neighborhoods
by
Eric C. Seymour
Chair: Professor Margaret Dewar
During the U.S. foreclosure crisis, millions of homes were foreclosed, with many repos-
sessed by the banks and federal agencies owning or insuring the unpaid mortgages. Prior
research has found strong associations between foreclosures and negative neighborhood
outcomes, including increased crime and diminished home values. These outcomes are
attributed to foreclosures being vacant and inadequately maintained, increasing neigh-
borhood blight and leading nearby homeowners to disinvest. Each of these mechanisms
is inuenced by the practices of the banks and federal agencies that repossessed fore-
closed homes, but these institutions and their practices have not yet been the subject of
sustained research. This dissertation addresses this gap by examining how the institutions
responsible for repossessed mortgage foreclosures—known as real estate owned proper-
ties, or REOs—manage their inventories in Detroit, which possessed one of the largest
concentrations of REOs in the nation for several years.
Using real estate transaction records for the Detroit tri-county area from 2005 to 2013,
along with policy analysis and interviews, I examine what happened to REOs in Detroit
and its suburbs. In this study, I compare what happened with REOs owned by federal
xii
agencies with those owned by private entities, as federal agencies possess a dual mandate
to both quickly reduce inventory and stabilize neighborhoods. I compare federal agencies
and private entities in terms of the share of sales they make to homebuyers and investors
of dierent sizes, the length of time properties remain in REO, and impact current and
former REOs have on nearby home values. I found that federal and private entities alike
sold large numbers of Detroit homes to investors, many of whom were linked to code
violations and tax delinquency. I also found that properties remained in HUD’s inventory
for lengthy periods, increasing the likelihood of deterioration. Further, I found that REOs
owned by both federal and private entities were likely to harm home values. My ndings
indicate potential conicts between federal agencies’ dual mandates, with pressures to sell
properties coming at the expense of neighborhood stabilization objectives. My ndings
also suggest that HUD’s rules for conveying properties after foreclosure are linked to
extended REO periods.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Since the onset of the foreclosure crisis in the mid-2000s, a staggering number of res-
idential properties have owed into the inventories of the nancial institutions and fed-
eral agencies owning, insuring, or servicing the mortgages used to purchase subsequently
foreclosed properties. These mortgage-reverted properties—popularly known as “bank-
owned properties”—are referred to in the real-estate industry as real estate owned (REO)
properties. The geography of REO accumulation mirrors the national geography of mort-
gage foreclosure, with substantial concentrations in the exurban settlements feverishly
developed during the creation of the housing bubble, as well as in the neighborhoods of
older central cities where predatory lending triggered waves of foreclosures (Immergluck,
2010a). In the wake of the foreclosure crisis, a growing body of research has emerged con-
cerned with the eects of foreclosures and REOs on the neighborhoods and municipali-
ties in which they are located. The consensus of this research is that foreclosures impose
negative externalities, pulling down property values and contributing to crime (Ellen, La-
coe, & Sharygin, 2013; Schuetz, Been, & Ellen, 2008). The bare fact of foreclosure alone,
however, does not account for these externalities. Rather, they are the product of the
interrelated problems of lengthy vacancy periods, poor property maintenance, heavily
discounted sales prices, and the oversupply of homes on the market. Each of these mech-
anisms is inuenced by the practices of the institutions responsible for REOs, but these
1
institutions and their practices have not yet been the subject of sustained research. This
dissertation addresses this gap by examining how the institutions responsible for REOs
manage their inventory in Detroit, which for several years has been among the cities with
the largest concentration of REOs (Immergluck & Smith, 2006b).
Detroit is an important site for examining REOs for several reasons. Detroit, like simi-
larly situated cities, retained a number of neighborhoods with stable, if not strong, housing
demand prior to the mortgage foreclosure crisis. Since the onset of the foreclosure crisis,
however, banks and federal agencies have come to be counted among these neighbor-
hoods’ largest property owners. How these institutions handle their inventories shapes
critical dimensions of neighborhood health, including property values, tenure, and va-
cancy. These dimensions inuence the decisions of neighborhood homeowners to remain
and invest, the municipal allocation of city services, and the decisions of households con-
templating moving to these neighborhoods. The preservation of these neighborhoods
in cities like Detroit is important for several reasons, both moral and practical, but for
the purposes of this research it is especially important to emphasize that these neighbor-
hoods have for decades oered aordable and attractive housing options for middle- and
working-class households otherwise unavailable within cities like Detroit. In their ab-
sence, households would likely prefer housing situated outside the city, further drawing
resources away from municipalities desperately in need of them.
Conducting this research in Detroit possesses additional salience given the increasing
prominence of urban regimes oriented toward urban management and market recovery
through the identication and removal of blight (Kirkpatrick, 2015). In the race to re-
move blight, however, the mechanisms through which blight is produced require better
understanding. Certainly secular processes of deindustrialization and suburbanization ex-
acerbated by white racist attitudes toward housing integration have withdrawn jobs and
people from Detroit, leading to housing abandonment and blight in many areas (Freund,
2010; Sugrue, 1996), but the resources and preferences of many households kept some
2
neighborhoods intact in the face of decades of population and job loss in Detroit. The in-
cursion of blight into these neighborhoods is not an inexorable outcome of market forces
or natural processes, but rather is mediated by numerous private and governmental insti-
tutions and their rules for governing foreclosures. By understanding these mechanisms,
policy responses can be be tailored to the problem of blight reduction at numerous points
of intervention, reducing reliance on demolition as a principle mechanism for stabilizing
neighborhoods hit hard during the foreclosure crisis. Further, many REOs are controlled
by federal agencies, including the two largest government sponsored enterprises (GSEs),
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD). Given this fact, the role of government in managing foreclosure and pre-
venting blight is hardly limited to the local state. Federal institutions play a crucial role
through their direct control of properties in vulnerable neighborhoods.
1.1 How Foreclosures Harm Neighborhoods
A substantial body of research links residential foreclosures to a number of negative
outcomes for neighborhoods, particularly heightened crime and diminished home val-
ues (Ellen et al., 2013; Schuetz et al., 2008). These outcomes, in turn, have the potential to
trigger or accelerate neighborhood disinvestment and decline in both the short- and long-
term (Li & Walter, 2013). In this section, I will review the literature on these foreclosure-
related spillovers, highlighting what is known about the neighborhood impacts of current
and former REOs, which are the focus of my dissertation. Additionally, I will highlight
what is known about the role of institutions, particularly the owners of REO properties,
in mediating the neighborhood impacts of foreclosures. I will make the case that owners
of REO properties preside over many of the mechanisms prior research establishes be-
tween foreclosures and neighborhood outcomes, but little is known about the manner in
which these institutions handle REOs and the property- and neighborhood-level impacts
of dierent institutional practices for managing and selling REOs.
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The majority of studies examining the impact of foreclosures focus on changes in
home sale prices, both for sales of foreclosed properties and for neighboring non-distressed
sales. Looking rst at the literature on foreclosure discounts, research indicates that fore-
closures sell at a substantial discount relative to non-distressed sales (Campbell, Giglio,
& Pathak, 2011; Clauretie & Daneshvary, 2009; Forgey, Rutherford, & VanBuskirk, 1994),
or do not appreciate in value at the same rate as other homes Pennington-Cross, 2006.
Initial studies of foreclosure discounts found that foreclosures sell at a discount of 20% or
more (Carroll, Clauretie, & Neill, 1997; Forgey et al., 1994; Pennington-Cross, 2006). These
studies, however, fail to account for neighborhood conditions. Home values, regardless
of whether they are for REOs, are likely to be lower in neighborhoods with lower sale
prices. Subsequent studies accounting for neighborhood context, among other covariates
for which foreclosure may have served as a proxy in prior studies, predict a smaller dis-
count. Clauretie and Daneshvary (2009), in their study of home sale prices in Las Vegas
between 2004 and 2007, found that foreclosures sold at a discount of between 7.5% and
7.9%, all else being equal.
While these studies are primarily concerned with isolating the discount generated by
foreclosure status alone, in their concern with removing the eect of other factors entan-
gled with foreclosure status, they point to several reasons why sellers might intentionally
sell foreclosures at discounts. Some scholars point out that sellers of foreclosed homes
may set lower listing prices or accept lower bids should they desire shorter marketing
times, lower carrying costs, or increased liquidity (Clauretie & Daneshvary, 2009; Frame,
2010). Sellers, of course, also set prices based on property conditions. Foreclosures in poor
condition, which may have deteriorated due to vacancy and reduced investment by REO
owners, sell at steep discounts. Discounted sale prices may also be a function of sellers’
net present value (NPV) calculations, which involve comparing the expected returns gen-
erated from a quick sale with those generated from sales where properties are marketed
for a longer time period, less carrying costs. Sellers’ perceptions of negative housing mar-
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ket trends would make them more likely to price properties at a discount to sell quickly,
so as to avoid the possibility of realizing smaller net prots by incurring higher carrying
costs. Immergluck (2012), in a study of REO sales in Atlanta, found that owners of REOs
began to sell their inventory in lower-value neighborhoods at a substantially faster pace
starting in 2008, indicating that sellers began pricing their properties at lower prices to
make them move faster. In short, the literature assumes foreclosure discounts stem, at
least in part, from the decisions of owners of REOs regarding whether or not to hold or
liquidate inventory and whether or not to invest in improvements and maintenance, but
little has been written about the decision-making calculus and observed practices of REO
owners and how these actually impact foreclosure discounts.
Foreclosures also decrease the sale prices of nearby non-foreclosures, although schol-
ars debate the magnitude and duration of the impact (Frame, 2010). Studies have found
that the degree to which foreclosures impact the sale price of non-foreclosures depends
on distance in time and space, with physically closer and more recent foreclosures im-
posing the largest discounts (Harding, Rosenblatt, & Yao, 2009; Lin, Rosenblatt, & Yao,
2007; Schuetz et al., 2008). Previous studies have also found that discounts depend on a
property’s stage in the foreclosure process, in particular, whether the property is a pre-
foreclosure, current foreclosure, or former foreclosure (Harding et al., 2009; Lin et al.,
2007; Kobie & Lee, 2011). REOs are found to impose substantially higher discounts than
pre-foreclosures. In their study of foreclosure discounts in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Kobie
and Lee (2011) estimate that each additional REO on the same block as a non-distressed
sale discounts that property’s price by roughly 3%. The comparable discount imposed by
pre-foreclosures is just 1.7%. The discounts imposed by foreclosures are generally found
to persist for several years, extending even beyond the point of sale (Harding et al., 2009;
Ihlanfeldt & Mayock, 2014).
To date, more eort has been put into estimating the size of the externalities im-
posed by foreclosures than examining the causes of these discounts. Many studies take
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for granted the operation of one or more of a limited number of mechanisms through
which foreclosures may generate discounts. The most commonly assumed mechanism
through which foreclosures pull down nearby sale prices is property deterioration and
blight (Coulton, Schramm, & Hirsh, 2008; Kobie & Lee, 2011; Whitaker et al., 2011, July).
Pre-foreclosures and REOs alike may be vacant for long periods of time, providing op-
portunity for property deterioration. Blight caused by deterioration, in turn, may neg-
atively impact the investment decisions of nearby property owners and the bid prices
of prospective buyers. The causal link between blight and diminished home values in
nearby areas has been accepted as truth in urban policy since at least the Progressive Era.
This relationship is supported by a number of recent empirical studies (Shlay & Whitman,
2006; Whitaker et al., 2011, July). Whitaker et al. (2011, July), in their study of Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, found that each additional nearby vacant property reduces home prices by
1.4%. Shlay and Whitman (2006) found similar results in Philadelphia, where abandoned
properties pulled down nearby sale prices by thousands of dollars.
Previous research, then, provides a strong basis for the assumption that blight result-
ing from vacancy is the primary channel through which foreclosures impact nearby home
sales. The assumption that REO status necessarily leads to blight, deterioration, and dis-
counted neighborhood sale prices, however, leaves the role of REO owners in handling
their properties unexamined. The results of Immergluck and Smith (2006a) suggest that
dierences among institutions responsible for REOs inuence whether foreclosures gen-
erate these discounts. The authors found that foreclosures of properties purchased with
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance are not associated with nearby home
sale prices, but foreclosures of properties purchased with conventional mortgages, on the
other hand, had a statistically signicant and negative association with nearby home sale
prices. This nding suggests that systems for handling foreclosures dier between HUD
and private lenders and servicers, but the authors do not comment on what these dier-
ences might be and how they encourage or discourage sale price discounts.
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Institutional dierences are also implicated in discounts imposed by former foreclo-
sures, principally through the sale process (H. Thomas, 2015). Several studies nd that
foreclosures continue to impose discounts months, if not years, after foreclosure, even
after sale. Rogers and Winter (2009), in their study of foreclosure externalities in St. Louis
County, Missouri between 1998 and 2007, found that nearby foreclosures are linked to
discounts of nearby home sales two years after foreclosure, the longest time period ex-
amined by the authors. Lin et al. (2007), in their study of spillovers in Chicago in 2003
and 2006, found that discounts remain fully ve years after a foreclosure start. Many
of these foreclosures were likely to have been sold during those time periods, although
the authors do not examine whether properties had exited REO status. Harding et al.
(2009), in a national study of foreclosure externalities from 1989 to 2007, estimated that
the largest average discounts among pre-foreclosures, foreclosures, and post-foreclosures
were imposed by former foreclosures, although results diered among metropolitan sta-
tistical area (MSA). Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2014), in their study of externalities in several
large Florida counties between 1998 and 2011, also found that externalities persisted after
sale.
While these studies suggest the existence and magnitude of externalities dier based
on the phase of the foreclosure process, they say little about the mechanisms driving dif-
ferences or similarities. Community activists and practitioners, however, argue the heavy
involvement of investors in the market for foreclosures drives the persistence of external-
ities after foreclosure, particularly in areas with weak housing markets. The strategies of
investors in distressed properties, including foreclosures, include the acquisition of large
inventories, sight unseen, with the intention of quickly reselling as many properties as
possible at a substantial markup (“ipping”). Other investors are active in the market for
foreclosures in the pursuit of cheap rental properties. Often, these investors make few,
if any repairs, in the pursuit of short-term gains (“milking”) (Ford et al., 2013; Mallach,
2010; Treuhaft, Rose, & Black, 2010). In one of the few systematic studies of dierences
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between REOs purchased by investors and those purchased by owner-occupants in terms
of property conditions, (Hwang, 2015) found that among REOs in Boston purchased be-
tween 2006 and 2011, those purchased by investors were more likely to be associated with
service requests and property neglect. In the only existing study to explicitly model dier-
ences in discounts based on the type of foreclosure buyer, Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2014)
found that former foreclosures purchased by investors generated larger discounts than
foreclosures purchased by owner-occupants, although the discounts dissipated over time.
The assumption that investor acquisitions of REOs is problematic is a central assumption
of recent studies examining what happens to REOs after they are sold (Immergluck, 2012;
Kim & Cho, 2016; McMillan & Chakraborty, 2016; Molina, 2015). These studies interpret
larger shares of sales to investors, particularly in distressed neighborhoods, as problematic
given the causal chain of reasoning discussed above.
Previous research also links foreclosures to increases in neighborhood crime, includ-
ing both property crime, like grati and vandalism, and violent crime (Cui & Walsh, 2015;
Ellen et al., 2013; Immergluck & Smith, 2006b). Foreclosure is thought to increase crime
through several mechanisms. First, foreclosures, through their physical deterioration,
may signal complacency among neighborhood residents about crime and social disorder.
Second, foreclosures, by increasing residential turnover and decreasing homeownership,
weaken informal social controls for preventing crime. Third, foreclosures, through va-
cancy, may encourage property theft and vandalism and provide cover for other criminal
activities. These mechanisms, particularly the rst two, stem from prior research on so-
cial disorganization theory, which links neighborhood characteristics like residential in-
stability to diminished social cohension and control, eroding important mechanisms for
preventing neighborhood crime (Sampson & Groves, 1989). Previous studies of the rela-
tionship between foreclosure and crime nd that foreclosures lead to the greatest increases
in crime when foreclosures have entered REO and/or they are vacant (Cui & Walsh, 2015;
Ellen et al., 2013). These ndings correspond to earlier research linking abandoned struc-
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tures, regardless of the reason for abandonment, to increased crime (Spelman, 1993). The
role of REO owners in mediating the visible insecurity and distress of foreclosures is not
examined in this literature. Research by the National Fair Housing Alliance (2014a), how-
ever, suggests that several large REO owners poorly maintain and market properties in
urban neighborhoods having a substantial share of minority residents in comparison to in-
ventory owned in majority white neighborhoods. Such institutional practices, community
activists fear, may accelerate social disorganization in neighborhoods with concentrated
foreclosures and increase criminal activity.
These short- and medium-term impacts of foreclosures, including increases in blight,
crime, and vacancy and decreases in home values and social capital can lead to more pro-
found long-term neighborhood changes. While the literature on neighborhood change
resulting from foreclosures is thin (for exceptions, see Li & Morrow-Jones, 2010; Baxter
& Lauria, 2000), the theoretical connections between, rst, blight, vacancy, residential
turnover, and property speculation and, second, long-term neighborhood conditions are
well established in the literature (G. Galster, 2001; Rohe & Stewart, 1996; Temkin & Rohe,
1998). Foreclosures of previously owner-occupied homes are commonly purchased by in-
vestors who then either convert them to rental housing or do nothing with them (Coulton
et al., 2008; Ford et al., 2013) . Properties owned by REOs, particularly in urban majority-
minority neighborhoods, may be neglected and exhibit property damage or other signs
of disinvestment (National Fair Housing Alliance, 2014a). These outcomes can lead to de-
clining neighborhood home prices, encouraging neighborhood property owners to reduce
investment in their holdings and potentially pushing other homeowners underwater on
their mortgages (i.e., when outstanding debt exceeds home value). These outcomes, in
turn, potentially lead to further speculative activity and reduced homeownership in a vi-
cious cycle of neighborhood decline. Thus, neighborhoods retaining desirable attributes
preceding the foreclosure crisis are potentially susceptible to long-term, substantial de-
clines in neighborhood conditions. Previous research on neighborhood change has been
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concerned with identifying the points in the process of change where public policy may
be able to intervene to arrest or reverse decline. This literature makes clear the role of in-
stitutions, particularly nancial, governmental, and nonprot, in helping prevent neigh-
borhoods from declining or tipping past the point of recovery. This dissertation seeks
to make a similar contribution by examining the role of REO owners in inuencing the
fortunes of middle- and working-class neighborhoods in older central cities like Detroit.
1.2 How REO Owners Handled Properties
As I have shown in the preceding section, foreclosures are clearly linked to negative
neighborhood outcomes. The literature on the subject points to a number of mechanisms
through which foreclosures generate these negative outcomes, but is largely silent on the
role of REO owners in inuencing the degree to which mortgage-reverted properties harm
neighborhoods. In this dissertation, I argue that the ways in which REO owners handled
their inventory in the years immediately following the peak of the mortgage foreclosure
crisis had a large negative impact on middle- and working-class neighborhoods in De-
troit and similarly situated cities. REO owners exercise substantial control over whether
properties are likely to generate harmful spillovers at three principal points of phases
of a property’s overall duration in REO, specically, (1) the point at which completed
foreclosures are formally conveyed into REO inventory, (2) the period of REO ownership
between conveyance and disposition, and (3) the point at which REOs are sold or oth-
erwise disposed of. Practices specic to each of these three points in the life of an REO
directly inuence the condition, occupancy, and price of REOs—each of which, in turn,
impacts neighborhood conditions. Not all REO owners, however, employ the same prac-
tices for receiving, managing, and disposing of mortgage-reverted properties. Lender and
federal housing agency practices for each of these three phases of the REO lifecycle of-
ten overlap, but sometimes dier in crucial ways that are both more and less harmful for
neighborhoods.
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With regard to practices for taking receipt of foreclosed properties, I will argue that
the timeliness for REO owners taking control of mortgage-reverted properties inuences
whether and how long they remain vacant, and therefore susceptible to deterioration.
Specically, I will argue that HUD’s practices for taking control of foreclosed FHA-insured
properties may be partially responsible for the lengthy period of time between foreclosure
and REO disposition, during which these properties are vacant and vulnerable. While pri-
vate entities and the GSEs take control of properties immediately after failed foreclosure
auctions, HUD takes control of FHA-insured properties long after this point (U.S. Govern-
ment Accountability Oce, 2013). The primary reason for this is the fact that HUD only
accepts foreclosed homes in “conveyable condition,” meaning only after redemption peri-
ods have expired, title has been cleared, and the property is in “broom-swept condition”
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2010b). This policy of requiring
conveyable condition is intended to save HUD the costs of managing properties prior to
the point at which they may be brought to market, but it leads to a divided approach
to handling properties after foreclosure, which in turn substantially increases properties’
time in REO. Additionally, HUD allows lenders to le insurance claims on FHA-insured
foreclosures at any point after foreclosure, further increasing the time properties are likely
to linger in inventory. Private entities and the GSEs, on the other hand, take control of
properties immediately after failed foreclosure auctions. This unied approach to han-
dling REOs between failed foreclosure auctions and disposition likely leads to shorter
REO durations, decreasing the chances of properties sitting vacant for long stretches and
harming neighborhood conditions. Other aspects of REO management and disposition,
however, inuence whether or not lender and GSE properties are indeed more or less
likely to harm neighborhood conditions, as discussed below.
While properties remain in REO, their owners are directly responsible for their main-
tenance and preservation, which in turn inuence whether properties become blighted
and pull down nearby property values. Property maintenance and preservation also in-
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uence the type of buyer, with investors being far more likely to purchase properties that
have been poorly maintained or require serious repairs (Herbert, Lambie-Hanson, Lew,
& Sanchez-Moyano, 2013). Private and federal entities alike employ contractors to secure
and maintain REOs prior to sale. These entities’ hiring and oversight practices, as well
as the standards to which they direct contractors to maintain properties, have a direct
bearing on property conditions and neighborhood spillovers. In this dissertation, I will
argue that REO owners, through either their failure to direct contractors to maintain REOs
located in Detroit to neighborhood standards or their failure to adequately oversee con-
tractors in order to ensure proper maintenance, may have contributed to the deterioration
of decent housing in middle- and working-class neighborhoods. Such preventable dete-
rioration, in turn, leads to diminished home values for foreclosures and nearby proper-
ties, decreased interest among prospective owner-occupants, increased sales to investors,
and expanded public expenditures for demolition and other forms of nuisance abatement.
Above and beyond basic property maintenance activities, such as mowing lawns and
securing doors and windows, REO owners’ decisions regarding repairs also inuences
whether properties sell to investors or owner-occupants. First, many, if not most prospec-
tive owner-occupants seek housing that can be occupied immediately or in the near-term.
Second, many prospective owner-occupants may nd it impossible to secure nancing for
homes requiring major repairs. I will argue that banks and federal housing agencies cre-
ated a major barrier for prospective owner-occupants in the market for foreclosures by
deciding against making repairs, as they instead preferred to make immediate cash sales
and reduce the risk they would potentially be exposed to by holding properties for longer
periods of time.
REO owners’ policies and practices for selling and otherwise disposing of REO proper-
ties are also implicated in whether these properties are linked to negative neighborhood
outcomes. Sales to investors, particularly in places with weak overall housing markets
like Detroit, can have seriously negative consequences, as investors in these markets fre-
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quently follow business models predicated on ipping, milking, and speculation (Mallach,
2010). Owner-occupied properties, on the other hand, help promote neighborhood stabil-
ity more than vacant or poorly maintained rental properties (Rohe & Stewart, 1996). I will
argue that the maintenance and sales practices of banks and federal housing agencies,
however, create inducements for investors and barriers for prospective owner-occupants,
particularly in cities like Detroit, and that these incentives and barriers had damaging
consequences for historically intact neighborhoods. First, REO owners were more likely
to engage in bulk sales in locations with large concentrations of foreclosures and where
home values, in the aggregate, had fallen. In these locations, REO owners packaged and
sold large numbers of REOs for pennies on the dollar in order to remove these properties
from their portfolios. Private and federal entities alike sold geographically tailored pack-
ages of REOs to the highest bidder, without rst vetting their capacity for returning prop-
erties to productive use. As a result, numerous predatory investors acquired large num-
bers of privately and federally owned REOs in Detroit and similarly situated cities. Many
of these investors engaged in precisely those harmful practices previous research predicts
they would. Many bulk buyers and other large investors rapidly resold properties at in-
ated prices, having made no improvements, prolonging property vacancy and creating
opportunities for further deterioration. Investors allowed those properties they failed to
ip to languish and deteriorate, eventually falling into public ownership through tax fore-
closure. Other bulk buyers and large investors extracted rental income from properties
while simultaneously withholding property taxes. Since repossession due to delinquent
property taxes takes several years to occur, investors were able to reap substantial short-
term returns, often many times more than their initial investment. Other bulk buyers
and large investors sold properties on contract, a type of seller-nanced home purchase
arrangement. The terms of these sales, however, are harsh; they require buyers to im-
prove properties so that they meet code, they impose extremely high interest rates, and
they provide none of the homebuyer protections aorded by a conventional mortgage.
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Properties sold on contract, therefore, often exhibit the same turnover and dilapidated
property conditions as rental properties owned by milkers (e.g., Goldstein & Stevenson,
2016a).
Further numbers of REOs were likely sold to investors due to REO owners’ prac-
tice of making few, if any repairs, particularly in locations like Detroit; pushing prop-
erties through an accelerated sales process; and selling properties “as-is.” As noted above,
prospective owner-occupants are generally more interested in purchasing move-in or
near move-in ready properties. Homes with substantial deciencies impose additional
costs and delays for prospective owner-occupants many are not interested in or capable
of dealing with. Further, lenders may not be willing to start new loans for such proper-
ties, as they provide insucient collateral in their present condition. Many REO sellers
also dictate that the sales process, including inspections and nancing, take place on an
accelerated—and sometimes impossible—timetable relative to conventional sales. The “as-
is” clause, however, makes it essential for buyers to have properties thoroughly inspected.
The meaning of “as-is” varies somewhat among REO owners, but it generally means that
the buyer accepts the property in its present condition, with no guarantee as to the con-
dition of the property, the quality of any repairs made by the seller, or the perfection of
title. The “as-is” clause, therefore, poses substantial nancial risk to the buyer and places
investors, with greater appetite for risk and access to capital, at a distinct advantage over
prospective owner-occupants (H. Thomas, 2015). The risks posed by the “as-is” clause
are exacerbated by the limited disclosures about property conditions made to potential
buyers.
1.3 Federal Entities’ Dual Mandate
A central focus of this dissertation is a comparison of federal agencies and private enti-
ties in terms of how they handled their REO inventories and the implications of those prac-
tices for neighborhoods hit hard by the foreclosure process, specically, those counted
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among Detroit’s historically intact middle- and working-class neighborhoods. My cen-
tral purpose in making this comparison is to shed light on possible conicts between
federal housing agencies’ dual mandates to (1) secure their agency-level nancial safety
and soundness and (2) expand homeownership opportunities and stabilize neighborhoods.
Prior research has established, for instance, that large numbers of REOs were “dumped” as
the foreclosure crisis deepened in 2008, with many of those properties sold to bad actors
(Ford et al., 2013; Immergluck, 2012). But within this overall trend in REO dispositions,
were federal agencies then or since able to secure better outcomes for the properties they
held in their inventories, or did loss agency loss-mitigation concerns lead them also to
ooad large numbers of properties to bad actors? Federal agencies have adopted sev-
eral programs intended to help prospective owner-occupants, government entities, and
nonprots purchase homes compete in the market for REOs. Were these programs able
to help more homebuyers and socially motivated buyers purchase these properties? This
dissertation inquires into how dierences in mission and policies between federal agen-
cies and private entities shaped the post-foreclosure trajectory of REOs in homeowner
neighborhoods whose fortunes were dependent on the stewardship of mortgage-reverted
properties in a manner consistent with best practices for neighborhood stabilization.
1.4 Overview of Dissertation
In Chapter II I present the the context of the study, specically, post-war development
in the Detroit tri-county area and the impact of subprime lending and mortgage foreclo-
sure in the region. While Detroit lost large numbers of households and jobs to the suburbs
over the past 60 years, it retained a number of intact middle- and working-class neighbor-
hoods, but these were the hardest hit areas in the tri-county area. Chapter III discusses
the pressures faced by federal agencies and private lenders as foreclosures mounted af-
ter 2006, and it discusses potential for conict between federal entities’ dual mandates
of maintaining scal soundness and stabilizing neighborhoods. Chapter IV details how I
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constructed a REO database from real estate transaction records, including the location of
REO properties, the agencies or lenders responsible for them, the time they spent in REO,
and the parties to whom they were sold. Using these databases, Chapter V provides an
overview of federal and private ownership of REOs in the Detroit tri-county area. Chapter
VI discuss how many properties were sold to investors and owner-occupants, and exam-
ines dierences between federal and private entities over time and across space in terms
of their likelihood of selling properties to owner-occupants, an important neighborhood
stabilization objective. This chapter also examines the relationship between REOs pur-
chased by investors and negative neighborhood outcomes, including tax foreclosure and
blight violations. Chapter VII identies the largest buyers of REOs in Detroit, sheds light
on their business models, and discusses their how their practices may have harmed neigh-
borhoods in Detroit. Chapter VIII examines how long properties remained in REO, which
is important because REO durations are linked to property vacancy and blight. Chapter IX
examines the impact of current and former REOs on nearby home sale prices, and Chapter
X summarizes the key ndings and discusses the policy implications of this research.
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CHAPTER II
Post-War Development and the Mortgage Foreclosure
Crisis in Detroit and Its Suburbs
2.1 Post-War Divergence of Detroit and Its Suburbs
This dissertation focuses on the Detroit tri-county metropolitan area, which consists
of Macomb, Oakland, and Wayne counties. This region encompasses the City of Detroit
and its inner-ring and primary outer-ring suburbs. This region has experienced substan-
tial and spatially uneven changes in demographics and employment since World War II,
with the City of Detroit having lost more than 60% of its 1950 population by 2010, while
the tri-county area excluding Detroit grew by 170% during the same period (U.S. Bureau
of the Census, 1952, 2010). In 1950, the year Detroit reached its peak population, the city
boasted 1.85 million residents. Fueled by the growth of the auto industry, the regional im-
portance of the wartime economy, and the inux of large numbers of foreign immigrants
and African-Americans from the the U.S. South (Sugrue, 1996; Wilkerson, 2010), Detroit
exhibited astonishing growth in the decades preceding 1950, when it grew from fewer
than 500,000 residents in 1910 to nearly two million by mid-century (U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 1913). In the decades since World War II, however, Detroit lost a substantial share
of its population and jobs to the suburbs and Sunbelt. Suburbanization stemming from
white racist attitudes toward the increasing numbers of African-Americans in Detroit and
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federal policies privileging suburban development over inner-city investment drew large
numbers of households out of Detroit (Freund, 2010; Jackson, 1985; Sugrue, 1996). Postwar
job sprawl, regional industrial restructuring, and technological change eliminated large
numbers of manufacturing jobs in Detroit and led to further rounds of population loss and
the immiseration of many of Detroit’s remaining residents (Bluestone & Harrison, 1982;
Mouw, 2000; Sugrue, 1996). In 1970, roughly 11% of Detroit families were living under the
poverty level (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970). By 2000, the year of the last decennial
census prior to the onset of the mortgage foreclosure crisis, the poverty rate in Detroit had
risen to 26%. In contrast, the poverty rate in 2000 for the tri-county area excluding Detroit
was just 6.5% (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000). Median household income for Detroit in
1999 stood at $29,526, while the comparable gures for the two suburban counties to the
north of Detroit, Macomb and Oakland County, were $52,102 and $61,907, respectively
(U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000).
These changes in population, employment, and income caused a major overall drop
in demand for housing in Detroit. Between 1970 and 2000, Detroit lost roughly 30% of its
housing units (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970, 2000). Much of this destruction stemmed
from the relocation of residents to the suburbs (G. Galster, 2012). During the same period,
the number of housing units in the tri-county area excluding Detroit grew by 51% (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1970, 2000). As the rate of housing destruction lagged the loss of
population, Detroit also exhibited a particularly high housing vacancy rate, which stood
at 10% in 2000. The comparable gure for the tri-county area excluding Detroit was just
4% (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000). It is worth noting that the decreasing size of house-
holds after mid-century meant that housing demand was not falling as fast as population
loss alone might suggest. The number of households in Detroit remained stable between
1950 and 1970, moving down just 3%. By 2000, the number of households in Detroit had
dropped 34% from its 1960 peak (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1952, 1961, 2000). While
the magnitude of the loss of Detroit households was quite large, it remained smaller than
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the roughly 50% decline in population the city experienced between 1950 and 2000 (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1952, 2000).
Despite this post-war divergence of Detroit’s central city and its suburbs, Detroit re-
tained a number of neighborhoods where demand for housing remained stable, if not
strong, through the years preceding the mortgage foreclosure crisis. Figure 2.1 shows the
spatial distribution of household change in Detroit from 1970 to 2000. This map shows that
neighborhoods experiencing the greatest disinvestment were clustered around the central
business district, the Detroit River, and sections of the East Side. Other neighborhoods,
particularly those on the West Side and on the periphery of the East Side, experienced far
less disinvestment. Among Detroit census tracts that possessed at least 100 single-family
detached housing units in 1970, 27% experienced a decline of no more than 5% of house-
holds and 15% experienced no change or positive growth (GeoLytics, Inc., 2003). These
strong neighborhoods are generally characterized by a higher-quality housing stock, with
far more of it built from brick and stone than housing in more depopulated places, where
the majority of the stock was built with light wood framing to quickly accommodate the
growing workforce at mid-century (McCulloch, 2015). Many of these stronger neighbor-
hoods retained residents deeply attached to their homes, neighborhoods, and the spatially
embedded social networks to which they belonged. Residents of these neighborhoods
often organized to preserve environmental conditions and quality-of-life in the face of
public service reductions.1 As a result, many of these strong neighborhoods possessed
housing vacancy rates prior to the mortgage foreclosure crisis similar to those observed
in Detroit’s suburbs, as evidenced in Figure 2.2. Fully one-quarter of predominantly resi-
dential census tracts possessed a vacancy rate of between 0 and 6% (GeoLytics, Inc., 2003).
In order to distinguish between Detroit’s strong neighborhoods and others, I employed a
technique for using census data to group similar area based on their values on selected
1It should be noted that Detroit residents’ organizing to “protect” their neighborhoods was sometimes
motivated by a concern for preserving white racial composition during a post-war period of increasing
racial transition (J. M. Thomas, 2013).
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indicators of housing market strength between 1990 and 2000 (see Section 4.5). See Ta-
ble 2.1 for the median and range of values for key housing market indicators in Detroit’s
strong neighborhoods and its suburbs.
2.2 Subprime Lending and Mortgage Foreclosures in the Detroit
Tri-County Area
Despite the often hard-won maintenance and improvement of many central city neigh-
borhoods in the post-war period, the emergence and expansion of subprime lending in the
1990s and subprime sellers’ penetration of central city housing markets came to threaten
these neighborhoods’ continued existence as stable enclaves for middle- and working-
class homeowners (Crump et al., 2008; Immergluck, 2011). Subprime loans are distin-
guished from conventional loans by a risk-based premium charged by lenders to borrow-
ers unable to qualify for conventional loans. The higher cost of subprime loans, however,
makes them more dicult for many borrowers to repay, leading to higher rates of fore-
closure. Subprime home loans remained a relatively obscure nancial instrument until
the 1990s, when changes in the regulation and structure of housing nance led to a boom
in subprime lending. The rise of private-label mortgage securitization, wherein home
loans originated by lenders were acquired in bulk by Wall Street rms, packaged into
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), and sold to outside investors, along with the rise of
private mortgage companies immune from the regulatory oversight paid to depository
institutions, were particularly inuential in creating the vast market for subprime loans
(Ashton, 2010). Investors and Wall Street nancial institutions, hungry for the high yields
of subprime loans and possessed of a false sense of security promoted by compromised
ratings agencies, generated high levels of demand for the product. To meet this demand,
mortgage brokers, who were also paid a premium for starting high-cost loans, steered
borrowers eligible for conventional loans into subprime loans and originated subprime
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loans for borrowers clearly lacking the ability to repay them (Immergluck, 2011).
In places like Detroit, the majority of subprime loans were issued to renance prior
mortgages. As home prices rose in the 1990s, mortgage brokers took advantage of cen-
tral city homeowners, many of whom possessed more equity in their home than they
possessed in other forms of personal wealth. Borrowers seeking to renance to pay for
home improvements, medical costs, or other personal expenses were steered into high
cost loans. When home values stopped rising, many borrowers could not renance their
way out of high-cost loans and, of those borrowers, many could not make their loan pay-
ments after interest-rate resets and balloon payments came due (Immergluck, 2011). As
home prices began to fall in the mid-to-late-2000s, many borrowers were pushed under-
water, meaning their outstanding loan balance exceeded the market value of their prop-
erty, leading to large numbers of defaults (Woolsey, 2008). In other cases, loss of work or
other unanticipated nancial diculties on top of onerous loan terms made it impossible
for borrowers to make their mortgage payments (Collins, 2003). Between 2004 and 2006
alone, the three years when subprime lending exceeded 20% of the national mortgage
market (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011), 13% of Detroit’s housing units were
linked to a subprime mortgage origination, either for home purchase or renance. The
comparable gure for the tri-county area excluding Detroit (and Hamtramck and High-
land Park, the two cities contained within Detroit) was just 8% (U.S. Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, 2004, 2005, 2006; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000).2
The spatial distribution of subprime lending in Detroit, however, was concentrated
among the city’s stable residential areas where homeowners had been able to build eq-
uity (see Figure 2.3). Nearly 20% of housing units in these areas (18.6%) were linked to
subprime home loan starts during this period, with roughly half of them being linked
to subprime renancing (see Table 2.1) (U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
2I identied originated loans as subprime where the lender was required to report the spread, which
they must do when the dierence between the annual percentage rate (APR) on the loan and the Treasury
yield is at least 3% for rst-lien loans or at least 5% for subordinate-lien loans (Pettit & Droesch, 2008).
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System, 2004, 2005, 2006; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000). In addition to this large dif-
ference in the rate of subprime lending between Detroit’s strong neighborhoods and its
suburbs, there was also a smaller dierence between Detroit’s inner- and outer-ring sub-
urbs (the denition of these areas is found in Section 4.5). Between 2004 and 2006, 10% of
housing units in inner-ring suburbs were linked to subprime loans, while the comparable
gure for outer-ring suburbs was slightly lower at 7%. Subprime lending, therefore, cre-
ated an uneven regional geography of risk for foreclosure and neighborhood decline, one
echoing the spatial patterning of historical nancial injustices, particularly the refusal of
lending institutions to lend in inner-city and minority-occupied neighborhoods (“redlin-
ing”) (Ashton, 2010; Crump et al., 2008). While the exact neighborhoods that were aected
within Detroit during the subprime crisis were dierent than those subject to redlining at
mid-century—these were clustered in the inner-city—subprime lending victimized many
of the same kinds of people.
The number of mortgage foreclosures, many stemming from subprime loans, exploded
in Detroit in the mid- to late-2000s. Between 2005 and 2013, the number of completed
mortgage foreclosures in Detroit exceeded 70,000 (CoreLogic, 2010; Wayne County Reg-
ister of Deeds, 2014).3 Mortgage foreclosures during this period occurred on more than
65,000 distinct residential properties in Detroit, or roughly 26% of the city’s housing stock
(CoreLogic, 2010; Data Driven Detroit, 2010; Wayne County Register of Deeds, 2014).
The number of mortgage foreclosures completed annually grew steeply from 2005 to 2007,
climbing from 6,660 to 15,192—a 128% increase (see Figure 2.4). The rising number of mort-
gage foreclosures in Detroit propelled the entire metropolitan area to the top of the list of
regional foreclosure rates in 2007, when the metro-level foreclosure rate was roughly ve
times the national average (Rooney, 2008). This sharp rise in foreclosures during these
3Determining the precise number of completed foreclosures in Detroit and other jurisdictions is compli-
cated by a number of factors. This topic is discussed in detail in Chapter IV, where I discuss my data sources
and how I used them to identify foreclosures and REO properties. Estimates of completed foreclosures in
this dissertation exclude alternatives to foreclosure sometimes available to delinquent borrowers, including
short sales and deeds-in-lieu-of-foreclosure.
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years is due in large part to the combination of interest rates resetting on subprime loans
and the softening of home prices after the lengthy buildup of the national housing bubble.
The number of mortgage foreclosures in Detroit fell from its 2007 peak value by roughly
25% by 2008 and 60% by 2009, after which the number of mortgage foreclosures completed
annually gradually declined to just below 3,000 in 2013. In 2007, there were 60 mortgage
foreclosures per 1,000 residential structures. By 2013, the gure had fallen to 12 mortgage
foreclosures per 1,000 structures.
Foreclosure rates were highest in Detroit’s historically strongest neighborhoods.4 The
median foreclosure rate—the number of distinct residential properties linked to a com-
pleted mortgage foreclosure between 2005 and 2013—among census tracts in Detroit’s
strong neighborhoods was 32% while the median among all other tracts was just 20%. The
high foreclosure rates in Detroit’s historically intact middle- and working-class neighbor-
hoods are linked to the large volume of subprime lending they attracted relative to other
Detroit neighborhoods, which possessed lower home values and fewer owner-occupied
properties.
Mortgage foreclosures hit Detroit’s inner- and outer-ring suburbs in the tri-county
area at a much lower rate than they hit the city itself. Using the number of properties
entering REO inventory in each of these areas between 2005 and 2013 as a proxy for com-
pleted foreclosures, 26% of housing units in Detroit’s strong neighborhoods were subject
to foreclosure, while the comparable gures for inner- and outer-ring suburbs are just
13% and 8%, respectively (RealtyTrac, 2015b; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000).5 Much
of this dierence is due to the fact that Detroit’s suburbs did not experience the same
4The methodology for identifying Detroit’s strong neighborhoods, which are elsewhere referred to as
the city’s middle- and working-class neighborhoods, is presented in Section 4.4.
5I sometimes use dierent datasets to describe foreclosure and REO trends in Detroit alone than I use
to compare Detroit to its suburbs. I do this because I possess slightly more accurate data for Detroit alone.
As the focus of this dissertation is on REO properties, I expended more eort in identifying REO properties
at the regional level than completed foreclosures alone. Using REOs as a proxy for foreclosures somewhat
underestimates the true number of completed mortgage foreclosures, as a small share sell at the foreclosure
auction. Using housing units as a denominator also underestimates the foreclosure rate, as not all housing
units are mortgageable properties. For example, the many units in a multifamily structure constitute just a
single mortgageable property.
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surge in completed mortgage foreclosures between 2006 and 2008 (see Figure 2.5). Fewer
subprime loans were originated in the suburbs relative to the total number of housing
units, meaning fewer suburban properties were subject to onerous interest rate resets in
the mid-2000s.
The regional spatial distribution of REOs is shown in Figure 2.6. This map shows the
number of REO starts, at the tract level, between 2005 and 2013 divided by the number
of mortgageable properties. Within the city of Detroit, strong neighborhoods exhibit the
highest mortgage-reversion rates, as noted above. Inner-ring suburban tracts immedi-
ately adjacent to Detroit have similarly high mortgage-reversion rates. Within Macomb
County, REO starts are concentrated along the I-94 corridor, continuing into the outer-
ring suburbs and intensifying at the county’s eastern boundary at New Haven. Within
outer-ring suburban Oakland County, tracts located in the city of Pontiac exhibit the high-
est mortgage-reversion rates. Like Detroit, Pontiac is an older industrial city with a far
higher percentage of low-income and minority residents than its more auent neighbors,
making it a greater target for subprime lending, although many of that city’s foreclosures
stemmed from landlord and and investor walkways (Oosting, 2009).
2.3 Changes in Regional Home Sale Prices
Between 2000 and 2015, the period covering the steepest ination of the housing bub-
ble, its collapse, and the initial recovery period, Detroit and its suburbs experienced enor-
mous changes in home values and a highly uneven recovery. Figure 2.7 shows changes in
median home sale prices for Detroit’s strong neighborhoods and its inner- and outer-ring
suburbs during this period. Each of these three areas exhibited a steep climb in sale prices
between 2000 and 2005; home prices rose by 129% in Detroit’s strong neighborhoods, 125%
in Detroit’s inner-ring suburbs, and 105% in Detroit’s outer-ring suburbs. This precipitous
increase in home prices reected national trends, which saw prices climb and peak by mid-
2006 (Bajaj, 2007). Starting in 2006, home prices in the Detroit region fell steeply, although
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the rate of decline was far sharper in Detroit than its suburbs. In 2009, when home values
reached their lowest both nationally and in the Detroit region, the median price in De-
troit’s strong neighborhoods had fallen 85% from its 2005 peak to just $12,000, closer for
many to the price of a used car than a single-family home. Home prices fell somewhat less
steeply in Detroit’s inner-ring suburbs, where prices dropped 63% from their 2005 value to
roughly $50,000. Home prices fell the least in Detroit’s outer-ring suburbs, moving down
35% from their 2005 values to $125,000. Just as home values fell the steepest in the city
of Detroit, so too was the home price recovery there the weakest. While home prices in
Detroit’s strong neighborhoods climbed by nearly 110% between 2009 and 2013, they and
outer-ring suburbs were 47% and 100% above their 2000 values, respectively (prices not
adjusted for ination).
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Figure 2.3: Ratio of Subprime Loans 2004–2006 to Mortgagable Properties. Note: “mort-
gageable properties” is the sum of housing units eligible for home mortgages. See Schuetz,
Been, and Ellen (2008) for methodology. Sources: U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 2004, 2005, 2006; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000.
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Figure 2.4: Completed Mortgage Foreclosures, Detroit 2005–2013. Sources: CoreLogic
(2010), Data Driven Detroit (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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Figure 2.5: REO Starts in Detroit’s Strong Neighborhoods and Inner- and Outer-Ring Sub-
urbs, 2005–2013. Sources: RealtyTrac (2015b), U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000).
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Figure 2.6: Ratio of REO starts 2005–2013 to Mortgagable Properties. Note: “mortgageable
properties” is the sum of housing units eligible for home mortgages. See Schuetz, Been,
and Ellen (2008) for methodology. Sources: (RealtyTrac, 2015b; U.S. Bureau of the Census,
2000).
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Figure 2.7: Median Home Sale Prices in Detroit Tri-County Area, 2000–2015. Source:
(RealtyTrac, 2015b).
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Table 2.1: Housing Market Indicators, Subprime Loans, and REO Starts in Detroit Tri-
County Area
Indicator Inner Suburbs Outer Suburbs Detroit’s StrongNeighborhoods
Median Household Income 1999
Min $19,713.00 $23,106.00 $25,051.00
Med $48,070.00 $65,391.50 $38,810.00
Max $123,610.00 $170,790.00 $110,745.00
Median Home Value 2000
Min $40,000.00 $15,800.00 $43,700.00
Med $116,800.00 $172,900.00 $74,000.00
Max $601,800.00 $856,500.00 $311,700.00
Housing Occupancy Rate 2000
Min 75.53% 79.90% 87.18%
Med 97.39% 96.37% 95.30%
Max 99.70% 99.54% 98.83%
Owner-Occupancy Rate 2000
Min 1.16% 7.43% 48.92%
Med 82.76% 85.50% 73.11%
Max 99.23% 99.68% 96.70%
Poverty Rate 2000
Min 0.17% 0.00% 3.36%
Med 5.31% 3.62% 14.75%
Max 40.14% 33.65% 33.29%
Ratio of Subprime Loans 2004–2006
to Housing Units 2000
Min 0.27% 0.27% 10.47%
Med 9.18% 6.07% 19.20%
Max 29.56% 27.09% 28.74%
Ratio of REO Starts 2005–2013
to Housing Units 2000
Min 0.58% 0.24% 12.62%
Med 12.66% 8.02% 25.87%
Max 32.77% 43.85% 42.21%
Note: Calculations are for census tracts located within each of the three areas and include
only tracts having more than 100 mortgageable properties (Ellen, Madar, & Weselcouch,
2014). Sources: RealtyTrac (2015b), U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem (2004, 2005, 2006), U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000).
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CHAPTER III
Federal Financial Institutions’ Policies and Practices
for Handling REOs
In the wake of the U.S. mortgage foreclosure crisis and the ensuing economic reces-
sion, private and federal entities together acquired and disposed of millions of REOs na-
tionwide. While national attention has often focused on the impact of the foreclosure
crisis on Sunbelt states like California and Florida (Florida, 2011), REOs were also highly
concentrated in older industrial cities, particularly in the Midwest. According to one
source, the Detroit and Flint metropolitan areas were both included among the top 10
MSAs in terms of the number of REOs relative to housing units in 2008 (Immergluck,
2010b). Comparisons of central city areas alone would likely place more Rustbelt cities
into the top rankings of places with high concentrations of REOs. In this chapter I discuss
REO owners’ policies and practices for handling their inventories. In particular, I focus
on federal entities’ approaches for managing their REO inventories, both nationally and
in distressed market areas.
3.1 HowFederal Entities TakePossession ofMortgage Foreclosures
Properties enter REO status at the end of the foreclosure process. Though laws gov-
erning mortgage foreclosure dier among states, the process follows a similar progres-
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sion that starts with a foreclosure ling and ends with a foreclosure sale. The foreclosure
process begins when a mortgage-holder issues a foreclosure notice to a borrower after
missing a specied number of payments. After a given number of days pass without pay-
ment, a mortgage-holder is likely to le for foreclosure. If a borrower is unable to sell her
home or seek other alternatives to foreclosure, the mortgage-holder oers the property
at a public auction. The highest auction bidder acquires the property, provided the bid
exceeds the reserve price set by the mortgage-holder, usually the unpaid balance on the
mortgage plus interest and fees. If a bidder fails to make an oer above the reserve price,
the property reverts back to the mortgage-holder. At this point properties are classied as
REO. In most cases, properties fail to sell at auction, particularly when and where foreclo-
sure rates are high and property values have fallen, meaning most foreclosures in these
markets translate into growing REO inventories (Immergluck, 2010b). When a mortgage
is held in a bank’s portfolio, that bank acquires title to the foreclosed property and re-
tains sole interest and responsibility. When a loan was pooled and incorporated into a
mortgage-backed security, however, benecial interest belongs to the investors owning
shares in the security. The vast majority of subprime loans originated from the late 1990s
through the mid-2000s were securitized along with a sizable share of conventional loans.
In these cases, banks hold title to foreclosures in name alone, and play the role of either
servicer or trustee. Servicers are tasked with collecting payments when mortgages are still
performing and maintaining and selling REOs after foreclosure. Servicers pass payments
and proceeds on to trustees, who in turn make payments to the owners with benecial
interest (Immergluck, 2011).
Federal institutions dier in the specics of how they acquire REO inventory. Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac take ownership of foreclosed properties due to their activity on the
secondary mortgage market. These two institutions purchase home loans from lenders,
bundle many of these loans into mortgage-backed securities, and sell them to investors
to generate money for further investment in home loans. The GSEs primarily purchased
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conventional, i.e., prime loans, but during the peak years of the housing bubble they began
to purchase riskier loans to increase their market share in the face of increasing competi-
tion from private securitization rms (Immergluck, 2011; J. Thomas & Von Order, 2010).
The GSEs retain the credit risk associated with both the mortgages they hold in their own
investment portfolios, as well those sold to MBS paying an additional fee guaranteeing the
security of their investment. Working through their mortgage servicers, the GSEs may
attempt to resolve delinquencies with means other than foreclosure, but when foreclosure
is pursued the GSEs take possession of properties that fail to sell at auction. HUD takes
possession of REOs when lenders foreclose on homes purchased with Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) insurance. After a lender forecloses on a property purchased with
FHA insurance, the lender deeds the property to HUD in exchange for an insurance claim
payment. The U.S. Department of Veterans Aairs (VA) repossesses properties purchased
with VA-provided insurance, but the VA takes possession at the time of the foreclosure
auction like the GSEs (U.S. Government Accountability Oce, 2013).
3.2 Federal Systems for Managing and Disposing of REOs
Though they dier in the particulars, institutions responsible for REOs move prop-
erties in their inventory through broadly similar disposition processes. Upon entering
REO inventory, institutions owning REOs or the servicers acting on their behalf gener-
ally try to sell or otherwise dispose of these properties. Some institutions handle these
tasks internally, while others contract with third-party asset management companies to
handle sales. These asset management companies, in turn, often work with local bro-
kers to sell properties through conventional retail channels. The institutions who own or
are otherwise responsible for REOs generally seek to sell their properties for the largest
possible return in the shortest possible time. In addition to this objective of maximizing
returns, federal entities and some servicers sometimes dispose of properties so as to pro-
mote owner-occupancy and neighborhood stabilization, sometimes selling properties as
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discounts to homebuyers and nonprots. In this section, I summarize federal and private
entities’ systems for managing and disposing of REOs and how they relate to the twin
goals of maximizing returns and helping homeowners and neighborhoods.
3.2.1 How HUD Acquires and Sells REO Properties
When a servicer forecloses on a FHA-insured property that is not sold to a third-party,
e.g., via short-sale or Sheri’s auction, the property remains the responsibility of the ser-
vicer until such time as they possess marketable title, that is, not until the expiration of
the redemption period (six months in Michigan) and the eviction of tenants after the expi-
ration of the redemption period, if necessary. Servicers only then may le claims with the
FHA, which then inspects the property and veries inspector compliance before taking
title. HUD requires servicers to convey properties in “Acceptable Conveyance Condition,”
which, in short, means properties must be vacant, secured, winterized, and cleared of de-
bris (“Conveyance of Occupied Property, 24 CFR 203.670,” 1996). Properties may be con-
veyed in damaged condition only where the damage resulted from “mortgagor neglect”
and the damage was discovered and documented at the time the servicer took control of
the property. Properties damaged while under the control of the servicer require HUD
approval prior to conveyance. In general, this approval is granted when the estimate of
the cost to repair the damages is equal to or less than $2,500. When damages are not
documented during the servicer’s initial post-foreclosure inspection and those damages
exceed the $2,500 threshold, HUD may re-convey the property to the servicer and require
them to make necessary repairs prior to acceptance (U.S. Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development, 2010b). A 2002 audit of HUD’s infrastructure for handling foreclosures
stated that HUD reported few reconveyances (U.S. Government Accountability Oce,
2002), however an interview with a representative of a Cleveland-based community de-
velopment corporation (CDC) indicated that reconveyances due to unacceptable property
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conditions greatly increased in number in the wake of the foreclosure crisis.1
Since 1999, HUD has outsourced the maintenance and disposition of REO properties.
Prior to 2010, HUD contractors were responsible for both maintenance and disposition
activities. Under new contracting procedures adopted in 2010, separate contractors were
hired to perform each of these two functions. HUD, through its four regional homeown-
ership centers, hires several entities to perform these functions in areas covering several
states. Most germane to the present study, however, are the timelines HUD lays out for
selling REO properties. When a HUD-owned property is rst placed on the real estate
market, priority is given to buyers using the home as a primary residence, government
entities, and HUD-approved nonprots. This period is referred to as the “exclusive listing
period,” the length of which varies principally based on the condition of the property. If
the property is insurable by FHA, which, in short, means the property does not require
substantial repairs, the exclusive listing period is 30 days (but now only 15 days as of 2013,
see (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2013)). For properties uninsur-
bale by FHA standards, the exclusive listing period is just ve days. After the exclusive
listing period, unsold properties enter the “extended listing period,” during which time
investors and buyers of second homes may purchase properties. The duration of the ex-
tended listing period is 180 days, after which unsold properties that have an as-is listing
value of more than $25,000 continue to be marketed in an open-ended extended listing
period (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2015b). After 180 days, un-
sold properties valued at or below $25,000 are oered to local government agencies for $1
as part of the Dollar Homes program. The Dollar Homes program has a window of just
10 days, after which unsold properties also enter an open-ended extended listing period.
HUD also has a seven day “lottery” period prior to the other listing periods for insurbale
properties in Revitalization Areas (more on this below) and all uninsurable properties.
1I approached a number of individuals at HUD and the GSEs, their contractors, and nonprots in Detroit
and Cleveland that have purchased REOs from federal entities. Few were willing to speak with me about the
topic of my research, though a few, primarily from the nonprot sector, were willing to discuss the matter.
I have kept their names and organizations condential.
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The lottery period is open only to HUD-approved nonprots, government entities, or
buyers eligible for the Good Neighbor Next Door (GNND) program, which allows teach-
ers, reghters, emergency medical technicians, and police ocers to bid at 50% of the
listing price. Starting in late 2009, HUD, along with the GSEs and a small number of large
lender/servicers, agreed to participate in the First Look program, which was conceived
by and operated National Community Stabilization Trust (NCST). The First Look pro-
gram, for HUD, adds an additional 10% discount for homes purchased by Neighborhood
Stabilization Program (NSP) participants.
HUD also has geographically targeted sales programs known as Revitalization Area
sales programs. Revitalization Areas are dened at the census block group level, and they
“must be in neighborhoods with very low income, low homeownership or a dispropor-
tionately high concentration of delinquent or foreclosed properties” (U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 2011). Additionally, revitalization areas must be those
where the average sales price of HUD-owned REOs is less than or equal to $200,000. A
large number of census block groups in Detroit, as in Cleveland, Chicago, and other hard-
hit municipalities are included among HUD’s Revitalization Areas. Revitalization Area
sale programs include not only the GNND, but also the Asset Control Area (ACA) pro-
gram, launched in 1998, which allows state, county, and local governments, as well as
eligible nonprots to enter into a two-year agreement with HUD making all HUD-owned
REOs exclusively available to local ACA participants. Homes with an appraised value
of $25,000 or less may be purchased for $100 and all other properties are discounted by
a minimum of 50% o the appraised value for the purpose of resale to income eligible
households. The ACA program was used in the late 1990s and early 2000s in Chicago,
Cleveland, Los Angeles and other cities. Since the early 2000s, the ACA program has only
been used a few times, a fact attributed to the lenders’ tightening credit standards and
HUD’s rigid pricing structure for the price at which properties must be sold to homebuy-
ers (almada_nonprots_2001; Seidman, Jakabovics, et al., 2009).
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In summary, HUD has a number of programs and incentives for selling foreclosed
FHA-insured properties to owner-occupants, nonprots, and local governments. These
programs are intended to further HUD’s mission to expand homeownership opportu-
nities, particularly for low-income households, and preserve neighborhoods by keeping
properties out of the hands of speculators. Prior audits of HUD’s disposition processes,
however, have identied several obstacles to maximizing the number of foreclosed prop-
erties sold to owner-occupants. One of the most critical obstacles identied in these audits
is the condition in which HUD sells its properties. HUD typically makes just the minimum
number of repairs required to meet basic health and safety standards. This reduces the
number of FHA-insurable properties, making it dicult, if not impossible, for prospec-
tive homeowners to obtain nancing for them. Properties in need of extensive repairs
are therefore most likely to be acquired by investors via cash sales, potentially remaining
unsold for long stretches of time (U.S. Government Accountability Oce, 2013).
3.2.2 How the GSEs Acquire and Sell REO Properties
Unlike HUD, the GSEs take title of properties that go unsold at foreclosure auctions
within 24 hours (U.S. Government Accountability Oce, 2013). The GSEs manage and
sell REO properties through a combination of internal channels and contractor networks.
Prior to listing properties, the GSEs repair a substantially larger share of properties than
HUD, at least when viewed at the level of holdings nationwide. According to one audit,
the GSEs repair between 23 and 29% of the REOs they sell, as compared to just 5% for HUD.
To support their goals of expanding homeownership, the GSEs oer several programs in-
tended to help homeowners purchase GSE-owned properties, though they are fewer in
number than those oered by HUD. Like HUD, the GSEs have participated in the national
First Look period since late 2009 (News, 2009). First Look provides an exclusive listing pe-
riod of 15 days for owner-occupants, local governments, and NSP grantees. The GSEs also
oer exible nancing for REO buyers. Fannie Mae’s HomePath program allows buyers
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to put down as little as 3% and does not require mortgage insurance. Additionally, Fannie
Mae oers loan products that include the cost of repairs. Freddie Mac has a nancing pro-
gram which allows borrowers to put up to 3.5% of the purchase price toward closing costs
and other expenses. Unlike HUD, both GSEs have explicit bulks sale programs for simulta-
neously disposing of large numbers of REOs to investors at substantial discounts (Fannie
Mae, 2016). Like HUD, however, the GSEs sell properties in as-is condition, which can
create diculties in nding nancing in addition to creating a disincentive for less risk-
averse homebuyers. In limited cases, Fannie Mae has also worked with local land banks to
dispose of distressed, low-value properties. Fannie Mae has worked intermittently with
the Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Authority (CCLRC) since 2009, selling homes
to the land bank for as little as $1 and contributing $3,500 toward demolition (Fujii, 2015;
Livingston, 2009). Fannie Mae oered to sell some of its properties to Detroit at a discount
during the Bing Administration (2009–2013), but city ocials turned down the oer be-
cause the $3,500 per property oered by Fannie Mae was too low to cover the costs of
demolition (MacDonald & Kurth, 2015). In 2015, however, Fannie Mae entered into an
agreement with the Detroit Land Bank Authority (DLBA) for the discounted sale of 44
homes (Gallagher, 2014).
3.2.3 How Lenders Sell REO Properties
While lenders and servicers are not charged with the same public purpose objectives
assigned to HUD and the GSEs, several national private entities participate in the First
Look program, including Bank of America, Chase, Citi, Deutsche Bank, GMAC, Nation-
star Mortgage, Ocwen Financial Corporation, Saxon Mortgage Services, U.S. Bank, and
Wells Fargo. According to press releases for the program, the combined federal and pri-
vate participation represented roughly 75% of the national REO marketplace in 2010 (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2010a). A small number of lenders
and servicers have additional programs for donating or discounting REOs to nonprof-
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its, though these programs were not launched until well after 2010. For instance, Wells
Fargo, one of the nation’s largest servicers and perhaps the most visibly active among ser-
vicers in participating in community development initiatives, launched its Community &
Neighborhood Stabilization Program sometime around 2014 (Franks, 2016).
Many private entities, like the GSEs, have also oered investors the option of bulk
purchases, though they dier in the particulars of how these transactions are executed.
According to one mortgage servicing trade publication,
Banks have dierent philosophies for dealing with bulk REO. . . Some sellers
only want to do end-of-the-year cleanouts and take writedowns. Others oper-
ate by doing big bulk sales at the end of every quarter. It changes from bank to
bank. Some have even chosen not to do it anymore have have discontinued
bulk sales [sic] (“Bulk REO Properties Sold through Bidding Transactions,”
2009).
Despite these dierences among lenders and servicers in the particulars of how they dis-
pose of properties, the logic driving their actions suggests bulk sales and other so-called
“alternative disposition strategies” were likely widespread in Detroit, including auctions,
particularly during the peak of the foreclosure crisis. For example, in 2007, several large
lenders hired Texas-based auctioneers to sell a pool of 450 properties properties, accepting
bids started at just $1 (Dymi, 2007).
3.3 The Growth of Federal REO Inventories
The growth of private and federal REO inventories, both nationally and in specic
housing markets, created substantial pressure for REO owners to dispose of inventory.
According to RealtyTrac, the number of foreclosure lings nationally rose from roughly
700,000 in 2006 to more 2.8 million in 2010, an increase of 300% (RealtyTrac, 2015a). Be-
tween 2006 and 2010 alone, more than 10 million foreclosure lings had been recorded.
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Although not every foreclosure ling led to a property being foreclosed or repossessed by
a private or federal entity, the number of properties entering REO was doubtless substan-
tial. In the early years of the foreclosure crisis, most foreclosures were linked to subprime
loans held by investors in private-label residential MBS, i.e., those that were not secured
by the GSEs. For that reason, REO inventories swelled for private REO owners between
2006 and 2008. While the number of properties entering private REO inventories at a
given point in time are not publicly available, sources estimate the standing REO inven-
tory linked to loans backing these private-label RMBS peaked in 2008 at more than 400,000
(McBride, 2010b, 2012). The numbers for properties entering and leaving each year were
much higher. As privately held REO inventories fell from their 2008 peak values, federal
inventories began to grow. As Figure 3.1 shows, the number of properties entering federal
inventories soared between 2008 and 2010. While REO starts for federal entities declined
between 2010 and 2014, they remained elevated relative to the pre-crisis period. Between
2008 and 2014, the GSEs and HUD acquired a combined 1,733,944 properties nationwide.
Fannie Mae handled the largest number of REOs of the federal entities by far, taking in
exactly 50% of the 1.73 million federal REOs acquired during this period. Freddie Mac
and HUD roughly split the other half of these federal REO starts (Fannie Mae, 2003, 2005,
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2014, 2015; Freddie Mac, 2005, 2006, 2007,
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Federal Housing Administration. Oce of Risk Analysis and Regulatory
Aairs, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014).
3.4 Pressures on the GSEs and HUD to Dispose of REOs
The two central GSEs involved in housing nance, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were
created by the federal government for the purpose of increasing liquidity and stability
in the U.S. residential mortgage market and, and a result, promoting borrowers’ access
to aordable mortgage credit. Fannie Mae was rst chartered as a private company by
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the Roosevelt administration in 1938 for the purpose of purchasing FHA-insured mort-
gages (FHA insurance was introduced four years before), which provided more money
for lenders to make additional such loans. In 1968, the government assigned Fannie Mae
the status of a GSE, i.e., a private corporation subject to federal oversight and regulation,
and altered Fannie Mae’s charter to allow it to purchase mortgages other than those in-
sured by the FHA or VA. This status signaled to investors that Fannie Mae (as well as
other GSEs, including Freddie Mac) had the full backing of the federal government. In
1970, the federal government established the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation,
now known as Freddie Mac. Freddie Mac was rst chartered for the purpose of purchasing
conventional loans issued by thrifts (as opposed to commercial banks), but was assigned
GSE status in 1989.
Fannie Mae played a supporting role in housing nance for the rst few decades of its
existence, but, after a number of regulatory changes and innovations in housing nance
occurring in the 1980s and 1990s, it, along with Freddie Mac, came to play a dominant role
in the mortgage market. The growing role of these institutions is due not only to their
privileged status, but also to growth of their issuance of MBS, created by bundling large
numbers of individual loans (Carliner, 1998; Immergluck, 2011; Schwartz, 2014). Lead-
ership of these entities in the 1990s and 2000s, particularly at Fannie Mae, also encour-
aged taking advantage of the GSEs’ privileged status to aggressively grow their portfolios,
greatly increasing their leverage as a result (Acharya, Richardson, Van Nieuwerburgh, &
White, 2011; Morgenson & Rosner, 2011). By 2000, the GSEs controlled fully 40% of home
mortgage debt (Frame, Fuster, Tracy, & Vickery, 2015). In the face of increased competi-
tion from companies issuing private-label MBS in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the GSEs
acquired riskier loans to maintain market share (Frame et al., 2015; J. Thomas & Von Or-
der, 2010). As the housing crisis intensied between 2006 and 2008, the two GSEs became
increasingly nancially distressed due to their high exposure and leverage.
In order to prevent the curtailment of the GSEs’ activity in the mortgage market and a
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spike in mortgage rates as a result, the federal government nationalized Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac in 2008 and committed up to $200 billion for investments in each company.
In total, the government ended up investing $189 billion in the two GSEs, with $117 billion
invested in Fannie Mae and $72 billion invested in Freddie Mac (Frame et al., 2015; Federal
Housing Finance Agency, n.d.). The GSEs were perceived at the time of their national-
ization to be no longer capable of raising debt—and, therefore, no longer able to purchase
loans on the secondary mortgage market—without the intervention of the federal govern-
ment. Under the terms of the bailout plan for the GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were
both placed under the conservatorship of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA),
which was vested with the powers of the management, boards, and shareholders of the
GSEs (Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2011). The central objective of the conservator-
ships was to return the GSEs to nancial health. In 2009, one year after the start of the
conservatorships, FHFA Director Lockhart (2009) remarked, “FHFA’s duties as conserva-
tor mean just that, conserving the Enterprises’ assets. This is our top goal.” In the rst
years of the conservatorships, the FHFA had the GSEs tighten underwriting in order to
limit taxpayers’ risk exposure on new loans. The FHFA also took steps to minimize losses
from mortgages already on their books, including the use of mortgage modications and
other foreclosure alternatives (Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2011).
The FHFA’s narrow focus on nancial soundness, however, has come into conict with
broader housing policy objectives. A frequently cited example of this conict is the FHFA’s
long-standing refusal to oer principal reduction to troubled borrowers with negative eq-
uity, i.e., those owing more on their mortgage than the market value of their homes (Frame
et al., 2015; Weise, 2010). Borrowers with negative equity have a high probability of de-
faulting, leading to additional foreclosures and default losses, as well as negative spillovers
in neighborhoods with concentrated foreclosures (Foote, Gerardi, & Willen, 2008; Frame,
2010). Based on the soundness of arguments that principal reductions would be more
eective than modications involving only reduced interest rates (Haughwout, Okah, &
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Tracy, 2016), the Treasury expanded the Home Aordable Modication Program (HAMP)
program (launched in 2008) in 2010 to oer principal reductions. Although several large
banks began making principal reductions after the launch of the new program, the FHFA
decided against participating due to its concern for moral hazard (Zandl, 2012). Speci-
cally, the FHFA feared borrowers would strategically default in order to trigger principal
reductions, thereby avoiding full payment of their mortgages. Some critics have framed
the FHFA’s decision as stemming from a conict between the agency’s short- and long-
term objectives. While prohibiting principal reduction prevented the FHFA from realizing
short-term losses on their balance sheets, this action runs counter to the agency’s objec-
tive of bringing stability to the national housing market (Weise, 2010). By the fourth quar-
ter of 2009, more than 11 million borrowers had negative equity, equivalent to roughly
one-quarter of existing borrowers, with the GSEs together owning more of those loans
than either investors or banks (McBride, 2010a). This represents a major missed oppor-
tunity for the federal government, through the GSEs, to have helped troubled borrowers
and neighborhoods. While the FHFA has recently reversed its position and begun to oer
principal reductions, the window of opportunity for the FHFA to have helped distressed
borrowers has passed (Goodman, Parrott, & Zhu, 2015).
The FHFA’s focus on short-term enterprise-level nancial improvements has also in-
uenced their stewardship of the GSEs in the area of REO management and disposition.
REO properties are a clear credit risk to these entities due to the high operational costs
associated with these properties. Table 3.1 shows the annual operating expenses for the
single-family REO inventory, which ballooned along with the number of new REOs be-
tween 2007 and 2010. Between those two years, operating expenses, which include the
costs of maintenance and repairs, increased 290% from $649 million to more than $2.5 bil-
lion. Between 2007 and 2011, the GSEs spent more than $8.5 billion handling single-family
REOs. The FHFA and the GSEs also faced the threat posed by the “shadow inventory” of
seriously delinquent mortgages (more than 90 days delinquent), which was vastly larger
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than annual REO inventories in the late 2000s and early 2010s. As shown in Table 3.2, the
ratio of the fourth-quarter inventory of seriously delinquent single-family mortgages to
REO properties was more than 6 to 1 in 2011 and 2012. The GSEs, at the encouragement
of the FHFA, were directed to dispose of REOs as rapidly as possible, while also making as
much money on them as possible, to reduce risk to their balance sheets and the taxpayers,
who remained on the hook for losses posted by the GSEs. While the GSEs relied on retail
means to sell most of their REO inventory, i.e., individual sales of properties using con-
ventional marketing methods, they turned to bulk sales for properties located in markets
with concentrated foreclosures and hard-to-sell properties (Fannie Mae, 2016; Goldstein
& Stevenson, 2016a). The geographic specicity and overall low number of these bulk
transactions relative to overall size of the GSEs’ REO inventory, however, kept the focus
o bulk sales until the FHFA and HUD jointly examined the feasibility of a national REO-
to-rental program, wherein large institutional investors would buy REOs in bulk in order
to manage them as rental properties for a certain number of years (U.S. Congress, 2012).
HUD, due to the depletion of its mortgages insurance fund during the mortgage fore-
closure crisis, was also under internal and external pressures to sell REOs rapidly while
maximizing overall returns (U.S. Congress, 2013c). In 2012, the FHFA piloted a national
REO-to-rental program by selling pools of properties in eight geographic areas where REO
concentrations were particularly high, including Atlanta, Chicago, parts of Florida, Los
Vegas, and Phoenix (Federal Housing Finance Agency. Oce of Inspector General, 2013).
As the housing market began to recover nationally during and after 2012, neither the
FHFA nor HUD decided to pursue the pilot further. Currently, the FHFA and HUD have
begun to engage in the bulk sale of seriously delinquent mortgages to investors prior to
foreclosure to avoid REO-related operating costs in their entirety (Perlberg, Gittelsohn, &
Benson, 2015).
What is missing from the public record, however, is the number of bulk sales that
occurred not as part of a national bulk sale pilot program, but rather as a release valve for
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possibly low-value properties in markets with large concentrations of REOs like Detroit.
Media accounts from Detroit and other cities report discounted sales to investors, many
of whom were bulk buyers (e.g., Dixon, 2011; Goldstein & Stevenson, 2016a). While these
local accounts focus on the damaging eects such sales can have on neighborhoods, the
FHFA views these sales as anomalous and almost not worth mention. In discussing the
parameters of the national REO-to-rental pilot program, Meg Burns, a Senior Associate
Director at the FHFA, told Congress only that “there are some small bulk sales of lower
valued properties that take place” (U.S. Congress, 2013a, p.9). Former FHFA Director
Edward DeMarco similarly downplayed bulk sales in distressed housing markets when
questioned by Congress about their extent and impact, remarking,
you have got anecdotes that are kind of driving sort of a sense of a larger
picture thing, and the anecdotes can be very well true and there could be a
good number of them, but when we are dealing with hundreds of thousands
of REO, they remain anecdotes (U.S. Congress, 2013b, p.20).
It is the purpose of this dissertation to determine precisely how many sales of federally
owned properties were made to investors, particularly large investors, and to what eect,
providing a systematic evaluation of such sales to improve the impression provided by
anecdote.
48
Table 3.1: GSE Single-Family REO Operating Expenses (in Mil-
lions), 2007–2011
Creditor 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Fannie Mae $444 $1,888 $857 $1,680 $765 $5,950
Freddie Mac $205 $1,097 $287 $676 $596 $2,861
Total $649 $2,941 $1,144 $2,536 $1,361 $8,541
Note: Expenses calculated based on maintenance, repair and
other costs; valuation allowances; disposition gains or losses;
and recoveries from insurance or bank repurchases. Calculations
made by Federal Housing Finance Agency. Oce of Inspector
General (2012). Sources: Fannie Mae (2009, 2011), Federal Hous-
ing Finance Agency. Oce of Inspector General (2012), Freddie
Mac (2009, 2011).
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Figure 3.1: Annual REO Starts, Dispositions, and Inventory for the GSEs and HUD, 2002–
2014. Sources: Fannie Mae (2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013a,
2014, 2015), Freddie Mac (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015),
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Federal Housing Administration.
Oce of Risk Analysis and Regulatory Aairs (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008,
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014)
50
Table 3.2: Single-Family REO Inventories and Mort-
gages Over 90 Days Delinquent, 2011–2012
Creditor 2011 2012 2013
Fannie Mae
Seriously Delinquent a 690,911 576,591 418,837
REO Inventory b 118,528 105,666 103,229
Ratio 5.83 5.46 4.06
Freddie Mac
Seriously Delinquent a 412,988 352,860 253,325
REO Inventory b 60,555 49,077 47,308
Ratio 6.82 7.19 5.35
GSEs
Seriously Delinquent a 1,103,899 929,451 672,162
REO Inventory b 179,083 154,743 150,537
Ratio 6.16 6.01 4.47
HUD
Seriously Delinquent a 635,096 738,991 627,958
REO Inventory b 37,445 32,226 25,306
Ratio 16.96 22.93 24.81
a Sources: Federal Housing Finance Agency (2012, 2013,
2014b), U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment. Federal Housing Administration. Oce of Risk
Analysis and Regulatory Aairs (2012, 2013, 2014).
b Sources: Fannie Mae (2012, 2013a, 2014), Freddie Mac
(2012, 2013, 2014), U.S. Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development. Federal Housing Administration. Of-
ce of Risk Analysis and Regulatory Aairs (2012, 2013,
2014).
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CHAPTER IV
Creating REO Pathways Databases
This dissertation employs two separate, but related databases of REO pathways, each
constructed using distinct data sources. The rst, which I will refer to as the Detroit
database, was constructed from two data sources limited to records of real-estate transac-
tions in the City of Detroit. The second, which I will refer to as the Regional database, was
constructed entirely from real-estate transaction records obtained from RealtyTrac for the
nine-county Detroit metropolitan area. These sources and the construction of these two
databases is detailed in the following sections.
4.1 Data Sources
To create the Detroit database of REO pathways, I rst identied which Detroit resi-
dential properties went through the entire mortgage foreclosure process between January
1, 2005 and December 31, 2013. For each of these properties I collected information related
to mortgage foreclosure auctions, including buyer name and sale amount; information re-
lated to the next sale occurring after the foreclosure auction, if one occurred during the
study period; whether and at what time in their post-mortgage-foreclosure history prop-
erties were repossessed due to delinquent property taxes; and whether and at what time
properties received a notication of blight by the City of Detroit.
To create the Detroit database, I combined property records from several sources (see
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Table 4.1). The vast majority of these data come from two sources: Detroit real-estate
transaction records from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2010 provided by Social Com-
pact, who in turn acquired these data from CoreLogic; and Detroit real-estate transaction
records from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2013 provided by Data Driven Detroit, who
in turn purchased them from the Wayne County Register of Deeds (WCROD). Records
from these two sources contain data elds essential for determining what happened to
properties subsequent to mortgage foreclosure and the parties responsible for them, in-
cluding record date, record type, buyer, seller, price, and property address. Because the
Data Driven Detroit data are more consistent in reporting the deed type as recorded in
the local land records, I use these data for the period they overlap with the Social Com-
pact data, specically, 2008 through 2010. Additionally, I obtained real-estate transaction
records for the City of Detroit from January 1, 2003 to September 12, 2014 through a data
grant from CoreLogic. These records exclude complete buyer and seller information and
contain only binary indicators, e.g., investor purchase, not the names of buyers and sell-
ers, so these data were used primarily for diagnostic purposes in constructing the Detroit
database.1 In particular, I used these data to nd foreclosure and sales records absent
from the Social Compact data between 2005 and 2007. I also obtained data directly from
the WCROD, which granted me research access to their on-line database of land records.
From this database I obtained mortgage foreclosure redemption receipts absent from the
other data sources, as well as buyer and seller information for the CoreLogic records
absent from the Social Compact data. To collect tax foreclosure data, I used records of
completed tax foreclosures from 2008 to 2013 WCROD records provided by Data Driven
Detroit. For 2014 and 2015, I used records of properties auctioned by the Wayne County
Treasurer for delinquent property taxes in 2014 and 2015 listed on Loveland Technologies’
website. Property characteristics, including lot size, square footage, and assessed value,
were obtained from the City of Detroit Assessor’s Oce. Finally, blight notication data
1These data, however, are central to the construction my home sales dataset, employed in the hedonic
regression discussed below.
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were retrieved from the City of Detroit’s online open data portal.
To create the regional database of REO pathways, I made use of a RealtyTrac data
obtained by Institute for Social Research (ISR) for the nine-county Detroit metropolitan
area. These counties include Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Genesee, Livingston, Lapeer,
St. Clair, Washtenaw, and Monroe Counties. The periods covered for each county dier:
data for the tri-county area of Wayne, Macomb, and Oakland are present from 2004 to
2015. These data contain records for each of the other counties from 2005 to 2015, with
the exception of Lapeer, for which records are present from 2006 to 2015. In addition to
providing real-estate transaction records, RealtyTrac provides assessor’s data containing
elds needed to control for property characteristics in statistical analysis.
4.2 Detroit Database Construction
My process for creating the Detroit REO pathways database began by generating a
list of properties for which my data indicate a completed foreclosure took place, i.e., those
for which a Sheri’s Deed was recorded between 2005 and 2013. For each record of a
completed mortgage foreclosure, I queried among my data for all records occurring on
or after the date of the Sheri’s Deed in question through the date of any subsequent
mortgage foreclosures or the last transaction recorded for a given property, whichever
occurs rst. Using the results of these queries, I applied a number of algorithms to locate or
derive information needed to populate the foreclosure pathways database. The following
sections explain these procedures in detail.
4.2.0.1 Identifying Records Related to a Common Street Address
Identifying all records related to a specic street address is a deceptively simple task.
Addresses are subject to error and variation, for example, street suxes, e.g., lane, road,
street, are not always present and they may or may not be abbreviated. Parcel numbers,
which exist largely for property tax collection purposes, are far easier to use to identify
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records associated with a given property. Parcel numbers oer a more consistent eld
for identifying individual properties. A liability of using parcel numbers, however, is
that they are not necessarily coterminous with the entirety of lands subsumed under a
common street address. Common street addresses may be linked to two or more parcel
numbers. This is often due to the simultaneous acquisition of a residential parcel with
a structure and an adjacent vacant lot. Such agglomerations are only gradually reected
in parcel numbers. As a result, records representing REO sales may be recorded using
a dierent parcel number than that for which the Sheri’s Deed was recorded. In other
cases, the party responsible for transcribing the physical document may have failed to
accurately transcribe the parcel number(s). In a small number of cases, parcel numbers are
not recorded at all. To balance the advantages and disadvantages of these two approaches
for identifying records associated with a given property, I identied records related to a
given property using both address and parcel number.
4.2.0.2 Identifying Residential Mortgage Foreclosures and REO Owners
To identify owners of REO properties, I rst identied all properties that went through
the entire mortgage foreclosure process from 2005 to 2013. For Detroit, as for Michi-
gan, this involves collecting Sheri’s Deed records. Data obtained from Social Compact,
however, do not contain detailed document type information for mortgage foreclosures;
records are simply labeled as a “foreclosure” in these data. To ensure records labeled as
“foreclosures” in the Social Compact data do not erroneously include records related to tax
foreclosure, I checked Social Compact foreclosure records against records obtained from
the CoreLogic data grant, which include the deed type listed in the local land records.
Records obtained from Wayne County include the full document type description, which
allowed me to query for Sheri’s Deed records alone. In a number of cases, properties
have two Sheri’s Deeds recorded in quick succession, which is due to one of several sce-
narios. The most common cases are those where both the senior and junior lien holder
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record Sheri’s Deeds (which is not proper—the junior lien holder recoups the dierence
between the auction amount and the senior lien holder’s balance, which is usually noth-
ing), or the servicer holds an initial, but illegitimate, foreclosure auction. To account for
these duplicate, from the perspective of the present study, foreclosure records, I removed
from consideration any Sheri’s Deed occurring 365 or fewer days prior another Sheri’s
Deed record. Additionally, I removed from consideration any Sheri’s Deed record for
which I was unable to identify an REO sale, but for which a Sheri’s Deed was recorded
at a later date. To account for the possibility a property was redeemed after foreclosure,
I collected Redemption Receipts from the WCROD and dropped all records of mortgage
foreclosures preceding a record of redemption. Previous studies have included deed in lieu
of foreclosure transactions when identifying REO properties. The additional complexity
of this task in the face of gaps and errors in the source data, however, was prohibitive.
The large number of properties moving through the entire foreclosure process is suitable
for present purposes.
After identifying Sheri’s Deed records, I applied several rules to identify parties tak-
ing possession of properties. In some instances, third-party purchasers acquire properties
at the foreclosure auction, but this is rare in Detroit. In nearly all cases, foreclosed prop-
erties enter REO status. Previous studies of REO pathways apply key-word searches to
the grantee names to distinguish between third-party buyers and institutions repossess-
ing properties, i.e., lenders transferring properties into REO. This procedure is inadequate
for my purposes for two reasons: rst, records of properties entering REO inventories of
federal entities often occur after a Sheri’s Deed is recorded. For HUD, this is nearly al-
ways the case. Second, MERS frequently appears as the grantee in Sheri’s Deed records.
Among records in the nal dataset, roughly 9,000 out of nearly 70,000 name MERS as
grantee in the Sheri’s Deed. As a result, it was necessary to look at subsequent records
to determine whether a property was repossessed by a bank or federal entity. To identify
properties entering federal REO inventories, I rst looked at the grantee name recorded
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in the Sheri’s Deed. If this name did not match a federal entity, I checked the grantee
eld in all subsequent transactions prior to subsequent mortgage or tax foreclosures. Fi-
nally, if neither of these procedures found a match, I searched grantor elds for federal
entity names. There are several instances in which federal entities’ names appear for the
rst time in a given property’s history as the grantor in a REO sale. In some instances,
federal entities required lenders to take back defectively underwritten loans after foreclo-
sure. In cases where there was an initial transfer to a federal entity followed by a return
transfer from the same federal entity to a lender, these properties were coded as privately
held REOs (n=862). In instances where MERS is named as the grantee in the Sheri’s
Deed—which indicates sale to a lender, not a third-party purchaser—I examined grantee
and grantor names in subsequent records for lender names in a manner similar to that
described for identifying federal entities. To accomplish these name-matching tasks, I
used regular expressions, which are special text strings that can be used for fuzzy string
matching.
Identifying individual private entities responsible for mortgage-reverted properties is
far more dicult than identifying properties for which the GSEs and HUD are responsi-
ble. Sheri’s Deeds documenting a property’s entrance into private REO inventories may
include the name of the mortgage pool, the trustee of the mortgage pool, the servicer
contracted by the trustee, an attorney, MERS, or any combination of these names in the
grantee eld (lenders and servicers may be dierent departments or subsidiaries of the
same institution). Seller names listed on records of REO sales exhibit the same variation
and complexity. Further, the large number of acquisitions and mergers occurring during
this period make it dicult to assign responsibility to a single party. As a result, it is im-
possible to state the exact number of properties sold by any one particular mortgagee or
servicer during the study period. It is possible, however, to present the results of fuzzy
string matching to present a rough estimate of how many properties the largest servicers
handled during this period. These data are presented below.
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To restrict data to records of mortgage-foreclosed residential properties, I used the
City of Detroit Assessor’s Oce records to obtain a given property’s class code, which
indicates each property’s use type, e.g., commercial, industrial, and residential. I obtained
the property class code from the assessor le released in the year closest to the year a
given mortgage foreclosure was recorded.
4.2.0.3 Identifying REO Sales
For each property entering REO, I identied REO sales using records occurring after
the mortgage foreclosure auction in question—but prior to any subsequent foreclosure,
should one occur—using a number of rules. In a rst pass across records following a
mortgage foreclosure auction, I ag the earliest record that is neither a mortgage foreclo-
sure nor a tax foreclosure (or any associated document, such as a notice of default) and
for which the grantee name does not match regular expressions detecting names of banks
and federal entities. This initial search essentially reproduces approaches used in previous
studies. In some instances, records coded as REO sales in the rst pass are followed by
sales from the party previously identied as the REO owner. These later sales are usually
the actual REO sale, so in instances where records coded as REO sales in the rst pass are
followed by records where the REO owner matches the name of the grantor—in addition
to other criteria limiting the transaction type and buyer name—I recode this later record
as the REO sale. The need for this additional step stems from the manner in which docu-
ments are recorded in the local land records. In some cases, REO sales are recorded with
the County after the sale out of REO. Documents for these REO sales are nearly always
dated earlier, but they are frequently led with the County at a later date.2 The grantor in
2Records obtained from WCROD contain both document date and recording date. Consistent availability
of recording date would obviate many of the coding diculties associated with documents being recorded
after substantial delays, but real-estate records obtained from Social Compact do not contain a recording
date eld. Additionally, I use the records from the CoreLogic data grant to retrieve additional information,
joining the CoreLogic data to the Social Compact and WCROD on parcel number or address and document
date. Records in the CoreLogic dataset do not contain the recording date. It would be possible to revise
my code to operate separately on the Social Compact data and WCROD data, using recording date for the
former and document date for the latter, but this would introduce even greater complexity to an already
58
the REO sale identied in the rst pass often matches the name of the REO owner, but I do
not include a criterion in the rst pass that the grantor be identical to the party identied
as the REO owner due to mergers of lending institutions and transfers to servicers with
dierent names. For example, properties repossessed by Washington Mutual and held in
REO inventory though late 2008 were transferred to J.P. Morgan after federal regulators
seized and sold o Washington Mutual. In other instances, my coding accepts the name
of a trustee in the grantee eld of a Sheri’s Deed as the name of the REO owner, but the
REO sale lists the servicer responsible for REO disposition as grantor.
Not all REO sales are captured in the local land records, for reasons which are not en-
tirely clear, but are likely due to error on the part of servicers to record these transactions.
As a result, some transactions coded as REO sales may actually be the next sale after the
REO sale. These cases are impossible to programmatically identify and remove, but man-
ual diagnostics suggest this is a rare occurrence. In other cases, the land records list the
legal description of the property, but include neither the street address nor the property
tax identication number, which are the two elds used to identify records occurring after
a given foreclosure. Records lacking both these identiers are impossible to link to other
records recorded for the same property.
4.2.0.4 Identifying Second Sales
The process of identifying the next sale occurring after a REO sale, should one occur,
is similar to the process for identifying REO sales described above. Iterating over records
occurring after REO sales, I code records as second sales if they meet the following cri-
teria: they are recorded on or after the date of the REO sale but prior to any subsequent
foreclosure, they are not themselves foreclosure-related records, and the grantee name
does not match regular expressions for bank or federal entity names. To reduce the like-
lihood of coding non-sale transfers between related entities, I only accepted Quit Claim
highly complex set of programs for coding records. The multiple passes these programs execute over the
records with their dierent rules perform very well in identifying REO sales and second sales.
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Deed records as REO sales where the sale amount is greater than or equal to $500. Docu-
ment types reliably associated with arm’s-length sales, specically, “Deeds” and Warranty
Deeds, are only restricted to records with a sale amount greater than or equal to $1.
4.2.0.5 Identifying Tax Foreclosures
Tax delinquency often signals disinvestment and frequently coincides with or pre-
cedes property abandonment (Wilson, Margulis, & Ketchum, 1994). In Detroit, however,
tax delinquency is a widespread phenomenon that also stems from tax assessments be-
ing set at a substantially higher base than what market values would dictate (Hodge,
McMillen, Sands, & Skidmore, 2016). Individuals underwater on their property taxes,
i.e., those whose property tax payments exceed the market value of their home, have a
powerful incentive to reduce or eliminate property tax payments. Inated property values
and the precarious nancial situation of many Detroit residents, in conjunction with the
increased enforcement of property tax reversion laws, has led to the repossession of tens-
of-thousands of properties since the early-2000s, when an expedited tax reversion process
was initiated in Michigan. Federal agencies, private lending institutions, investors own-
ing mortgage-reverted properties, and investors purchasing REOs out of lender invento-
ries, however, possess the resources, if not the mandate, to pay property taxes. Further,
these actors are absentee owners; tax-delinquent homeowners in Detroit are often per-
sonally invested in their properties and neighborhoods. If homeowner households are
not nancially investing in their properties, they are at least living in them, indicating a
modicum of care. Lender- and investor-owned tax-delinquent properties, however, stem
from one of a few likely scenarios, all ruthless. First, current and former REOs may be al-
lowed to fall into tax foreclosure as a passive means of disposing of ostensibly unprotable
properties. Properties considered valuable when high-priced loans could be secured for
purchase or renancing may be considered liabilities from a portfolio management per-
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spective.3 REOs purchased by investors are frequently converted to rentals; in numerous
cases these investors extract rent from tenants while withholding property tax payments
as a short-term strategy for accumulating wealth at the expense of tenants, who may be
evicted as a result of tax foreclosure, neighborhoods, and the municipality.
The mechanics of the Michigan tax foreclosure law, revised and codied in Public
Act 123 (1999), enables county governments to repossess tax-delinquent properties after
three years of non-payment. Counties then sell tax-reverted properties at auction to re-
coup delinquent taxes, rst for a minimum of the combined delinquent taxes, interest and
fees, then, if a property remains unsold, for a minimum of $500. When the county repos-
sesses properties in advance of an auction sale, that action is documented in a Judgment of
Foreclosure deed submitted to the WCROD. I use these Judgment of Foreclosure records
to identify occurrences of tax foreclosure from 2005 to 2013. Due to a signicant delay in
Judgment of Foreclosure records being submitted for properties auctioned in 2014, I used
records of properties that were oered at the annual property tax auction available from
the website of Loveland Technologies, a Detroit-based company focusing on the analysis
and visualization of real-estate data. As Judgment of Foreclosure records have not been
created and/or recorded yet for the 2015 auctions, I again took advantage of Loveland
Technologies for these records.
4.2.0.6 Transactions Involving Multiple Properties
The unit of observation in local land records is the document recording information
about sales, transfers, mortgages, liens, etc. for one or more properties. The manner in
which these records are handled and sold by third-party vendors like CoreLogic, on the
other hand, takes the individual property as the unit of analysis. This conversion creates
3Tax delinquency and tax foreclosure also occur on so-called zombie foreclosures, also known as bank
walkaways or charge-os. In these cases, lenders initiate foreclosure, but decide against completing the
process after comparing carrying costs and sale prices. In these cases, the borrowers remain responsible
for the property, including payment of property taxes. It is extremely dicult, however, to identify zom-
bie foreclosures, as there several other reasons for delays in the foreclosure process, most notably, those
stemming from the fallout of the robo-signing scandal.
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a situation wherein all properties included in a single transaction document are assigned
identical information in separate rows in a table, including sales price. In instances where
documents record the sale of multiple distinct properties, these prices need to be broken
apart to reect the unique contribution of each property to the overall sales price. In
instances where the two properties are adjacent parcels, usually one containing a structure
and one a vacant lot, these records need to be consolidated as the sales price pertains to
only one common street address. To address the situation in which a document records
a sale of two or more distinct properties, i.e., two or more properties constituting what
an ordinary person would consider to be a distinct address, each property is assigned
a share of the document sales price proportionate to its share of the assessed value of
all properties. Assessed value is taken from Assessor’s Oce data released in the year
nearest the transaction document in question. Where properties need to be consolidated,
I assigned the lot size of the adjacent vacant lot to the record for the parcel containing
the structure and dropped the vacant lot from the dataset. Duplexes are few in number
(~40) and present diculties for programmatically recreating post-foreclosure pathways;
specically, duplexes vacillate between appearing as joint and separate properties in the
transaction records, so I excluded them from analysis.
I rst performed these operations for splitting and grouping Sheri’s Deed records.
The majority of Sheri’s Deeds listing more than one property are those where one prop-
erty has a structure, the other is an adjacent vacant lot, and both share a common address.
A small number of Sheri’s Deeds list two parcels that together comprise a duplex; these
are dropped from the database for the reasons stated above. Next, I searched among REO
sales for individual properties constituting part of multiple-property transactions. Since I
aggregated Sheri’s Deeds for adjacent parcels sharing a common street address, I found
few REO sales belonging to multiple-property transactions. Among the few documents
detected among REO sales having two or more properties associated with them (~25), I
found instances of records erroneously indicating multiple properties were sold together;
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in these cases, the physical document does not list the properties found in the dataset. For
this reason, I dropped all REO sales records associated with bundles having more than
two properties. Properties listed in multiple-property documents among second sales all
seem to reect the source documents, so sales prices are allocated among properties ac-
cordingly.
4.2.0.7 Categorizing Buyers
To categorize REO buyers and buyers of second sales, I followed approaches taken in
previous studies. In two recent papers, Ellen, Madar, and Weselcouch (2014) and Immer-
gluck and Law (2014) classied parties purchasing properties out of REO inventories as
likely investors if any one of four conditions are met. First, the name of the purchaser
contains corporate identiers, such as “INC” and “LLC”; second, the purchaser name is
matched to two or more REO acquisitions or four or more acquisitions of any type during
the course of the study period (both studies covered roughly a decade); third, the purchaser
resold at least one REO property within 12 months of its purchase. I used each of these
conditions, but I revised the second condition by classifying purchasers as likely investors
if they purchased two or more properties either out of REO or at the rst sale subsequent
to a REO sale, in addition to coding buyers as investors if they purchased four or more
properties of any type during the study period, i.e., REO or otherwise. REO sales and
second sales are similar, at least in Detroit, in terms of participants and prices. In many
cases, second sales constitute part of the same market for distressed properties as REO
sales.4 To search for matches among names of buyers, I rst normalized buyers’ names
by removing words, phrases, and acronyms referring to marriage status and tenancy, e.g.,
‘Joint Tenant with Right of Survivorship’, as well as suxes of individuals’ names, e.g.,
4I coded investors in two stages. First, I identied investors through corporate identiers and the total
number of acquisitions of REO properties or properties one sale away from REO. I then recoded parties
identied as individuals in the rst round as investors if they bought four or more properties during the
study period, regardless of whether or not these were REO sales. This second step changed the share of
purchases by investors by less than one percentage point.
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“Jr” and “II.” I also removed middle initials and alphabetically sorted the constituent names
of each proper name to account for variations in data entry. Where data elds for buyer
name contained two or more names, which largely occurs when married couples jointly
purchase property, I split these names and counted the number of appearance of each
separate name.
Following Ellen et al. (2014), I used normalized buyer names and investor ags to iden-
tify investors and classify them as small, medium, or large investors. First, individuals and
entities that purchased more than 50 properties were classied as large investors; next,
individuals and entities that purchased 10 or more properties were classied as medium in-
vestors; nally, individuals and entities that purchased two or more REOs or four or more
property of any type were classied as small investors. Buyers with corporate names who
purchased only one property were also classied as small investors, as were individuals
or entities that purchased only one property, but resold their property within 12 months.
These procedures for classifying likely investors have several known limitations. First,
some investors purchased only one property during the study period, leading to an under-
estimate of investor activity. Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2014) address these issues by using
records of property tax reductions for owner-occupants, but these data are faulty and
available only for some years in Detroit. Similarly, Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2014) point
out the number and complexity of transaction documents recorded after mortgage fore-
closure may lead to the erroneous coding of lenders’ transfers to subsidiary or allied REO
management companies as a REO sale. I guarded against this threat to the best of my
ability by preventing records having grantee names matching those of known servicers
and subsidiaries from being coded as a REO sale.
4.2.0.8 Conrming Sales Prices
Many REO sales have recorded sale amounts of $0, but in some cases this reects errors
in the transcription of the land records. For whatever reason, sales amounts listed on the
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physical documents are not always recorded in the electronic land records. Data obtained
from the CoreLogic data grant, however, are more likely to list these sales prices. I used
these data to update REO sales in the REO pathways database where CoreLogic lists a
non-zero sales amount.
4.2.0.9 Adding Geospatial Information
I geocoded records in the REO pathways database using address, city, and zip code
elds. In instances where addresses failed to return a result during geocoding, I used par-
cel numbers to match records to a table of Detroit parcels containing spatial coordinates.
Once geocoded, records were assigned census tract numbers.
4.3 Regional Database Construction
My process for creating the regional REO pathways database follows the steps for
creating the Detroit database detailed above as closely as possible, but dierences in these
data necessitated minor departures. First, to identify completed mortgage foreclosures, I
used the code RealtyTrac supplies to denote conveyance of trustee’s deed upon sale. In
addition, I selected records where RealtyTrac codes indicate a sale at auction but the name
of the buyer is variant of Mortgage Electronic Registration Services (MERS). Second, given
the diculty of testing parcel numbers across each of these counties for the presence
of sales involving adjacent parcels, I dropped all records associated with a transaction
identier linked to two or more properties. These bundles are relatively few in number,
particularly among residential properties.
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4.4 IdentifyingDetroit’s StrongNeighborhoodsUsingClusterAnal-
ysis
In previous research, hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) has proven useful in previous
studies for classifying dierent geographic units, including neighborhoods e.g., Mikel-
bank, 2004. The purpose of HCA is to group a large number of observations based on
similarities in terms of measurements on pre-selected indicators. To identify Detroit’s
strong neighborhoods, I used HCA to sort Detroit neighborhoods into a limited num-
ber of clusters based on their housing market conditions in 2000 and changes in those
conditions between 1990 and 2000. Taking census tracts as proxies for neighborhoods, I
obtained tract-level data from the GeoLytics Neighborhood Change Database, which con-
tains past decennial census data adjusted to 2000 census tract boundaries. The variables I
included in the HCA were: population density in 2000 and its change from 1990 to 2000;
housing unit density in 2000 and its change from 1990 to 2000; poverty rate in 1999 and its
change from 1989 to 1999; median household income in 1999 and its percentage change
from 1989 to 1999; median value of owner-occupied housing in 2000 and its percentage
change from 1990 to 2000; owner-occupancy rate in 2000 and its change from 1990 to
2000; and housing vacancy rate in 2000 and its change from 1990 to 2000. In addition, I
included the share of residential properties having residential structures in 2009, i.e., the
share of residential properties that are not vacant lots, derived from the Detroit Residen-
tial Parcel Survey (DRPS), a parcel-by-parcel survey of residential property conditions
in Detroit conducted in 2009. Before being entered into the HCA, variables for which
increasing measures indicate worsening neighborhood conditions, for example, the va-
cancy rate, were inverted so that increasing levels for all variables indicated improving
conditions. All variables were standardized before running the cluster analysis to account
for dierences in units of measurement. Tracts with fewer than 100 residential parcels,
as per the DRPS, were removed from the analysis to retain only tracts with residential
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characteristics, as were tracts showing median home values of zero dollars in either 1990
or 2000.
HCA operates through a process of agglomeration. Each observation, in this case, each
census tract, begins as a unique cluster. The next step of the process combines the two
most similar observations into a new cluster. In successive stages the two most similar
clusters are merged, either individual observations or clusters formed at earlier stages of
the analysis, until all observations have been grouped into one nal cluster. The conven-
tion for determining the nal number of clusters is to strike a balance between retaining
only a limited number of clusters and keeping highly dissimilar clusters apart. In practice,
this means selecting the smallest number of clusters immediately prior to the agglomera-
tion of two highly dissimilar clusters. Following this approach, I extracted three clusters
of Detroit census tracts. One of these clusters had very high values for indicators of hous-
ing market strength relative to the three others and ts well with my understanding of
the location of Detroit’s strong neighborhoods. Figure 4.1 shows a truncated dendrogram
generated from the cluster analysis, dendrograms being the conventional visualization
used to determine the appropriate number of clusters to extract. Horizontal lines repre-
sent cluster merges and their corresponding Y-axis values show the distance between the
clusters at the point of the merge. Vertical lines represent the clusters constituting part of
a given merge. This dendrogram displays the nal 20 merges. It shows a clear separation
between tracts constituting strong neighborhoods and all other tracts. Median z-scores for
the variables entered in the HCA are presented for each of the last three clusters in Table
4.2. This table shows that the cluster selected to represent Detroit’s strong neighborhoods
has particularly high relative values for the inverse of the poverty rate, owner-occupancy
rate, the inverse of the vacancy rate, and the share of residential parcels with structures.5
Figure 4.2 presents the spatial distribution of these strong neighborhoods.
5A common approach for determining the contribution of each indicator in dening the grouping of
observations into clusters is linear discriminant analysis (LDA). Applying LDA to the results of the cluster
analysis, I found the share of residential parcels having structures was the most inuential predictor of the
cluster into which a tract was grouped by a wide margin.
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Table 4.3 shows how strong neighborhoods compare with other neighborhoods in-
cluded in the cluster analysis. Overall, these indicators show strong neighborhoods ex-
hibited much stronger housing markets than other residential areas. For example, the
median of census tract median household income in 1999 across the strong neighbor-
hoods was $38,810, while the median value for other neighborhoods was only $23,766.
Strong neighborhoods were also predominantly owner-occupied; the minimum value
from strong neighborhoods exceeds the median for other neighborhoods. The median
poverty rate in strong neighborhoods is half the median rate in other neighborhoods.
However, 15% is not negligible. As scholars such as Galster (2005) have argued, poverty
rate between 15 to 20% could be a critical threshold for neighborhood change. Below this
threshold, problems associated with poverty may not signicantly and negatively aect
the neighborhood; above this, problems with increased poverty may rise signicantly.
Thus, while these tracts are strong relative to others in Detroit, many had challenges
even before the housing crisis. An important question to ask is how well these neigh-
borhoods have endured the additional stresses imposed by mortgage foreclosures and
the great recession that followed. The last indicator in the table describes the neighbor-
hoods’ physical environment. The median share of residential parcels with structures in
the strong neighborhoods was 96%, much higher than the median share in other neigh-
borhoods, 67%. Since the survey was conducted a few years after the mortgage foreclosure
crisis started, it implied that these strong neighborhoods were largely intact prior to the
housing crisis. Tracts in other neighborhoods, however, exhibit higher maximum values
for median housing value in 2000 and the maximum for the share of residential parcels
having structures is nearly identical to that for strong neighborhoods. The absence of
these tracts from the cluster of strong neighborhoods is explained by the particular com-
bination of measures on the indicators included in the cluster analysis. For example, the
tract included among other neighborhoods with the median home value of $457,700 has
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an owner-occupancy rate of just 24% and a median household income of $25,838.6
4.5 Identifying Detroit’s Inner- and Outer-Ring Suburbs
A central question of this dissertation is whether federal and private entities treated
mortgage-reverted properties dierently in Detroit, particularly within the city’s strong
neighborhoods, than in outlying suburban areas. Previous studies have established a con-
vention of separating metropolitan areas into the categories of inner-city, inner-ring sub-
urban, and outer-ring suburban, with the occasional inclusion of exurban (Hanlon & Vi-
cino, 2007; S. Lee & Leigh, 2007; McMillan & Chakraborty, 2016). A central assumption of
the approaches used to distinguish among these spaces is a concentric pattern of urban
development, an assumption more likely to hold true in regions including older industrial
cities like Detroit. This model of concentric rings of ever-newer development surround-
ing older central cities ultimately fails at large distances, where distant concentric bands
overlap with rural hinterland or the suburbs of other urban areas. The nine-county De-
troit metropolitan area contains historic nodes of urban development other than Detroit,
each with suburbs in their orbit, including Ann Arbor in Washtenaw County and Flint in
Genesee County. Proximity to these other major urban areas is likely to inuence REO
disposition above and beyond what might be expected given distance from Detroit. For
this reason, I consider only the Detroit tri-county area, which includes Oakland, Macomb,
and Wayne counties. I identied Detroit’s inner- and outer-ring suburbs using the same
criteria applied by Hanlon and Vicino (2007) in their study of Baltimore’s inner-ring sub-
urbs. First, using 2000 census county subdivisions as the areal unit of analysis, I selected
all subdivisions sharing a boundary with the city of Detroit, excluding Hamtramck and
Highland Park, which are both fully contained within the city of Detroit. Second, I se-
lected all county subdivisions touching the subdivisions selected in the rst step having
more than 50% of their housing stock built prior to 1970, according to the 2000 census. The
6This is the Gold Coast area in Detroit, located on the river on the inner east side.
69
city of Pontiac was excluded from analysis because of its dissimilarity with other places in
the tri-county area outside of the inner-ring suburbs. Located in central Oakland County,
Pontiac is an older industrial city that has experienced decades of job and population loss
similar to Detroit. Figure 4.3 shows the location of inner- and outer-ring suburbs in the
Detroit tri-county area.7
7Following the work of Oreld (1999), I also conducted a cluster analysis of county subdivisions in the
tri-county area to identify inner- and outer-ring suburbs based on a range of indicators used to distinguish
among dierent sections of metropolitan areas. I selected housing unit density, median age of housing
structures, median values of owner-occupied housing units, and the owner-occupancy rate—all from the
2000 census—-as indicators for distinguishing between inner-ring and outer-ring suburbs. The results of
this analysis were nearly identical to those obtained using adjacency to Detroit and the predominance of pre-
1970s housing stock. The cluster analysis, however, selected some outlying areas into the cluster covering
the clear candidates for inner-ring suburban. I followed the approach taken by Hanlon and Vicino (2007)
given its simplicity and overall agreement with more sophisticated techniques, i.e., cluster analysis.
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Figure 4.1: Truncated Dendrogram of Hierarchical Cluster Analysis. Sources: Author’s
calculation from GeoLytics, Inc. (2003).
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Table 4.1: Data Sources for Detroit REO Pathways Database
Source Description Coverage
City of Detroit
Assessor’s Oce
Annual tax assessment records 2006, 2009, 2010,
2012
City of Detroit Open
Data Portal
All property-based violations adjudi-
cated by the City of Detroit Department
of Administrative Hearings
2005 to 2016
CoreLogic Records awarded from CoreLogic con-
taining all deed types, but for which
the names of the buyer and seller were
redacted
01/01/2003 to
09/12/2014
CoreLogic through
Michigan Community
Resources
Records purchased from First Ameri-
can CoreLogic by Social Compact and
provided by Michigan Community Re-
sources containing records of mort-
gage foreclosures, market sales, property
transfers, REO sales, and REO transfers
01/01/2005 to
12/31/2007
Loveland Technologies Website listing Detroit properties oered
at property tax auction
2014 and 2015
Wayne County
Register of Deeds
through Data Driven
Detroit
Records purchased from the WCROD
by Data Driven Detroit containing War-
ranty Deed, Quit Claim Deed, Sher-
i’s Deed, and Judgment of Foreclosure
records
01/01/2012 to
12/31/2013
Wayne County
Register of Deeds
through Michigan
Community Resources
Records purchased from the WCROD
by Michigan Community Resources con-
taining Deed, Warranty Deed, Quit
Claim Deed, Sheri’s Deed, and Judg-
ment of Foreclosure records
01/01/2008 to
12/31/2011
Wayne County
Register of Deeds Web
Portal
Online database of local land records.
Used to obtain Redemption Receipts and
Notices of Release of Foreclosure
01/01/2005 to
present
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Table 4.2: Median Z-Scores for Indicators of Neighborhood Strength by Cluster
Cluster number
Indicator 566a 569 570
Poverty rate 1999 (inverse) 1.10 -1.06 -0.35
Owner-occupancy rate 2000 1.01 -0.78 -0.29
Share of residential parcels having structures 0.99 -1.54 0.04
Housing occupancy rate 2000 0.97 -0.96 -0.10
Median household income 1999 (log) 0.94 -1.04 -0.27
Dierence in housing unit density 1990–2000 0.74 -1.01 -0.01
Median value owner-occupied housing 2000 (log) 0.70 -1.09 -0.11
Population density 2000 0.38 -0.91 0.21
% change in median home value 1990–2000 0.37 -1.01 0.09
Dierence in population density 1990–2000 0.34 -1.00 -0.11
Dierence in housing occupancy rate 1990–2000 0.33 -0.63 -0.10
Housing unit density 2000 0.20 -0.84 0.14
Dierence in owner-occupancy rate 1990–2000 -0.20 0.55 -0.15
Dierence in poverty rate 1989–1999 (inverse) -0.46 0.42 0.21
% change in median household income 1989–1999 -0.61 0.50 0.08
Number of tracts 103 61 123
a Cluster identied as strong neighborhoods
Sources: Data Driven Detroit (2010), GeoLytics, Inc. (2003).
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Figure 4.3: Detroit’s Strong Neighborhoods and Inner- and Outer-Ring Suburbs. Sources:
Author’s calculation from GeoLytics, Inc. (2003).
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CHAPTER V
REO Stocks in the Detroit Tri-County Area
5.1 Detroit REO Stocks 2005-2013
The vast majority of completed mortgage foreclosures—fully 97%—entered REO inven-
tory. Table 5.1 shows the number and share of properties acquired by each type of par-
ticipant in the Sheri’s sale. Government entities—excluding federal entities—and non-
prots purchased just 0.1% of mortgage foreclosures at auction. The majority of these
were taken by the Michigan State Housing Development Authority (MSHDA) due to its
role in nancing home loans for low-income households. Several others were taken by
Habitat for Humanity due to its modest role in nancing home purchases. Parties classi-
ed as “likely individuals” acquired 248 properties over this period, though some of these
buyers may actually be investors I was unable to classify as such due to data limitations.
Parties classied as “likely investors” purchased roughly 1,700 properties, accounting for
2.4% of properties oered at auction. The remainder of mortgage foreclosures became
REOs. Private entities, i.e., banks and the various parties acting on behalf of investors in
mortgage-backed securities, repossessed nearly 60% of completed mortgage foreclosures.
Fannie Mae repossessed nearly 20%, HUD 15%, Freddie Mac fewer than 5%, and the VA less
than 1%. The combined share of all REOs entering federal inventories is 37%, equivalent
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to 10% of all residential properties in Detroit.1
Counting the number of REOs owned or serviced by individual private institutions is
more challenging than nding the number of properties repossessed by specic federal
entities. Financial institutions named in local land records represent one or more of three
primary interests in mortgage foreclosures: mortgage holders, servicers, and trustees.
Separate divisions within large nancial institutions, or subsidiaries of these institutions,
may service the loans for which another division acts as trustee. In other instances, a divi-
sion of one company may serve as trustee while a separate company may act as servicer.
Local land records may record the names of one or more of these entities performing
these various functions, creating diculties in programmatically assigning properties to
one particular coporation or another. Further, each name is subject to variation across
records (e.g., Bank of America and BAC, which stands for Bank of America Corporation).
To generate a list of the largest private entities responsible for REOs and a rough estimate
of their inventories, I obtained the names of the nation’s largest mortgage servicers, many
of them also mortgage lenders, and queried for their presence among REO sales records.2
Table 5.2 shows the ve largest private entities named in land records for REOs in
Detroit and the number of REOs for which they are the seller of record. Together, these
entities account for just above 50% of privately held REOs in Detroit. The list of the
largest private owners of REO properties roughly corresponds with the relative position
of the nation’s largest servicers in terms of their national servicing volume in 2008 (see
Table 5.3). The top REO owner, Deutsche Bank, while absent from the list of the nation’s
largest servicers, was among the largest backers of subprime loans in the 2000s. Deutsche
contracted with third-party entities, particularly Ocwen Financial, to service the loans
1From here on, “likely individuals” and “likely investors” will simply be referred to as individuals and
investors, respectively, througout this document.
2These records contain more information than Sheri’s Deed records about mortgagees and/or servicers,
particularly where MERS is listed as the grantee. This query thus excludes owner information for REO
records not sold during the study period, but the substantial gap between the properties repossessed by
the top ve corporations and all other corporations indicates the inclusion of these records would not alter
change the order of these largest corporate REO owners, servicers, and trustees.
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backing the mortgage-backed securities for which Deutsche served as trustee.
Just as the number of completed mortgage foreclosures grew at a rapid pace from 2005
to 2007, so too did the number of properties owing into REO inventories (see Figure 5.1).3
The annual number of properties entering private inventories grew 156% during this two-
year period, rising to a peak of 12,000. The pace of properties entering federal inventories
was slow relative to the surge experienced by private entities, but far from trivial. The
two-year growth rate was 87% for the GSEs and 56% for HUD. While the number of prop-
erties entering private inventories fell precipitously after 2007, the number of properties
entering federal inventories continued to grow through 2010 before falling toward their
2005 levels. The abrupt decline of properties entering private inventory is partially ex-
plained by the moratoria on mortgage foreclosures observed by many servicers in 2008
and 2009. The growing rate of REOs entering federal inventories reects national trends
(see Figure 3.1), and stems from foreclosures spreading from unsustainable subprime loans
to prime and near-prime loans held or securitized by the GSEs in 2008. Some suggest the
2010 spike in GSE acquisitions stemmed from the widespread cancellation of HAMP trial
periods (Ganey, 2010). Investigative reporters at The Detroit Free Press acquired records
from the GSEs in 2011 indicating the entities required mortgage servicers to foreclose on a
xed share of delinquent loans, which may also be partially responsible for the continued
ow of properties into GSE inventories Dixon (2011).
Changes in the number and acceleration of REO sales largely echo the accumulation
pattern described above. Private entities rapidly increased their rate of REO sales in 2007
and 2008 in response to the enormous inux of mortgage-reverted properties. While the
year-over-year change in the number of private entities’ REO sales fell from nearly 100%
in 2008 to negative 40% in 2009, private entities as a whole sold more than 60% of their in-
ventory that year.4 After 2010, the number of properties entering private REO inventories
3VA gures are omitted from this gure and all subsequent analyses due to the small size of its inventory.
REO stocks are calculated as the annual cumulative total properties owing into REO inventories less the
annual cumulative total properties sold out of REO.
4To reiterate, my estimation of sales and inventory are restricted to REO starts between 2005 and 2013.
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again climbed above the number of REO sales, but the combined annual inventory had by
then fallen below the 2005 level. The GSEs increased their sales at roughly the same rate
as private entities through 2008, but sustained their 2008 level of nearly 2,000 per year
sales through the study period, which translates to sales of between 40 and 50% of inven-
tory every year. HUD sales, on the other hand, were virtually non-existent prior to 2009.
As a result, they possessed nearly twice the 2008 inventory of the GSEs. In 2009, however,
HUD sold nearly 3,000 homes, equivalent to half their current inventory. HUD sales have
slowed since 2009, but still outpace the rate at which HUD accumulates REOs. This initial
delay in HUD’s disposition is taken up again later in the survival analysis of properties
leaving REO stocks and hedonic estimation of the impact of properties lingering in REO
inventory on adjacent home sales prices.
In terms of the spatial distribution of REO accumulation, strong neighborhoods had
more REOs per residential structure (31%) than the rest of the city (21%), mirroring dier-
ences in foreclosures rates between these two areas (see Table 5.4). While strong neigh-
borhoods contain 51% of Detroit’s residential structures, they contained 60% of the city’s
mortgage foreclosures during the study period. The high concentration of REO proper-
ties in Detroit’s strong neighborhoods, 38% of which were held in federal inventories,
indicates the importance of REO disposition strategies in shaping these neighborhoods’
future. Figure 5.2 compares the rate of REO starts and sales between strong neighbor-
hoods and neighborhoods over the study period. It shows that while a larger share of
residential properties in strong neighborhoods were repossessed and sold than in other
neighborhoods, relative changes in REO starts and sales are generally similar between
these two types of neighborhoods.
As a result, I am unable to provide perfect representations of inventory in the initial years of the study
period.
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5.2 Regional REO Trends
Figure 5.3 shows the number of REO starts per 1,000 housing units in Detroit’s strong
neighborhoods and inner- and outer-ring suburbs. Compared to Detroit’s strong neigh-
borhoods, a much smaller share of suburban housing units became mortgage-reverted,
with outer-ring suburbs having the smallest rate of REO starts. The greatest dierence
between Detroit and suburban locations lies in their share of properties repossessed by
private entities. Nearly 50 out of every 1,000 housing units in Detroit were repossessed
by private entities in 2007, while the comparable peak values are 12 and 8 REO starts per
1,000 housing units for inner- and outer-ring suburbs, respectively. This enormous dif-
ference between Detroit and suburban locations is likely explained by the larger share of
private label subprime loans issued in Detroit in the early 2000s. These three locations
are far more similar, however, in their share of properties repossessed by federal entities,
but the the inner-ring suburbs still exhibit a lower rate of properties entering federal in-
ventory than Detroit, and the outer-ring suburbs still exhibit a lower rate of properties
entering federal inventory than inner-ring suburbs.
The regional spatial distribution of REOs is shown in Figure 2.5. This map presents the
number of REO starts, at the tract level, between 2005 and 2013 divided by the number of
mortgageable properties.5 Within the city of Detroit, strong neighborhoods clearly have
the highest mortgage-reversion rates, as noted in Chapter II. Inner-ring suburban tracts
immediately adjacent to Detroit have similarly high mortgage-reversion rates. Within
Macomb County, REO starts are concentrated along the I-94 corridor, continuing into the
outer-ring suburbs and intensifying at county’s eastern boundary at New Haven. Within
outer-ring suburban Oakland County, tracts located in the city of Pontiac exhibit the high-
est mortgage-reversion rates. As noted in the previous chapter, Pontiac was excluded from
inclusion in the outer-ring suburban area. The bulk of Wayne County is covered by De-
troit and inner-ring suburbs.
5See Ellen et al. (2014) for construction of mortgageable property variable.
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Table 5.1: Completed Mortgage Foreclosures by Type of Buyer at Sheri’s
Auction, Detroit, 2005–2013
Owner Foreclosures Share of Total Foreclosures
Private Entities 41,460 59.70%
Fannie Mae 12,756 18.37%
HUD 9,981 14.37%
Freddie Mac 2,822 4.06%
Likely Investors 1,663 2.39%
VA 443 0.64%
Likely Individuals 248 0.36%
City and Nonprot Entities 70 0.10%
Total 69,443 100.0%
Sources: CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
Table 5.2: Five Largest Private REO Owners, 2005–2013
Institution REOs Share ofPrivate REOs
Share of
All REOs
Wells Fargo (Wachovia) 5,278 12.7% 7.8%
Deutsche Bank 4,783 11.5% 7.1%
JPMorgan Chase (Washington Mutual,
Long Beach)
4,452 10.7% 6.6%
Bank of America (Countrywide, LaSalle) 4,396 10.6% 6.5%
U.S. Bank 2,526 6.1% 3.7%
Total Top Five 21,335 52.8% 31.8%
Total Privately Held REOs 41,460 100.0% 60.2%
Sources: CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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Table 5.3: Top 10 Residential Servicers Ranked by National Volume, 2008
Company Home Oce Volume Market Share
Bank of America Charlotte, NC $2,056,043 19.30%
Wells Fargo & Company San Francisco, CA $1,780,884 16.72%
Chase Iselin, NJ $1,503,230 14.11%
Countrywide Calabasas, CA $1,485,285 13.94%
CitiMortgage O’Fallon, MO $809,633 7.60%
Ally Bank Bloomington, MN $396,333 3.72%
PNC Mortgage Miamisburg, OH $187,110 1.76%
OneWest Bank Pasadena, CA $162,000 1.52%
SunTrust Bank Richmond, VA $159,663 1.50%
PHH Mortgage Mt. Laurel, NJ $149,756 1.41%
Total Top 10 Servicers $8,689,937 81.58%
Source: MortgageStats (n.d.).
Table 5.4: REO Concentrations in Strong and Other Neighborhoods, 2005–2013
Characteristics StrongNeighborhoods
Other
Neighborhoods Total
Tracts 103 184 287
Residential parcels with structures 128,190 123,607 251,797
Share of structures 51% 49% 100%
Total REO properties 40,117 26,454 66,571
Share of all REO properties 60% 40% 100%
REOs as share of area structures 31% 21% 26%
Share of area REOs by owner:
Fannie Mae 19% 19% 19%
Freddie Mac 4% 4% 4%
HUD 15% 15% 15%
All federal 38% 38% 38%
Private Entities 62% 62% 62%
Sources: CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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Figure 5.1: REO Starts, Sales, and Stocks in Detroit by Owner, 2005–2013. Sources: Core-
Logic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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Figure 5.2: REO Starts and Sales in Strong and Other Neighborhoods, 2005–2013. Sources:
CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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Figure 5.3: REO Starts in Detroit’s Strong Neighborhoods and Suburbs, 2005–2013.
Sources: RealtyTrac (2015b), U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000).
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CHAPTER VI
Investor and Owner-Occupant REO Acquisitions and
Post-Sale Outcomes
In this chapter I argue that both federal and private REO owners’ practices for manag-
ing and disposing of REOs led to a preponderance of mortgage-reverted residential prop-
erties in Detroit being sold to investors, many of them large out-of-state operators. In turn,
I argue, the harmful business models employed by many of these investors have substan-
tially undermined conditions in Detroit’s historically intact middle- and working-class
neighborhoods, threatening their continued existence as Detroit’s established middle-
income homeowner enclaves. In Chapter III, I discussed the build-up of private and federal
REO inventories, both nationally and in Detroit in the wake of the mortgage foreclosure
crisis, and the pressure placed on the GSEs and HUD to reduce their inventories. Here,
I argue these pressures may have led federal entities to dispose of properties located in
these neighborhoods through bulk sales, rather than retail means, and to invest less in
repairs than would have been helpful in maximizing homebuyer interest. In other words,
the evidence in this chapter suggests federal agencies’ mandate to balance their books
may have come at the expense of their mandate to expand homeownership and stabilize
neighborhoods in placed like Detroit’s strong neighborhoods.
In this chapter I begin by reviewing the literature on the neighborhood impact of
investor-buyers. I then discuss aspects of federal entities’ practices and the environmental
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constraints and pressures they face in terms of how they tilt REO sales toward investors,
particularly in declining housing markets. To establish these assertions, I then present
descriptive statistics of the dierent rates at which federal and private entities sold REOs
to investors and other types of buyers, both across time and across metropolitan space.
I also discuss trends in the sale price of REOs to shed light on dierences in the prices
paid by homebuyers and investors. As the types of properties in each entities’ portfolios
dier, particularly in terms of size and the specic characteristics of the neighborhood in
which they are located, I next present the results of a statistical analysis of the likelihood
of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and HUD selling an REO to an investor after controlling for
property- and neighborhood-specic conditions, as well as temporal changes.
After these descriptive and inferential analyses of REO owners’ propensities for sell-
ing properties to investors and how they vary across time and space, I discuss the concrete
impact of investor acquisitions, focusing on the City of Detroit, where investor activity
was far greater than in the suburbs. While a number of recent studies have examined the
location, extent, and implications of investor acquisitions of REO properties (Immergluck
& Law, 2014; McMillan & Chakraborty, 2016; Molina, 2015), few have examined whether
or not high rates of investor activity actually negatively impact neighborhood conditions
(for exceptions, see Coulton et al., 2008; Ford et al., 2013; Hwang, 2015). In the nal sec-
tions of this chapter, I argue investor activity, particularly the activity of large investors,
is strongly linked to negative outcomes, specically, ipping, municipal blight violations
and tax foreclosure.
6.1 Investor Ownership and Its Challenges
While investors have long accounted for a signicant portion of the market for dis-
tressed properties (Satter, 2010; Sternlieb, 1966), their role in the market for such prop-
erties increased signicantly following the foreclosure crisis. Immergluck (2012) found
that investors consistently accounted for 40% of REO acquisitions in Atlanta from 2005
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to 2009. Ford et al. (2013) similarly found that investors dominated the market for for-
closures in Cleveland, and my research shows that investors accounted for 68% of REO
sales from 2005 to 2013, with investor activity substantially higher (75%) between 2005
and 2008 than it was between 2009 and 2013 (62%). Investors have been found to be most
active among buyers of low-value properties. Immergluck (2012) found that investors
purchased the majority of the surge of low-value properties (< $30,000) sold in Atlanta in
2008 and 2009. Ellen et al. (2014) found similar patterns in their study of Atlanta, Miami,
and New York, with investors being far more likely to buy low-value properties, partic-
ularly prior to 2010. In their study of post-foreclosure pathways in Los Angeles, Pfeier
and Molina (2013) found that investors were most active in neighborhoods with lower
incomes and high foreclosure rates. In short, there is overwhelming evidence of investors
targeting vulnerable neighborhoods in the wake of the foreclosure crisis, including those
in Detroit’s middle- and working class neighborhoods.
As noted above, investors are not inherently bad for neighborhoods. Investors have
long played a vital role in supplying rental housing, but some types of investors attracted
to lower-income neighborhoods are linked to negative outcomes, as demonstrated in this
study. This study has identied the substantial presence of “ippers,” which purchase low-
value properties and (attempt to) sell them quickly in as-is or similar condition (Mallach,
2010). I have also identied the presence of “milkers,” who purchase distressed properties
and rent them in as-is condition with minimal, if any, maintenance. Milkers are similar
to contract sellers, who sell properties at inated prices in as-is condition on contract,
making buyers responsible for maintenance and property taxes. Contract sellers often
structure their deals to precipitate the eventual default of buyers, who are vulnerable to
summary eviction (Satter, 2010). Some investors, usually those with local ties, pursue
strategies predicated on property appreciation. These include rehabbers, who purchase,
improve, and resell properties at a prot, and holders, who rent their properties but main-
tain or improve their conditions based on an expectation of medium-to-long-term market
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improvement. While there is very little research indicating the relative share of each
type of investor among buyers of REO properties in dierent markets, studies of cities hit
hard by the foreclosure crisis nd strong connections between investor activity and neg-
ative outcomes. Ford et al. (2013) found that Cleveland REOs acquired by investors had a
high likelihood of being abandoned, condemned, subject to demolition, or tax delinquent.
Hwang (2015) found a similar association between investor buyers of REOs in Boston,
with investor-owned properties being more likely to be associated with a service request.
These studies also found that large and non-local investors were more likely to be asso-
ciated with negative outcomes than smaller and local investors (Ford et al., 2013; Herbert
et al., 2013).
While investor ownership is linked to negative outcomes in hard-hit neighborhoods,
owner-occupancy, conversely, is linked to neighborhood stability (Rohe & Stewart, 1996).
At the most basic level, homeownership insures occupancy. Investor-owned properties,
particularly those purchased by ippers and other types of speculators, often remain
vacant and susceptible to deterioration. Investor-owned rentals can also lead to blight,
as many investor landlords seek only short-term revenues, deferring or abstaining from
maintaining their properties. Homeowners, on the other hand, have a strong incentive to
maintain and invest in their properties, as these serve as a primary source of equity for
average households. The presence of homeowners can also attract other homeowners,
leading to a virtuous cycle of investment and improvement (G. C. Galster, 1987).
6.2 Institutional Sales Practices
As discussed in Chapter III, federal entities have a number of programs intended to
help homeowners, nonprots, and local governments compete in the market for REOs.
The focus of the present chapter is on homeowners, as the share of properties purchased
by local government entities and nonprots during the study period is extremely small
(Ellen et al., 2014). Both HUD and the GSEs have exclusive listing periods during which
90
investors are excluded from bidding on properties (“First Look”). Further, both entities
oer nancing with exible terms like low down-payments. The specics of how fed-
eral REOs are managed and marketed in places like Detroit, however, creates diculties
for prospective owner-occupants seeking to take advantage of these programs. For in-
stance, HUD does not make repairs to bring their properties up to standards for FHA-
insurance eligibility. Buyers must pay for such properties in cash. The GSEs, on the other
hand, repair a larger share of their inventory nationally, increasing their attractiveness
to homebuyers, but the geographic distribution of repairs is unknown (U.S. Government
Accountability Oce, 2013). Despite this higher national rate of repair for the GSEs, they
likely make minimal repairs in Detroit properties, directing their resources to markets
they deem safer and more remunerative. Recent examinations of REOs in neighborhoods
of color in central cities nationwide found that Fannie Mae, along with a number of large
lender servicers, systematically allowed a much larger share of its urban properties to
fall into disrepair relative to those in suburban and predominantly white neighborhoods
(National Fair Housing Alliance, 2014b). Further, both HUD and the GSEs sell properties
in as-is condition alone, meaning properties are sold without any guarantee as to their
condition or the perfection of title. This greatly increases the risk posed by the sale to the
buyer, dampening demand among prospective owner-occupants (H. Thomas, 2015). On-
line consumer aairs discussion boards also contain numerous complaints about Fannie
Mae’s systems for selling properties. For instance, complaints have been led about the
listing agents contracted to sell Fannie Mae’s REOs, including listing agents’ refusal to
work with buyers seeking nancing and listing agents not responding to bids in time to
take advantage of exclusive listing periods (“Top 93 Complaints and Reviews about Fannie
Mae,” n.d.).
Protocols for pricing properties can also adversely aect demand among prospective
owner-occupants. Anecdotal evidence indicates the GSEs initially list properties at prices
well above comparable homes, even in hard-hit markets. Many homebuyers are either un-
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able or unwilling to purchase at these prices, but by the time prices are dropped on unsold
properties, they are open to bidding from investors, who are at a competitive advantage
due to their ability to pay in cash (Perlberg, 2014). Changes in FHA rules for appraisals and
standards for originating insurance policies generated additional barriers for prospective
owner-occupants. For instance, FHA began to require random assignment of appraisers to
any property transaction in the metropolitan area, but the appraisers were likely to know
more about suburban properties and lack understanding of the diversity of neighborhood
housing markets in the city. They often further undervalued urban properties even in the
context of weak demand. FHA also began to retain middle-man companies to carry out
the random assignments and to collect fees for this service; this reduced appraisers’ fees
and made them less likely to want to appraise city properties (Dewar, Thomas, Deng, &
Seymour, 2016). While this policy change was intended to prevent the abuses that led
to the foreclosure crisis, it has had the unintended eect of dampening the purchasing
power of moderate-income buyers in cities like Detroit.
6.3 The Type and Concentration of REO Buyers
Table 6.1 shows the number of REO sales made to each category of buyer, as well as
dierences in the share of sales made to each type of buyer between strong neighbor-
hoods and other residential areas in Detroit. Small investors account for 37% of REO sales
citywide, making them the largest type of REO buyer during the study period. Individuals
acquired a slightly smaller share at 31% of REOs citywide, while large investors acquired
17%, and medium investors acquired 15%. The concentration of buyers in strong neigh-
borhoods is nearly identical to those in other neighborhoods, running somewhat counter
to previous studies’ ndings of greater investor activity in tracts with weaker housing
markets (e.g., Immergluck, 2012). Figure 6.1 shows annual changes in the concentration
of each type of buyer against the annual number of REO sales. This gure show that in-
vestors dominated the market for REO properties during the rst half of the study period
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when REO inventories grew at a rapid pace. In 2008, when the annual number of REO
sales was the largest, investors accounted for 75% of sales. Starting in 2010, however, indi-
viduals consistently accounted for roughly 40% of REO sales each year, making them the
largest type of buyer, both within and outside of Detroit’s strong neighborhoods. While
no directly comparable gures exist, investor activity in Detroit appears to consistently
dwarf the share of investor acquisitions found in other markets with large REO concen-
trations, including Fulton County (Atlanta) and Miami-Dade County. Investor activity in
Detroit does, however, resemble trends observed in low income block groups in Fulton
County (median income less than $30,000), where Immergluck (2012) observed investors
as a whole acquired 64% of REOs between January 2008 and April 2009.
Table 6.2 provides information on the share of sales made to each category of buyer
by each category of seller. It shows that each of the federal entities sold substantially
more properties to individuals in strong neighborhoods than private entities (24%), with
HUD selling the largest share among the three federal entities at 51%. Freddie Mac made
39% of its sales to individuals, with Fannie Mae close behind at 37%. HUD and Freddie
Mac also made a substantially smaller share of sales to large investors than either Fannie
Mae or private entities. Figure 6.2 presents the annual share of REO sales made to each
type of buyer by the entity making the sale. This gure shows that each of the federal
entities gradually sold a larger share of REOs to individuals and a decreasing share to small
investors, with the lines for these two types of buyers crisscrossing at a point near the
middle of the study period. Starting in 2009, HUD consistently sold between 48 and 56%
of its REOs to individuals. The share of sales made by Fannie to individuals rose above 40%
in 2010, the year Fannie Mae experienced its largest single-year number of acquisitions,
but gradually fell as a larger share of sales were made to both small and large investors in
2011 and 2012, when Fannie Mae increased its sales volume. Trends in the concentration
of buyers for Freddie Mac roughly mirror those for Fannie Mae, but Freddie Mac came
to make more than 50% of its annual REO sales to individuals, and it never made much
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more than 10% of sales to large investors. Freddie Mac’s annual number of acquisitions,
however, did not rise in 2010 as it did for Fannie Mae, so Freddie Mac likely experienced
less pressure to escalate dispositions to investors. Finally, private entities made sales to
each type of buyer at a fairly consistent level across the study period, with a notable bump
in the share of sales to large investors in 2008 and 2009.
Table 6.3 presents the concentration of investors and owner-occupants among REO
buyers in Detroit and suburban locations. A much larger share of REOs were sold to
individuals in suburban locations compared to Detroit’s strong neighborhoods. Roughly
52% of REOs were sold to individuals in inner-ring suburbs, while more than 70% were
sold to individuals in outer-ring areas. The share of properties sold to investors in the
suburbs changed little over the study period, while the share of REOs sold to individuals
in Detroit increased after 2008, moving from roughly 25% to nearly 40%—still much lower
than the comparable gures for suburban locations. Among REO sales to investors, small
investors account for an increasingly large share with distance from the city. In the city
of Detroit, where the percentage of investor sales are highest, small investors account for
56% of all such sales. The comparable gures for inner- and outer-ring suburbs are 71%
and 86%, respectively.
6.4 REO Sale Prices
REO sale prices fell dramatically after the rst few years of the study period, mirroring
results from studies of REO sale price trends in Atlanta (Immergluck, 2012) and Cleveland
(Coulton et al., 2008). Figure 6.3 shows that the share of REO properties in strong neigh-
borhoods sold for less than $10,000 increased from under one percent in 2005 to 55% in
2008 and 70% in 2009.1 The rapid increase in the share of properties selling at extremely
1As noted elsewhere, REO sales included in the analysis are only for properties for which a document
of a completed mortgage foreclosure was recorded starting on January 1, 2005. Other REO sales occurred
during the study period for properties with a completed mortgage foreclosure documented prior to 2005.
Analysis of Social Compact records agged as “REO Sales” from 2005 to 2010, regardless of their foreclosure
date, shows these records have sales prices consistent with those derived from the post-foreclosure database.
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discounted prices is consistent with previous studies showing that as the foreclosure cri-
sis spread in 2008 and nancial markets collapsed, owners of REO properties began to
empty their inventories at re-sale prices (Immergluck, 2012). As shown above, REO
acquisitions—particularly among private entities—surged in 2007 and 2008. Banks and
federal entities have strong incentives to reduce their inventories, so they likely dramati-
cally lowered prices to reduce their exposure to nancial risk vis-à-vis REO properties.
Figure 6.4 presents the share of REO sales by price range in strong neighborhoods
for the GSEs, HUD, and private entities. The patterns exhibited by each of these sellers
broadly reect the overall trend of a rapid rise in the number of REOs sold at extremely
low prices starting in 2008. HUD and private entities, however, sold somewhat larger
shares of properties after 2007 for under $10,000 than either of the GSEs. From 2008
to 2012, between 64% and 70% of HUD’s sales were priced under $10,000, with the year
HUD made far and away its largest number of sales, 2009, exhibiting the largest share
of sales below $10,000. This is also the rst year HUD made more sales to individuals
than investors. Private entities made ever larger shares of sales below $10,000 after 2008,
even as inventory and sales plummeted, perhaps reecting the deteriorated condition of
properties lingering in inventory.2 In terms of the overall share of sales made for less
than $10,000 from 2008 to 2013, HUD stands at 66%, private entities at 63%, Fannie at 60%,
and Freddie at 44%. Also worth noting from this gure is the share of properties sold
by private entities for less than $500. Private entities made between 15% to 20% of sales
in this price range starting in 2008, while the share of sales made in this price range by
federal entities was marginal. To assist with comparing trends in sale prices among these
four sellers, Figure 6.5 shows changes in the median sale price over time in both strong
neighborhoods and other neighborhoods. These gures show relatively little separation
I present information only for sales with a document price of at least one dollar. Some properties were
donated and fall in $0 category, but this category also includes records for which parties failed to record the
sale price, meaning some belong in higher-value categories. Other records were indeed transacted for $0 to
investors. Given this uncertainly, I focus on properties with at least a $1 sales amount.
2The duration of properties in federal entities is taken up in a later chapter.
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among sellers, with the exception of the climbing median sale prices for Freddie Mac from
2009 ($8,050) to 2011 ($15,050). Median sale prices for Freddie Mac fell to the level of other
sellers again by 2013. Median sales prices among other sellers were relatively at after
2008.
Figure 6.6 shows the distribution of REO sale prices in strong neighborhoods for each
category of buyer, excluding government and nonprot entities due to their trivial pres-
ence among buyers, and Figure 6.7 compares the median sale prices for these buyers in
strong and other neighborhoods. The ndings are precisely as expected based on prior
research: individuals paid the most for REOs and investors paid less as the overall number
of properties they acquired grew. In other words, large investors paid the least, on aver-
age, for REOs, while small investors, many likely mom-and-pop operations, paid the most
among investors. In 2008 and 2009, when the number of REO sales skyrocketed, nearly
half of the purchases made by large investors were at prices below $500. These were also
the two years when large investors accounted for their largest share of sales during the
study period (see Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.10 shows the median REO sale prices across the three comparison areas, i.e.,
Detroit’s strong neighborhoods and inner- and outer-ring suburbs. Median sale prices
in Detroit plummeted between 2005 and 2008, after which they remained at. Inner-and
outer-ring suburban areas also experienced a substantial decline in sale prices through
2009, but both areas saw rebounding sale prices after 2011, particularly in the outer-ring
suburbs. REO sale prices in outer-ring locations climbed to 75% of their 2005 peak values,
while the comparable gures for inner-ring locations and Detroit’s strong neighborhoods
are 50% and just 9%, respectively.
6.5 Predicting Sales to Investors
In this section, I discuss the statistical techniques I used for estimating the likelihood of
federal and private entities selling REOs to investors and the results of those procedures.
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The reason for using regression analysis, in addition to the descriptive analysis of investor
acquisitions presented above, is to remove the eects of a given property’s character and
location in inuencing whether or not the property was sold to an investor. As discussed
elsewhere in this dissertation, the literature shows that investors are more likely than
prospective owner-occupants to purchase lower quality properties and those located in
areas with greater disinvestment (Mallach, 2010). Homebuyers principally seek primary
residences ready for occupation, while investors in declining areas often look to cheaply
add properties to their portfolios of rental properties. Among federal entities is more
likely to have smaller and potentially lower-quality properties in its inventory. This is
due to the fact FHA-insurance is primarily used for rst-time homebuyers, who typically
have less wealth than experienced owners seeking loans without FHA insurance. The
descriptive statistics show that HUD sold a larger share of REOs to owner-occupants, but
this dierence could possibly stem from the character and location of these properties
rather than from HUD’s sales practices. It is with the intention of removing the eects of
these other explanatory variables that I use regression analysis. The specic technique I
use is logistic regression, which is used for predicting a binary outcome, in this case being
the dichotomous outcome of sale either to an investor or an owner-occupant.
6.5.1 Detroit-Only Models
Using the database of post-foreclosure pathways derived from the Social Compact and
WCROD data, I t a series of logistic regression models to test whether federal entities
were less likely to sell REOs to investors than private entities and whether annual dier-
ences in the likelihood of sales to investors among federal and private entities changed
during the study period. Additionally, I tested whether these dierences changed based
on the type of investor, i.e., whether investors were small, medium, or large, as dened
in previous chapters. I restricted the dataset to REOs that entered REO between 2005 and
2012 and were sold out of inventory between 2006 and 2013. Since I only identied REO
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sales for properties that entered REO on or after January 1, 2005, the number of REO sales
identied in the database for 2005 is small relative to the number of sales identied in
subsequent years. The database includes just six REO sales from HUD and eight sales
from Freddie Mac in 2005, making data for that year too sparse to include in the model.
The dataset was further reduced to just REOs sold to investors and individuals and prop-
erties located in a census tract having at least 100 residential parcels (i.e., the same tracts
included in the cluster analysis used to dene strong and other neighborhoods).
The independent variables of primary interest are dummy variables generated for each
combination of federal entity and REO sale year. Each of these variables takes sales by
private entities as the reference category. Taking 2006, for example, I included one vari-
able where all properties sold by Fannie Mae are coded 1 and all other observations are
coded 0. I repeated this coding scheme for Freddie Mac and HUD, while omitting the
generation of a variable for private entities. This scheme for coding sales in 2006 is re-
peated through 2013. These variables’ coecients represent annual dierences between
federal and private entities in the log odds of selling to an investor. To account for annual
dierences, I included dummy variables for each year, taking 2006 as the reference year.
To account for seasonal dierences in market activity, I also included a series of dummies
for each quarter of the year, taking the rst quarter (January, February, March) as the
reference category. I further t the model with property characteristics, specically, oor
area, assessed value in the year of foreclosure, and the time between the Sheri’s sale and
REO sale in days. I centered these property-level variables on their mean values to aid
in interpreting the intercept. Finally, I included census tract xed eects to control for
neighborhood context. The formal specication of this model is as follows:
ln
[
Pinvestorpurchase
1 − Pinvestorpurchase
]
= b0 + b1 · SellerYeari + b2 · Yeari + b3 ·Quarteri
+ b4 · Propertyi + b5 · Daysi + b6 ·Tracti + ei
(6.1)
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Where Pinvestor purchase is the probability of property i being sold to an investor; SellerYear
is a set of dummy variables indicating sale of property i by seller j in year k, where all
sales made by investors in year k are coded 0; Year is a set of dummy variables for the
year in which property i was sold; Property is a vector of property characteristics; Quarter
is a set of dummy variables controlling for the quarter in which property i was sold;
Days is a variable controlling for the time in days between Sheri’s sale and REO sale;
Tract is a series of dummy variables for each census tract controlling for area-invariant
neighborhood characteristics, and e is the error term.
I regressed the binary outcome of whether or not a property was sold to an investor
on the independent variables described in the above paragraph, rst using the entire re-
stricted dataset for REO sales in Detroit, then on REO sales in strong neighborhoods alone,
and nally on REO sales in other neighborhoods alone. I ran the model with these two
subsets of the Detroit database to allow models for strong and other neighborhoods to
have dierent intercepts, reecting the log odds of a sale to an investor in 2006 by a pri-
vate entity, and dierent coecients for each dummy variable representing an interaction
between sale by one of the three federal entities and year. Property variables and Days are
standardized against the grand mean for Detroit properties to facilitate interpretation.
Table 6.4 presents the odds ratios and the standard errors of the raw log odds estimates.
Overall, the results show that, all else being equal, federal entities were less likely to sell
properties to investors than were private entities, with HUD exhibiting the greatest sepa-
ration from private entities. The odds ratios for Fannie Mae are signicant across all three
models starting in 2009, with the exception of 2013 in strong neighborhoods, indicating
Fannie Mae were successful in increasing their odds of selling constant-quality housing
to owner-occupants in the second half of the study period. The odds ratios for HUD
are signicant across all models starting in 2008. Fannie Mae and HUD both exhibited the
greatest dierence from private entities in 2010, the year the national First Look programs
were launched (the programs were ocially started late 2009). The odds ratio for Fannie
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Mae in 2010 is 0.498 and the odds ratio for HUD just 0.238. After 2010, the likelihoods of
Fannie, HUD, and private entities selling a given property to an investor exhibit a modest
convergence. Freddie Mac exhibited the greatest separation from private entires in strong
neighborhoods in 2012; the odds ratio for Freddie Mac in that year is 0.480. Unlike Fannie
Mae and HUD, the odds ratios for sales made by Freddie Mac in 2010 are not signicant
in any of the models. Annual changes in the likelihood of private entities selling a given
property to an investor are reected in the coecients for the dummy variables indicat-
ing the year of sale. Relative to 2006, the results, overall, indicate private entities were
more likely to sell properties to investors between 2007 and 2009, when the volume of
private entities’ REO sales escalated in response to growing inventory. The coecients
are signicant and below 1 in 2012 and 2013, meaning private entities were less likely to
sell properties to investors in those two years than they were in 2006. Coecients for
property characteristics indicate larger and higher-valued homes were less likely to sell
to investors, while homes with longer periods between Sheri’s sale and REO sale were
more likely to be sold to investors, conforming to previous ndings.
To clarify the presentation of these results, Figure 6.11 shows the predicted probabil-
ity of sale to an investor based on the coecients from the citywide and strong neigh-
borhoods only models. More precisely, they show the predicted probability of sale to an
investor for a property possessing average values, either citywide or for strong neigh-
borhoods alone, for assessed value, oor area, and days on the market in a census tract
having the average owner-occupancy rate. Not surprisingly, these results resemble the
rates of sales to investors presented in the chapter showing descriptive statistics derived
from the citywide database of post-foreclosure pathways. While many of the coecients
in the model are statistically signicant, indicating the consistent presence of a dierence
between each federal entity and private entities as a whole, the practical dierences be-
tween federal and private entities are quite modest in some years, particularly among the
GSEs. HUD, however, is easily seen to have a much lower predicted probability of sell-
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ing a given home to an investor during and after 2008. Based on the citywide model, the
percentage point dierence between HUD and private entities ranges from nearly 20% in
2008 to more than 30% in 2010. Fannie Mae never diers from private entities by more
than 12 percentage points, while Freddie Mac, after several years of minor dierences,
exhibits am 18 percentage point dierence from private entities in 2012. Compared to
the predicted probability for properties citywide, the comparable gures derived from the
model using observations from strong neighborhoods alone exhibits a lower overall prob-
ability of sales to investors, with HUD predicted to sell fewer than 50% of properties to
investors from 2008 through 2013. No other entity is predicted to have sold 50% or more
of its REO sales in a given year to owner-occupants, with the exception of Freddie Mac,
with a predicted probability of selling 48% of its REOs to investors in 2012.
To address the question of whether dierences between federal and private entities in
terms of likelihood of sale to an investor depend on the size of the investor, I conducted
multinomial logistic regression. For the dependent variable, I grouped sales to medium
and large investors together due to the sparseness of sales to either large or medium
investor by Freddie Mac and HUD in some years. Sales to individuals were coded as 0,
sales to small investors coded as 1, and sales to medium and large investors coded as
2. The multinomial regression calculates odds for each of these two levels of investor
buyers against the reference category of sales to individuals. As several tracts lacked
sales to large and medium investors by Freddie and HUD, I dropped census tract xed
eects from the model and included census tract indicators of housing market strength
and spatial expansion terms used in similar studies to reduce spatial autocorrelation (Can,
1997; G. Galster, Temkin, Walker, & Sawyer, 2004; Immergluck & Smith, 2006a). The
specic neighborhood indicators included in the model are median home value of owner-
occupied housing in 2000, median household income in 1999, poverty rate in 1999, and
owner-occupancy rate in 2000. The spatial expansion terms involve adding to the model
latitude(y), longitude(x), x2 , y2, with x and y having rst been normalized. Table 6.5
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presents the results of the multinomial model along with the results of a binary logit
regressing sale to an investor on the same predictors included in the multinomial model.
The formal model is specied as follows:
ln
[
Pij
Pi1
]
= b0j + b1j · SellerYeari + b2j · Yeari + b3j ·Quarteri
+ b4j · Propertyi + b5j · Daysi + b6j · Nbhdi + ei + b7j · Spacei + ei
(6.2)
Where i is the ith individual, j is the jth category of buyer, j = 1 represents a sale to
an owner-occupant, Nbhd is a vector of tract-level neighborhood attributes, and Space
represents the spatial terms described above.
Overall, the results of the multinomial model indicate that for federal entities the odds
of sale to a medium or large investor rather than an individual as compared to the odds for
private entities are much smaller than federal entities’ odds of selling a given property to
a small investor rather than an individual when compared to private entities. This pattern
is most apparent for HUD, for whom odds ratios for sales to medium or large investors
fall below 0.20 each year including and after 2008. An exception to this pattern is found
in the higher odds ratios for Fannie Mae in 2012 and 2013 in the column comparing sales
to medium and large investors with sales to individuals. This nding suggests that the
elevated rate of sales to large investors during these years is not explained by dierences
in the property quality or location of properties sold by Fannie, but rather by Fannie’s
increase in bulk sales in those years—bulk sales involving properties from both strong
and other neighborhoods (see Figure 6.2).3 Coecients for property characteristics are
similar to those obtained in the initial logit models.
3Multinomial regression was also conducted using just sales in strong tracts with results similar to those
of the model using the citywide dataset.
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6.5.2 Regional Model
To address the question of whether federal and private entities were less likely to sell
properties to investors in Detroit’s strong neighborhoods than they were in suburban lo-
cations, I constructed a logistic regression model for use with my regional post-foreclosure
database. The dependent variable remained the binary outcome of a sale to an investor
or a sale to an individual. The parameters of primary interest in this model reect the
interaction of seller, year, and, unlike in the Detroit-only model, location, as well as indi-
vidual dummy variables for each location, reecting the change in intercept for each of
the two suburban locations with reference to Detroit’s strong neighborhoods. The formal
specication of the model is as follows:
ln
[
Pinvestorpurchase
1 − Pinvestorpurchase
]
= b0 + b1 · SellerYearLocationi + b2 · Yeari + b3 ·Quarteri
+ b4 · Propertyi + b5 · Daysi + b6 · Nbhdi
+ b7 ·Countyi + b8 · Locationi + b9 · SpatLaдi + ei
(6.3)
Where SellerYearLocation is a set of dummy variables indicating sale of property i by seller
j in year k and location l, where l takes the levels of Detroit, inner-ring suburb, and outer-
ring suburb; County is a set of dummy variables indicating the county in which property
i is located; Location is a set of dummy variables for each of the two suburban locations;
and SpatLag is the inverse distance-weighted average of arm’s length home sale prices
occurring within 5,000 feet of and 180 days prior to sale of property i.4 Because there
4Before arriving at the model presented here, I had attempted to t a model including county subdivision,
but this resulted in rank deciency. This is due to an insucient number of observations for combination
of seller, buyer, year, and county subdivision. As a result, I employed controls for counties. In order to
control for spatial context above and beyond what was already accounted for by the census tract indicators
of housing market strength, I included the spatial lag of home sales prices, which controls for time-variant
neighborhood attributes centered on each REO property through the capitalization of these attributes in
adjacent home sale prices. I conducted a likelihood ratio test to compare the t of models with and without
the spatial lag term. The likelihood ratio chi-square is 202.807 and a has a p-value < 0.0001, indicating a
highly statistically signicant improvement in model t.
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were too few reversions for some categories of sellers in 2005 and 2006, I restricted the
dataset to REOs that entered REO between 2006 and 2012 and were sold out of inventory
between 2007 and 2013.
Table 6.6 presents the results of the regression analysis. As with the Detroit-only
models, the parameter estimates for the federal entity indicators are almost all statisti-
cally signicant and lower than 1. Thus, regardless of location in the Detroit tri-county
area, federal entities were more likely to sell a given property to an owner-occupant than
a private entity, all else being equal. The dummy variables for inner- and outer-suburban
location are highly signicant, with the indicator for sales in inner-ring suburbs having
an odds ratio of 0.634 and the indicator for sales in outer-ring suburbs having an odds
ratio of 0.438. These results indicate investors are less likely to sell properties to investors
at greater distances from Detroit, even after controlling for property characteristics and
neighborhood housing market indicators. Because of these locational dierences in the
odds of a private entity selling a property to an investor, the odds ratios calculated for
the federal entities in each of the three locations, i.e., Detroit, inner- and outer-ring sub-
urbs, are not directly comparable. In other words, an odds ratio of 0.382 for Fannie Mae
in Detroit in 2010 equates to a dierent probability of making a sale to an investor than a
hypothetically equal odds ratio estimated for either suburban location. In outer-ring sub-
urbs, for instance, an odds ratio larger than 0.383 actually translates to a lower probability
of sale to an investor than the lower odds ratio in Detroit due to the inclusion of the term
for location.
To illustrate these dierences, Figure 6.12 shows the probability of sale to an investor
for federal and private entities for an average property in an average neighborhood in each
one of the three locations, i.e., Detroit’s strong neighborhood and inner- and outer-ring
suburbs. Probabilities for both inner- and outer-ring suburbs were calculated for prop-
erties located in Oakland County. The predicted probabilities for Detroit’s strong neigh-
borhoods are similar to those predicted in the Detroit-only model, with private entities
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consistently having an 80% predicted probability of selling a given REO to an investor
in each year between 2007 and 2013. The predicted probabilities for the GSEs and HUD
are comparable to the results of the Detroit-model in terms of their annual dierences
from the baseline of sales by private entities. These probabilities, however, are somewhat
higher than those produced form the Detroit-only model, as seen in Figure 6.11 Predicted
probabilities for the two suburban locations are substantially lower than those for De-
troit’s strong neighborhoods. Some of this dierence is due to the dierences between
the three locations in terms of average property characteristics and neighborhood condi-
tions, but the parameter estimate for dierences between inner- and outer-ring suburbs
and Detroit’s strong neighborhoods accounts for the majority of the dierences in the
levels for annual predicted probabilities. As seen in the gure, private entities are far less
likely to have sold an area-average REO to an investor in suburban locations. Predicated
probabilities in inner-ring suburbs range between 52% and 66%, while they range from
just 31% to 44% in outer-ring suburbs. Given these lower baseline predicted probabilities
in a given year in suburban locations, comparable odds ratios for federal entities in these
locations translate into smaller dierences in predicted probabilities relative to private
entities. HUD retains a lower predicted probability of selling to an investor than private
entities or the GSEs in inner-ring suburbs, with a 19 percentage-point dierence from
private entities in 2010. In outer-ring neighborhoods, where the gap between private and
federal entities is the smallest, the dierence between HUD and private entities is just 12
percentage points. In terms of change over time, the probabilities of federal entities selling
to investors in the two suburban locations do not exhibit the same decrease in the like-
lihood of sale to investors exhibited in Detroit during and after 2010. The probability of
federal entities selling to investors in Detroit’s strong neighborhoods, however, remains
high relative to the comparable gures in the suburbs, despite the consistent trend lines
observed in these locations.
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6.5.3 Discussion of Models Predicting Sale to an Investor
Considered together, the above results provide provisional support for the claim that
federal First Look programs launched in late 2009 made a dierence in increasing the
likelihood of a given property in Detroit being sold to an owner-occupant, particularly
for an average property in the city’s strong neighborhoods. HUD, in particular, exhibited
a sharp decrease in the probability of selling a given property to an investor after 2007,
reaching its lowest annual probability of selling to an investor in 2010. What remains to
be explained, however, is the reason for the decline in probability of sale to an investor in
2009. Particularly remarkable is the fact that HUD’s probability of selling to an investor
was lowest, and far lower than the GSEs and private entities, in the same year that it made
its single largest annual number of sales, which reached nearly 3,000 in 2010 (see Figure
6.2). Some of this dierence from the GSEs may be attributable to the availability of the
more aordable and exible nancing oered through FHA than conventional sources.
Fannie Mae exhibits a smaller gap between its predicted probability of selling a given
property to an investor and the comparable gure for private entities, though the gap for
Fannie, too, grew to its largest in 2010. As noted above, Fannie exhibits a modest increase
in the probability of selling to an investor after 2010, the same period during which its
inventory grew, likely as a result of failed trial modications. In terms of nancing, Fannie
Mae only rolled out a nancing program intended to be competitive with FHA-nancing,
the HomeReady mortgage, in 2016. Unlike Fannie Mae and HUD, Freddie Mac did not
exhibit a lower probability of selling to an investor than a private entity in 2010, though
the gap between Freddie Mac and private entities grew wider than the gap between Fannie
Mae and private entities in 2011 and remained wider after.
Compared to Detroit’s strong neighborhoods, inner- and outer-ring suburbs exhibit a
far lower likelihood of federal and private entities selling area-average properties to in-
vestors, with little change in these predicted probabilities over time. These ndings are
consistent with a similar recent study of REO pathways in metropolitan Chicago (McMil-
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lan & Chakraborty, 2016). Much of this dierence is explained by the substantially lower
activity of medium and large investors in suburban locations, particularly in outer-ring
suburbs, where they acquired a combined share of just 4% of REO sales (see Table 6.3).
The relative absence of medium and large investors from suburban locations, in turn, is
likely explained by many investors’ motivation to acquire properties to oer them on the
rental market and the economy of scale derived from acquiring rental properties in con-
centrated areas. Combined with the bulk sales of Detroit homes by federal and private
entities alike, large-scale investors had obvious incentives for targeting their activities in
central-city Detroit and some its neighboring municipalities. It is precisely in these areas
where federal programs intended to provide prospective owner-occupants with the means
to compete with investors in the market for mortgage-reverted properties could have the
greatest eect. While the results presented here provide modest evidence of such pro-
grams’ success in making a larger share of REO sales to owner-occupants, the majority of
properties were ultimately acquired by investors. The impact of these investors’ acquisi-
tions is addressed in the next section.
6.6 Blight Violations and Tax Foreclosure Following Sale
6.6.1 Determination of Tax Foreclosure among Former REOs
Table 6.7 shows the number and percentage of REOs sold by federal and private enti-
ties that were later subject to tax foreclosure. This table presents the number and share
of properties that were tax-reverted after the REO sale but prior to any subsequent sale,
as well as gures for properties that were repossessed for back taxes at any point after
the REO sale. As the table shows, REOs sold by private entities were much more likely
to experience tax foreclosure than those sold by federal entities. Fully 50% of REOs sold
by private entities were eventually repossessed for delinquent property taxes, while the
comparable gures for federal entities fell between 27 and 31%. The higher tax-reversion
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rate of private entities’ former REOs, particularly when looking at tax foreclosures occur-
ring after one or more sales, is largely a function of the larger share of sales they made
to investors, many of whom ipped large numbers of properties, often to other investors.
The net eect of intra-investor trading of former REOs is the repeated deferral of respon-
sible ownership behavior, as indicated here trough failure to pay property taxes. To illus-
trate this cycle, Table 6.8 shows the tax-reversion rate among former REOs purchased by
each category of buyer. While the tax-reversion rate for large investors is already highest
among buyers prior to resale, the share of properties that were purchased out of REO by
large investors balloons to nearly 70% when looking at tax-reversion at any point after the
initial REO sale. As expected, the incidence of tax foreclosure among REOs purchased by
individuals barely changes given individual buyers’ search for a primary residence, not a
speculative investment vehicle.
While a smaller share of REOs formerly owned by federal entities experienced tax
foreclosure, the gures are hardly trivial. More than 20% of REOs formerly owned by
federal entities were tax reverted after only one sale, and more than 25% were tax-reverted
at a later date regardless of the number of sales after exiting REO.
6.6.2 Determination of Blight among Former REOs
In November 2013, the Blight Removal Task Force (BRTF) began a parcel-by-parcel
survey of property conditions in Detroit in order to identify blighted properties and cre-
ate a list of properties prioritized for demolition. Properties were classied as blighted
and placed on the prioritized demolition list if they met one of several criteria. The BRTF
summarizes these conditions thusly: “properties that are exposed to the elements, are not
structurally sound, are in need of major repairs, are re damaged, or have essentially been
turned into a neighborhood dumping ground, were classied as ‘blight’ by the Task Force”
(Detroit Blight Removal Task Force, 2014). Among Detroit’s roughly 380,000 properties,
the BRTF identied 40,777 blighted structures and 38,429 further properties with the po-
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tential to meet the Task Force’s blight criteria in the near future. The BRTF counted all
properties owned by the federal entities among the latter group of properties.
Table 6.9 shows the share of former REOs that the BRTF identied as blighted by the
REO inventory of origin.5 Nearly 25% of former REOs owned by private entities at any
point during the study period were recommended for immediate removal, in both strong
and other neighborhoods, and more than 40% of current and former privately owned REOs
were agged as either blighted or possessing indicators of becoming future blight. Federal
entities exhibited lower shares of former REOs classied as blighted, with HUD showing
the lowest percentages of properties requiring immediate treatment. As expected, prop-
erties entering REO prior to 2009 show a greater likelihood of requiring treatment than
properties repossessed after 2009, though the percentages across these two time periods
remains quite close for private entities. This suggests improvements in federal disposition
practices after the peak of the foreclosure crisis, particularly in terms of sales to individ-
uals, may have led to better outcomes for former REOs. Table 6.10 supports this idea,
showing that a far smaller share of former REOs acquired by individuals were agged as
potentially in need of demolition or repair. Fully 60% of former REOs acquired by large in-
vestors were agged as either blighted or possessing indicators of becoming future blight,
with more than than 30% agged for immediate removal, regardless of when these prop-
erties entered REO.
6.6.3 Regression Analysis of Tax Foreclosure by Buyer Type
To examine dierences in the impacts of selling properties to investors relative to
owner-occupants, I t a logistic regression model regressing the dichotomous outcome of
whether or not a given former REO property was subject to tax foreclosure on the type
of buyer. As discussed in prior chapters, tax foreclosure is a strong indicator of prop-
erty disinvestment. Though the descriptive statistics show that investors’ acquisitions
5This table considers only former REOs as the BRTF classied all current federally owned properties as
possessing indicators of future blight.
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were subject to tax-reversion at a substantially higher rate than individuals’ acquisitions
(see Table 6.8), these dierences are certainly inuenced by property characteristics and
neighborhood housing market conditions. I used logistic regression to control for these
other factors likely to inuence buyers’ decisions to allow properties to lapse into tax
foreclosure. Since many investors ip their properties, often to other investors, I examine
whether properties are subject to tax foreclosure at any point after their initial purchase
by an investor, regardless of whether they were sold to other investors. The formal spec-
ication of the model is as follows:
ln
[
Ptax f oreclosure
1 − Ptax f oreclosure
]
= b0 + b1 · Buyeri + b2 · Yeari + b3 ·Quarteri
+ b4 · Propertyi + b5 ·Tracti + b6 · SpatLaдi + ei
(6.4)
Where Buyer is a set of dummy variables indicating whether the property was purchased
by a small investor or a medium to large investor, taking purchases by individuals as the
reference category. The data supplied to this model are derived from the Detroit-specic
database of post-foreclosure pathways for years 2006 through 2012. I include only records
through 2012 as three years are required for tax forfeiture to occur.
Table 6.11 presents the results of the logit model. I ran the regression three sepa-
rate times using (1) all Detroit observations, (2) observations in strong neighborhoods
alone, and (3) observations from other residential areas in Detroit. Overall, the results
conrm that investors are indeed more likely to allow their REO acquisitions to fall into
tax foreclosure than owner-occupants, with medium and large investors being consider-
ably more likely to have properties experience tax foreclosure than either individuals or
small investors. In the citywide model, the odds ratio for small investors is 1.626 while the
odds ratio for medium and large investors is 3.248. The model restricted to observations
from strong neighborhoods alone exhibits smaller coecients for the investor dummy
variables, while the model for other neighborhoods exhibits larger coecients. The pa-
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rameter estimates for the constant term and annual eects, however, are dierent across
the models, making it dicult to directly compare the parameters for the investor dum-
mies. The dummy variables for the year of the REO sale, which take 2006 as the reference
category, indicate an increase in the odds of tax foreclosure through 2009, again, relative
to 2006, after which the relative odds fall quite steeply. As expected, increased values of
the spatial lag term decrease the odds of subsequent tax foreclosure.
To aid in the interpretation of these results, I again present the predicted probabilities
generated from the model results. Figure 6.13 presents these predicted probabilities, which
were calculated using citywide averages for property characteristics and based on the hy-
pothetical property’s location in a tract possessing the average owner-occupancy rate for
each area.6 Overall, the predicted probability for an average property being subsequently
subject to tax reversion is incredibly high, regardless of location or buyer type, with in-
vestors, as expected, possessing the highest probability of later allowing properties to
fall into tax foreclosure. In 2008, the year of peak probability, medium and large investors
had an 83% predicted probability of having an acquisition with average characteristics and
situated in an average neighborhood later repossessed due to tax delinquency. The com-
parable gures for small investors and individuals are 71% and 60%, respectively. The 2008
values in strong neighborhoods, now for property with citywide-average housing char-
acteristics, but located in a tract having the average owner-occupancy rate among strong
neighborhoods alone, are 76% for medium and large investors, 64% for small investors,
and 53% for individuals. The predicted probability for individuals in strong tracts falls
below 50% in 2009, while small investors fall below this threshold in 2010, and medium
and large investors only do so in 2011.
Having estimated a model including only the main eects of buyer type, i.e., individ-
ual versus small investors versus medium and large investors, I subsequently estimated
6The model predicts dierent levels for dierent tracts, with some having higher odds and some having
lower odds of a property going through tax foreclosure, but I chose to present the predicted probabilities
for an average tract for illustrative purposes.
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a model including interaction terms for the type of buyer and the year of purchase. I
hypothesize that the composition of actors within each overall category of buyer might
change over time, leading to annual dierences among these entities in terms of their rel-
ative likelihood of allowing properties to enter tax foreclosure. The formal specication
of this model is as follows:
ln
[
Ptax f oreclosure
1 − Ptax f oreclosure
]
= b0 + b1 · BuyerYeari + b2 · Yeari + b3 ·Quarteri
+ b4 · Propertyi + b5 ·Tracti + b6 · SpatLaдi + ei
(6.5)
Where BuyerYear is a vector of terms indicating sale of property i by buyer type j in
year k. This term is analogous to the SellerYear term included in the Detroit-only models
predicting the odds of sale to an investor. Table 6.12 presents the results of this model.
The odds ratios for the terms indicating the interaction of buyer and year exhibit mod-
est variation, the most substantial of which is the dierence between the odds ratios for
medium and large investors from 2008 to 2009—the odds ratio jumps from 2.622 to 4.054—
indicating a higher probability of tax foreclosure in 2009 for medium and large investors
than estimated from xed eects alone. In a plot of the probabilities generated from these
interaction terms, this dierence among medium and large investors in 2009 is the only
clearly noticeable dierence, besides the trend lines beginning much closer in 2006. See
Figure 6.14.
The extremely high predicted probability of an REO purchased between 2006 and 2009
later being subject to tax foreclosure is explained in part by the bulk acquisition strategies
of medium and large investors. Some, if not many of these classes of investors pursued
a triage approach to acquiring REOs, whereby they would purchase in large numbers
with the understanding only a fraction of them could be quickly ipped for a prot. The
rest were intentionally allowed to fall into tax foreclosure. Changes in the lower predicted
probability of tax foreclosure over time likely reect changes in the composition of buyers,
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even among large investors, after the earlier wave of predatory nance absorbed large
numbers of Detroit properties. Despite these improvements, the predicted rate at which
average properties entered tax foreclosure remained unacceptably high. The predicted
probability of medium and large investors’ 2012 acquisition of an average property still
exceeds 25%. The predicted probability for individuals is also particularly high during
this time, suggesting that replacing investors with owner-occupants is hardly a panacea
for the tax foreclosure problem in Detroit. There are, however, local factors that increase
the likelihood of tax foreclosure in Detroit among many types of buyers, particularly the
articially high property tax assessments, which can lead to property tax bills exceeding
home values by the end of a three year period, i.e., the number of years between initial
tax delinquency and property forfeiture.
Figure 6.1: REO Sales by Buyer Type in Strong and Other Neighborhoods, 2005–2013.
Sources: CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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Figure 6.2: REO Sales by Seller and Buyer Type, Detroit 2005–2013. Sources: CoreLogic
(2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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Figure 6.3: Share of REO Sales by Price Range in Strong and Other Neighborhoods, 2005–
2013. Sources: CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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Figure 6.4: Share of REO Sales by Seller and Price Range in Strong Neighborhoods, 2005–
2013. Sources: CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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Figure 6.5: Median REO Sale Price by Seller in Strong and Other Neighborhoods, Detroit
2005–2013. Sources: CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
Table 6.4: Odds Ratios for Logistic Regression for Investor Purchase on REO Inventory of
Origin
Dependent variable:
Investor purchase
All Strong Other
(1) (2) (3)
TR_FANNIE2006 0.786∗ (0.129) 0.786 (0.176) 0.778 (0.189)
TR_FANNIE2007 0.805∗∗ (0.092) 0.916 (0.128) 0.706∗∗∗ (0.133)
TR_FANNIE2008 0.964 (0.074) 1.004 (0.098) 0.919 (0.114)
TR_FANNIE2009 0.532∗∗∗ (0.062) 0.568∗∗∗ (0.077) 0.480∗∗∗ (0.102)
TR_FANNIE2010 0.517∗∗∗ (0.075) 0.498∗∗∗ (0.095) 0.549∗∗∗ (0.123)
TR_FANNIE2011 0.599∗∗∗ (0.082) 0.591∗∗∗ (0.104) 0.617∗∗∗ (0.133)
TR_FANNIE2012 0.671∗∗∗ (0.086) 0.686∗∗∗ (0.110) 0.647∗∗∗ (0.138)
TR_FANNIE2013 0.752∗∗∗ (0.104) 0.800 (0.137) 0.681∗∗ (0.163)
TR_FREDDIE2006 0.511∗∗ (0.279) 0.372∗∗∗ (0.375) 0.767 (0.437)
TR_FREDDIE2007 0.772 (0.178) 0.802 (0.223) 0.715 (0.296)
TR_FREDDIE2008 0.705∗∗∗ (0.109) 0.747∗∗ (0.141) 0.651∗∗ (0.171)
TR_FREDDIE2009 0.594∗∗∗ (0.110) 0.636∗∗∗ (0.131) 0.526∗∗∗ (0.206)
TR_FREDDIE2010 0.917 (0.156) 0.828 (0.178) 1.367 (0.341)
120
TR_FREDDIE2011 0.533∗∗∗ (0.194) 0.562∗∗∗ (0.217) 0.489 (0.456)
TR_FREDDIE2012 0.428∗∗∗ (0.180) 0.480∗∗∗ (0.206) 0.247∗∗∗ (0.404)
TR_FREDDIE2013 0.541∗∗∗ (0.140) 0.507∗∗∗ (0.173) 0.562∗∗ (0.244)
TR_HUD2006 0.624∗∗∗ (0.144) 0.710∗∗ (0.174) 0.440∗∗∗ (0.268)
TR_HUD2007 0.899 (0.159) 1.081 (0.198) 0.644 (0.268)
TR_HUD2008 0.328∗∗∗ (0.124) 0.290∗∗∗ (0.141) 0.551∗∗ (0.269)
TR_HUD2009 0.281∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.314∗∗∗ (0.062) 0.237∗∗∗ (0.089)
TR_HUD2010 0.232∗∗∗ (0.074) 0.230∗∗∗ (0.091) 0.244∗∗∗ (0.127)
TR_HUD2011 0.305∗∗∗ (0.087) 0.340∗∗∗ (0.108) 0.241∗∗∗ (0.150)
TR_HUD2012 0.329∗∗∗ (0.096) 0.336∗∗∗ (0.118) 0.304∗∗∗ (0.165)
TR_HUD2013 0.385∗∗∗ (0.105) 0.372∗∗∗ (0.132) 0.382∗∗∗ (0.178)
reo_sale_year2007 1.235∗∗∗ (0.055) 1.222∗∗∗ (0.075) 1.245∗∗∗ (0.080)
reo_sale_year2008 1.373∗∗∗ (0.050) 1.366∗∗∗ (0.069) 1.369∗∗∗ (0.074)
reo_sale_year2009 1.159∗∗∗ (0.053) 1.072 (0.072) 1.306∗∗∗ (0.081)
reo_sale_year2010 0.915 (0.070) 0.896 (0.092) 0.938 (0.112)
reo_sale_year2011 0.903 (0.081) 0.896 (0.106) 0.908 (0.128)
reo_sale_year2012 0.800∗∗∗ (0.081) 0.850 (0.107) 0.723∗∗ (0.127)
reo_sale_year2013 0.777∗∗∗ (0.091) 0.895 (0.121) 0.632∗∗∗ (0.139)
quarter1 0.878∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.912∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.833∗∗∗ (0.044)
quarter2 0.917∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.968 (0.037) 0.843∗∗∗ (0.047)
quarter3 0.937∗∗ (0.030) 0.970 (0.038) 0.894∗∗ (0.049)
oor_area_ln_cgm 0.806∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.679∗∗∗ (0.051) 0.945 (0.050)
assessed_val_ln_cgm 0.880∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.922∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.812∗∗∗ (0.038)
timedelta_cgm 1.000∗∗∗ (0.00004) 1.000∗∗∗ (0.0001) 1.001∗∗∗ (0.0001)
Constant 3.310∗∗∗ (0.106) 3.004∗∗∗ (0.116) 6.851∗∗∗ (0.223)
Observations 53,521 32,116 21,405
Log Likelihood −30,343.340 −18,601.880 −11,687.970
Chi-square versus
null model 4,882.935
∗∗∗ 2,761.696∗∗∗ 2,173.942∗∗∗
Akaike Inf. Crit. 61,334.680 37,483.760 23,817.940
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Census tract xed eects not shown. Sources: City of Detroit Asses-
sor (2014), CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
Table 6.5: Odds Ratios for Multinomial Logistic Regression for Investor Type on REO
Inventory of Origin
Logistic Multinomial log-linear
All investors Small investors Medium and LargeInvestors
(1) (2) (3)
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TR_FANNIE2006 0.776∗∗ (0.127) 0.894 (0.133) 0.565∗∗∗ (0.172)
TR_FANNIE2007 0.788∗∗∗ (0.091) 0.991 (0.095) 0.507∗∗∗ (0.116)
TR_FANNIE2008 0.938 (0.073) 0.980 (0.081) 0.892 (0.081)
TR_FANNIE2009 0.529∗∗∗ (0.061) 0.835∗∗∗ (0.067) 0.307∗∗∗ (0.077)
TR_FANNIE2010 0.511∗∗∗ (0.074) 0.578∗∗∗ (0.083) 0.433∗∗∗ (0.091)
TR_FANNIE2011 0.603∗∗∗ (0.081) 0.516∗∗∗ (0.094) 0.697∗∗∗ (0.093)
TR_FANNIE2012 0.670∗∗∗ (0.085) 0.575∗∗∗ (0.099) 0.772∗∗∗ (0.097)
TR_FANNIE2013 0.753∗∗∗ (0.103) 0.634∗∗∗ (0.116) 0.927 (0.122)
TR_FREDDIE2006 0.510∗∗ (0.277) 0.542∗∗ (0.300) 0.450∗∗ (0.385)
TR_FREDDIE2007 0.772 (0.176) 0.861 (0.188) 0.643∗∗ (0.215)
TR_FREDDIE2008 0.674∗∗∗ (0.107) 0.990 (0.113) 0.363∗∗∗ (0.140)
TR_FREDDIE2009 0.582∗∗∗ (0.109) 0.874 (0.119) 0.364∗∗∗ (0.138)
TR_FREDDIE2010 0.878 (0.154) 0.909 (0.170) 0.839 (0.186)
TR_FREDDIE2011 0.501∗∗∗ (0.191) 0.616∗∗ (0.210) 0.354∗∗∗ (0.271)
TR_FREDDIE2012 0.419∗∗∗ (0.177) 0.482∗∗∗ (0.204) 0.349∗∗∗ (0.237)
TR_FREDDIE2013 0.560∗∗∗ (0.138) 0.605∗∗∗ (0.154) 0.490∗∗∗ (0.181)
TR_HUD2006 0.627∗∗∗ (0.142) 0.639∗∗∗ (0.154) 0.608∗∗∗ (0.185)
TR_HUD2007 0.870 (0.157) 0.995 (0.165) 0.685∗∗ (0.190)
TR_HUD2008 0.309∗∗∗ (0.122) 0.471∗∗∗ (0.133) 0.168∗∗∗ (0.170)
TR_HUD2009 0.281∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.502∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.127∗∗∗ (0.067)
TR_HUD2010 0.230∗∗∗ (0.073) 0.316∗∗∗ (0.080) 0.134∗∗∗ (0.100)
TR_HUD2011 0.307∗∗∗ (0.086) 0.372∗∗∗ (0.098) 0.241∗∗∗ (0.106)
TR_HUD2012 0.329∗∗∗ (0.095) 0.410∗∗∗ (0.108) 0.246∗∗∗ (0.119)
TR_HUD2013 0.390∗∗∗ (0.104) 0.407∗∗∗ (0.116) 0.371∗∗∗ (0.129)
reo_sale_year2007 1.239∗∗∗ (0.054) 1.079 (0.058) 1.558∗∗∗ (0.065)
reo_sale_year2008 1.373∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.998 (0.053) 2.126∗∗∗ (0.060)
reo_sale_year2009 1.156∗∗∗ (0.053) 0.712∗∗∗ (0.057) 2.076∗∗∗ (0.063)
reo_sale_year2010 0.915 (0.070) 0.730∗∗∗ (0.076) 1.282∗∗∗ (0.082)
reo_sale_year2011 0.890 (0.080) 0.672∗∗∗ (0.089) 1.329∗∗∗ (0.094)
reo_sale_year2012 0.802∗∗∗ (0.080) 0.606∗∗∗ (0.090) 1.194∗ (0.094)
reo_sale_year2013 0.764∗∗∗ (0.090) 0.664∗∗∗ (0.098) 0.958 (0.108)
quarter1 0.880∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.909∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.842∗∗∗ (0.032)
quarter2 0.920∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.863∗∗∗ (0.032) 0.995 (0.033)
quarter3 0.938∗∗ (0.030) 0.852∗∗∗ (0.033) 1.059∗ (0.034)
oor_area_ln_zgm 0.929∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.950∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.901∗∗∗ (0.014)
assessed_val_ln_zgm 0.927∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.956∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.895∗∗∗ (0.014)
timedelta_zgm 1.103∗∗∗ (0.011) 1.080∗∗∗ (0.012) 1.130∗∗∗ (0.013)
X_norm 0.925 (0.049) 0.870∗∗ (0.055) 1.001 (0.058)
Y_norm 2.085∗∗∗ (0.082) 2.055∗∗∗ (0.090) 2.106∗∗∗ (0.095)
lat.2 0.252∗∗∗ (0.247) 0.441∗∗∗ (0.273) 0.115∗∗∗ (0.307)
long.2 1.796∗∗∗ (0.186) 1.628∗∗ (0.205) 2.071∗∗∗ (0.219)
latXlong 4.604∗∗∗ (0.309) 2.304∗∗ (0.343) 12.106∗∗∗ (0.363)
med_hm_val_zgm 0.915∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.940∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.878∗∗∗ (0.025)
med_hh_inc_zgm 1.027 (0.028) 1.009 (0.030) 1.038 (0.033)
pov_rate_zgm 0.954∗∗ (0.020) 0.914∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.995 (0.023)
122
own_occ_zgm 0.886∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.916∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.851∗∗∗ (0.024)
Constant 3.106∗∗∗ (0.052) 2.126∗∗∗ (0.056) 0.986 (0.063)
Observations 53,521 53,521
Log Likelihood −30,770.650 −33,423.5
Chi-square versus
null model 4,028.306
∗∗∗ 6,019.885∗∗∗
Akaike Inf. Crit. 61,635.310 111,347.600 111,347.600
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Sources: City of Detroit Assessor (2014), CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County
Register of Deeds (2014).
Table 6.6: Odds Ratios for Logistic Regression for Investor Type on Inventory of Origin,
Regional Model
Dependent variable:
buyer_cat
TR_FANNIE_det2007 1.023 (0.128)
TR_FANNIE_det2008 1.154 (0.093)
TR_FANNIE_det2009 0.557∗∗∗ (0.073)
TR_FANNIE_det2010 0.390∗∗∗ (0.069)
TR_FANNIE_det2011 0.443∗∗∗ (0.067)
TR_FANNIE_det2012 0.418∗∗∗ (0.072)
TR_FANNIE_det2013 0.427∗∗∗ (0.101)
TR_FANNIE_inner2007 0.684∗∗∗ (0.083)
TR_FANNIE_inner2009 0.749∗∗∗ (0.048)
TR_FANNIE_inner2010 0.628∗∗∗ (0.046)
TR_FANNIE_inner2011 0.662∗∗∗ (0.046)
TR_FANNIE_inner2012 0.607∗∗∗ (0.047)
TR_FANNIE_inner2013 0.542∗∗∗ (0.065)
TR_FANNIE_outer2007 0.515∗∗∗ (0.115)
TR_FANNIE_outer2008 0.552∗∗∗ (0.079)
TR_FANNIE_outer2009 0.670∗∗∗ (0.060)
TR_FANNIE_outer2010 0.580∗∗∗ (0.057)
TR_FANNIE_outer2011 0.586∗∗∗ (0.054)
TR_FANNIE_outer2012 0.537∗∗∗ (0.056)
TR_FANNIE_outer2013 0.414∗∗∗ (0.078)
TR_FREDDIE_det2007 1.122 (0.223)
TR_FREDDIE_det2008 0.757∗∗ (0.134)
TR_FREDDIE_det2009 0.567∗∗∗ (0.127)
TR_FREDDIE_det2010 0.549∗∗∗ (0.157)
TR_FREDDIE_det2011 0.391∗∗∗ (0.196)
TR_FREDDIE_det2012 0.250∗∗∗ (0.168)
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TR_FREDDIE_det2013 0.368∗∗∗ (0.147)
TR_FREDDIE_inner2007 0.806∗ (0.119)
TR_FREDDIE_inner2008 0.829∗∗ (0.081)
TR_FREDDIE_inner2009 0.722∗∗∗ (0.070)
TR_FREDDIE_inner2010 0.715∗∗∗ (0.060)
TR_FREDDIE_inner2011 0.492∗∗∗ (0.061)
TR_FREDDIE_inner2012 0.536∗∗∗ (0.061)
TR_FREDDIE_inner2013 0.524∗∗∗ (0.082)
TR_FREDDIE_outer2007 0.568∗∗∗ (0.152)
TR_FREDDIE_outer2008 0.612∗∗∗ (0.097)
TR_FREDDIE_outer2009 0.668∗∗∗ (0.081)
TR_FREDDIE_outer2010 0.671∗∗∗ (0.068)
TR_FREDDIE_outer2011 0.509∗∗∗ (0.071)
TR_FREDDIE_outer2012 0.464∗∗∗ (0.072)
TR_FREDDIE_outer2013 0.398∗∗∗ (0.096)
TR_HUD_det2007 0.672 (0.392)
TR_HUD_det2008 0.422∗∗∗ (0.141)
TR_HUD_det2009 0.285∗∗∗ (0.055)
TR_HUD_det2010 0.182∗∗∗ (0.069)
TR_HUD_det2011 0.240∗∗∗ (0.074)
TR_HUD_det2012 0.233∗∗∗ (0.081)
TR_HUD_det2013 0.203∗∗∗ (0.091)
TR_HUD_inner2007 0.657∗∗∗ (0.134)
TR_HUD_inner2008 0.728∗∗∗ (0.079)
TR_HUD_inner2009 0.629∗∗∗ (0.045)
TR_HUD_inner2010 0.450∗∗∗ (0.057)
TR_HUD_inner2011 0.460∗∗∗ (0.059)
TR_HUD_inner2012 0.409∗∗∗ (0.057)
TR_HUD_inner2013 0.401∗∗∗ (0.067)
TR_HUD_outer2007 0.808 (0.208)
TR_HUD_outer2008 0.495∗∗∗ (0.145)
TR_HUD_outer2009 0.620∗∗∗ (0.087)
TR_HUD_outer2010 0.532∗∗∗ (0.099)
TR_HUD_outer2011 0.619∗∗∗ (0.100)
TR_HUD_outer2012 0.595∗∗∗ (0.086)
TR_HUD_outer2013 0.433∗∗∗ (0.097)
new_clust1 0.634∗∗∗ (0.027)
new_clust2 0.438∗∗∗ (0.033)
reo_sale_year2008 0.951∗ (0.029)
reo_sale_year2009 0.918∗∗∗ (0.032)
reo_sale_year2010 1.049 (0.036)
reo_sale_year2011 1.054 (0.039)
reo_sale_year2012 1.237∗∗∗ (0.038)
reo_sale_year2013 1.541∗∗∗ (0.047)
quarter1 0.933∗∗∗ (0.016)
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quarter2 0.917∗∗∗ (0.017)
quarter3 0.959∗∗ (0.017)
oor_area_ln_zgm 0.849∗∗∗ (0.009)
assessed_val_ln_zgm 0.755∗∗∗ (0.012)
timedelta_zgm 1.032∗∗∗ (0.007)
spat_lag5k_ln_zgm 0.848∗∗∗ (0.012)
med_hm_val_zgm 0.971∗ (0.017)
med_hh_inc_zgm 1.055∗∗∗ (0.020)
own_occ_zgm 0.995 (0.008)
pov_rate_zgm 1.079∗∗∗ (0.010)
county_cat1 0.896∗∗∗ (0.017)
county_cat2 0.979 (0.017)
Constant 1.927∗∗∗ (0.033)
Observations 133,309
Log Likelihood −82,697.460
Chi-square versus
null model 18,611.340
∗∗∗
Akaike Inf. Crit. 165,564.900
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Sources: RealtyTrac (2015b), U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000).
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Figure 6.6: Share of REO Sales by Buyer and Price Range in Strong Neighborhoods, 2005–
2013. Sources: CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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Table 6.11: Odds Ratios for Logistic Regression for Subsequent Tax Foreclosure on Buyer
Type
Dependent variable:
Tax foreclosure
All Strong Other
(1) (2) (3)
buyer_mlevel1 1.626∗∗∗ (0.027) 1.547∗∗∗ (0.033) 1.759∗∗∗ (0.045)
buyer_mlevel2 3.248∗∗∗ (0.028) 2.851∗∗∗ (0.035) 4.138∗∗∗ (0.048)
reo_sale_year2007 1.609∗∗∗ (0.050) 1.610∗∗∗ (0.065) 1.588∗∗∗ (0.077)
reo_sale_year2008 1.655∗∗∗ (0.054) 1.489∗∗∗ (0.072) 1.829∗∗∗ (0.084)
reo_sale_year2009 1.185∗∗ (0.076) 0.961 (0.102) 1.433∗∗∗ (0.116)
reo_sale_year2010 0.659∗∗∗ (0.086) 0.513∗∗∗ (0.116) 0.830 (0.131)
reo_sale_year2011 0.379∗∗∗ (0.090) 0.286∗∗∗ (0.123) 0.501∗∗∗ (0.135)
reo_sale_year2012 0.217∗∗∗ (0.094) 0.154∗∗∗ (0.131) 0.309∗∗∗ (0.137)
quarter1 0.904∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.880∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.940 (0.051)
quarter2 0.797∗∗∗ (0.032) 0.772∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.831∗∗∗ (0.054)
quarter3 0.766∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.713∗∗∗ (0.042) 0.848∗∗∗ (0.057)
oor_area_ln_zgm 0.882∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.829∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.944∗∗ (0.022)
assessed_val_ln_zgm 0.857∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.856∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.866∗∗∗ (0.024)
timedelta_zgm 1.175∗∗∗ (0.011) 1.158∗∗∗ (0.013) 1.203∗∗∗ (0.019)
spat_lag5k_ln_zgm 0.822∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.733∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.921∗∗ (0.040)
Constant 0.393∗∗∗ (0.118) 0.473∗∗∗ (0.132) 1.925∗∗∗ (0.232)
Observations 46,182 30,210 15,972
Log Likelihood −26,198.510 −17,206.990 −8,946.714
Chi-square versus
null model 11,468.52
∗∗∗ 5,827.268∗∗∗ 3,066.45∗∗∗
Akaike Inf. Crit. 52,895.020 34,649.980 18,185.430
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Census tract xed eects not shown. Sources: CoreLogic (2010),
Loveland Technologies (2015), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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Table 6.12: Odds Ratios for Logistic Regression for Subsequent Tax Foreclosure on Buyer
Type including Interaction Terms
Dependent variable:
Tax foreclosure
All Strong Other
(1) (2) (3)
TR_small2006 1.274∗∗ (0.098) 1.297∗∗ (0.131) 1.297∗∗ (0.131)
TR_small2007 1.359∗∗∗ (0.070) 1.265∗∗∗ (0.089) 1.265∗∗∗ (0.089)
TR_small2008 1.416∗∗∗ (0.052) 1.442∗∗∗ (0.065) 1.442∗∗∗ (0.065)
TR_small2009 1.788∗∗∗ (0.052) 1.623∗∗∗ (0.062) 1.623∗∗∗ (0.062)
TR_small2010 1.824∗∗∗ (0.075) 1.645∗∗∗ (0.092) 1.645∗∗∗ (0.092)
TR_small2011 1.888∗∗∗ (0.094) 1.592∗∗∗ (0.119) 1.592∗∗∗ (0.119)
TR_small2012 2.128∗∗∗ (0.121) 2.110∗∗∗ (0.164) 2.110∗∗∗ (0.164)
TR_large2006 1.232∗ (0.112) 1.152 (0.151) 1.152 (0.151)
TR_large2007 2.070∗∗∗ (0.076) 1.757∗∗∗ (0.096) 1.757∗∗∗ (0.096)
TR_large2008 3.202∗∗∗ (0.054) 2.622∗∗∗ (0.067) 2.622∗∗∗ (0.067)
TR_large2009 4.651∗∗∗ (0.055) 4.054∗∗∗ (0.066) 4.054∗∗∗ (0.066)
TR_large2010 3.463∗∗∗ (0.084) 3.144∗∗∗ (0.102) 3.144∗∗∗ (0.102)
TR_large2011 3.522∗∗∗ (0.091) 3.087∗∗∗ (0.112) 3.087∗∗∗ (0.112)
TR_large2012 3.663∗∗∗ (0.116) 3.777∗∗∗ (0.155) 3.777∗∗∗ (0.155)
reo_sale_year2007 1.387∗∗∗ (0.099) 1.479∗∗∗ (0.130) 1.479∗∗∗ (0.130)
reo_sale_year2008 1.216∗∗ (0.095) 1.135 (0.126) 1.135 (0.126)
reo_sale_year2009 0.706∗∗∗ (0.107) 0.609∗∗∗ (0.143) 0.609∗∗∗ (0.143)
reo_sale_year2010 0.429∗∗∗ (0.117) 0.351∗∗∗ (0.156) 0.351∗∗∗ (0.156)
reo_sale_year2011 0.242∗∗∗ (0.126) 0.197∗∗∗ (0.169) 0.197∗∗∗ (0.169)
reo_sale_year2012 0.131∗∗∗ (0.140) 0.089∗∗∗ (0.194) 0.089∗∗∗ (0.194)
quarter1 0.910∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.884∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.884∗∗∗ (0.037)
quarter2 0.804∗∗∗ (0.032) 0.779∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.779∗∗∗ (0.039)
quarter3 0.778∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.725∗∗∗ (0.042) 0.725∗∗∗ (0.042)
oor_area_ln_zgm 0.880∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.828∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.828∗∗∗ (0.021)
assessed_val_ln_zgm 0.856∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.854∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.854∗∗∗ (0.016)
timedelta_zgm 1.172∗∗∗ (0.011) 1.156∗∗∗ (0.014) 1.156∗∗∗ (0.014)
spat_lag5k_ln_zgm 0.822∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.732∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.732∗∗∗ (0.040)
Constant 0.569∗∗∗ (0.135) 0.660∗∗∗ (0.159) 0.660∗∗∗ (0.159)
Observations 46,182 30,210 30,210
Log Likelihood −26,104.530 −17,150.710 −17,150.710
Chi-square versus
null model 11,656.48
∗∗∗ 5,828.268∗∗∗ 3,066.45∗∗∗
Akaike Inf. Crit. 52,731.050 34,561.410 34,561.410
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Census tract xed eects not shown. Sources: CoreLogic (2010),
Loveland Technologies (2015), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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Figure 6.7: Median REO Sale Price by Buyer in Strong and Other Neighborhoods, 2005–
2013. Sources: CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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Figure 6.8: REO Sales as Share of All Detroit Real Estate Transactions, 2005–2013. Sources:
CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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Figure 6.9: Median Sale Price REO Sales and Other Sales, Detroit, 2005–2013. Sources:
CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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Figure 6.10: Median REO Sale Price, Detroit Tri-County Area, 2005–2015. RealtyTrac
(2015b).
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Figure 6.11: Predicted Probability of Sale to Investor by REO Inventory of Origin. Sources:
City of Detroit Assessor (2014), CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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Figure 6.12: Predicted Probability of Sale to an Investor in Detroit’s Strong Neighbor-
hoods and Inner and Outer Ring Suburbs by REO Inventory of Origin. Sources: RealtyTrac
(2015b), U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000).
138
Figure 6.13: Predicted Probability of Tax Foreclosure by Buyer Type, Detroit. Sources:
CoreLogic (2010), Loveland Technologies (2015), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
Figure 6.14: Predicted Probability of Tax Foreclosure by Buyer Type including Interaction
Terms, Detroit. Sources: CoreLogic (2010), Loveland Technologies (2015), Wayne County
Register of Deeds (2014).
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CHAPTER VII
Identifying Leading REO Investors
7.1 Largest Buyers in Detroit
The 20 largest buyers of REOs sold by private entities, HUD, Fannie Mae, and Freddie
Mac are presented in tables 7.1, 7.3, 7.4, and 7.2.1 Overall, these tables show that while
some investors purchased large numbers of properties, the top investors in terms of pur-
chasing volume account for only a modest share of sales, both relative to the total number
of REO sales and sales to investors alone.2 These ndings indicate substantial deconcen-
tration in the market for REOs in Detroit, which is consistent with ndings from other
cities (Immergluck & Law, 2014). There are notable dierences, however, among federal
and private entities in terms of the share of sales made to the most active investors. The
top 20 investors in Fannie Mae’s REOs account for 26% of sales to likely investors, the
1Names in the buyer columns in these tables including more than one name (separated by commas) are
related entities identied through examination of actual real-estate transaction documents recorded with
the Wayne County Register of Deeds and supplemental internet research. My primary means for linking
entities was to compare the names of the managing members signing these documents. The total number of
REOs acquired by large investors may be slightly under the true value given the diculties of normalizing
names outlined in the methods section. To construct these tables, I examined the 30 largest buyers and
combined the totals for parties I knew to be related. In some instances, I queried the database using more
complex string matching patterns to generate a count, but only for those parties that at least appeared in
the list of the top 30 buyers.
2These tables present information on the 20 largest buyers regardless of whether they are investors or
government and nonprot entities. The majority of these buyers are investors, but a few are government
and nonprot entities, e.g., the Michigan Land Bank. Calculations in the table for share of sales to investors
exclude government and nonprot entities. Thus, the data presented for the share of investor acquisitions
by the 20 largest investors is slightly lower for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which have government or
nonprot entities among their 20 largest buyers.
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greatest concentration among HUD, the GSEs, and private entities, while Freddie Mac
had the lowest concentration with the top 20 buyers accounting for just 13% of all sales to
investors. The concentration of large investors among HUD’s sales to investors (17%) is
slightly greater than Freddie Mac, while private entities exhibit a concentration (23%) sim-
ilar to Fannie Mae. Despite the overall deconcentration of investors in REO properties, a
number of individual entities rapidly acquired large numbers of mortgage-reverted prop-
erties from the GSEs, HUD, and private entities, which is indicative of bulk purchasing
arrangements.
Paramount Land Holdings (aka Interstate Investment Group) of Gilbert, SC was the
single largest purchaser of REOs during the study period, acquiring more than 1,000 REOs
in 2008 and 2009 from private sources and several hundred more from other REO investors.
The majority of Paramount’s REO acquisitions had been foreclosed due to defaults on
mortgages issued by Long Beach Mortgage Company, one of the largest originators of sub-
prime loans in the 2000s and a subsidiary of Washington Mutual since 1999. These prop-
erties were sold to Paramount, at an average price of roughly $700, by Deutsche on behalf
of investors in bonds backed by Long Beach and by Washington Mutual. Paramount re-
ceived a $10 million loan from the Detroit Police and Retirement Fund in 2008 to purchase
distressed residential properties and resell them in habitable condition via land contract.
Though Paramount used a small share of the loan to purchase REOs in Detroit (its man-
agers spent $5 million of the loan on vacations and luxury items), it failed to pay property
taxes and left many, if not most, of its properties unsecured. While Paramount disposed
of nearly 25% of the REOs in my database, more than 80% of these sales were to other
large investors, some of whom appear elsewhere on my lists of the largest buyers. Where
Paramount did make sales to individuals, it sold them in distressed condition at highly
inated prices and failed to disclose arrears on property taxes (Gross, 2015; Guyette, 2012;
Snell, 2012).3 As a consequence, many of the REOs acquired by Paramount, regardless
3The number of contract sales to individuals and families is higher than that recorded in my database
due to the failure of Paramount and related entities to record transfers with the County. This assertion
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of whether they were sold to occupants, were later repossessed for delinquent property
taxes. Roughly 740 former REOs owned by Paramount experienced tax foreclosure, while
roughly 200 of the properties it sold had the same outcome.4
Between 2008 and 2010, the peak years of REO liquidation for private entities, a small
group of investors leveraged private capital to acquire vast numbers of REOs at extremely
discounted prices, primarily in distressed urban areas (Botos, 2010; Logan, 2009; Ford
et al., 2013).5 This group of investors includes Destiny Ventures (aka SB Ventures), Blue
Spruce Entities, and Stonecrest—three of the ve largest buyers of private REOs in Detroit.
According to media accounts, these investors purchased REOs primarily in order to ip
them, reselling properties to other out-of-state investors at several times the price they
paid within days of acquiring them. These entities had numerous code violations levied
against them in other cities, and they have been accused of passively disposing of dis-
tressed properties through tax foreclosure and city-initiated demolition. My ndings are
entirely consistent with these accounts. Destiny Ventures, the second largest buyer, ac-
quired the majority of its nearly 1,000 REOs from Ameriquest, Argent, New Century, and
Deutsche (which purchased, securitized, and sold these subprime lenders’ loans) between
2007 and 2009.6 Among properties for which records indicate a sale amount of at least one
dollar (n=701), Destiny Ventures paid a total of $317,446, or $452 per property. Destiny
sold roughly 90% of its acquisitions during the study period, 99% of which were sold to
other investors, including 57% to large investors. Destiny Ventures sold its properties for
$1,500, on average, with a median time to sale of just 53 days. Clearly, Destiny Ventures
about sales prices is derived from the cited sources.
4As noted in the methods section, tax foreclosures are the only record for which the study period extends
beyond 2013. My post-foreclosure database includes records of properties oered at tax foreclosure auctions
in 2014 and 2015, the rationale being tax-reversion is a three-year process, thus it is quite defensible to link
the owner of a given property at the end of 2013 to a tax foreclosure occurring in the next year or two. The
only limitation of this approach is that some investors likely sold properties without disclosing delinquent
taxes.
5Since roughly 2012, large institutional investors, including hedge funds, private-quity rms, and real
estate investment trusts, have purchased large numbers of REOs as part of REO-to-rental schemes. This
type of investor was not active in the early years of the foreclosure crisis.
6This includes only years in which Destiny Ventures acquired more than 10 REOs. I follow the same
convention in reporting the years in which a given investor was active below.
142
was engaged in a large-scale ipping operation. Stonecrest was Destiny Ventures largest
buyer at 150 properties, illustrating the interconnections among this class of investors.
Destiny Ventures’ second largest buyer (101 properties) was TSE Properties, of Sher-
man Oaks, CA, one of the many shell companries operated by Eric and Sheila Tomasi.
The Tomasis acquired nearly 6,000 distressed properties in the Midwest between 2009
and 2011, including many in Cleveland and Detroit (MacDonald, 2011). Their properties
came from REO sales—they acquired 61 directly from Fannie Mae and 98 directly from pri-
vate lenders—acquisitions from other investors purchasing directly from banks, and gov-
ernment auctions of tax-reverted properties. The Tomasis, like many other out-of-state
investors purchasing former REOs from Destiny Ventures and its peers, sell properties on
contract. Land contracts are a form of seller-nancing in which the buyer pays for the
property in installments, receiving title only after the buyer has paid the full amount of
the property. Buyers are responsible for bringing properties up to code and paying prop-
erty taxes, but they can be evicted after missing a single payment. Land contracts have
long been a means for low-income households or those with damaged credit to nance
home purchases, but, because the terms feature high interest rates and the properties of-
ten require extensive repairs, they have a high failure rate. For decades, property owners
in inner-city neighborhoods have preyed on minority households by convincing them to
enter into land contracts the owners know to be unsustainable (Satter, 2010). Contract
sellers often design their contracts to fail in order to appropriate the value of the im-
provements made by the buyer. While it is impossible to ascertain the intent of the The
Tomasis, they, like others engaged in contract sales in Detroit, oer properties at onerous
terms to households otherwise unable to secure nancing. Properties are sold at prices
thousands of dollars above what the Tomasis pay for their properties, without the instal-
lation or repair of necessary mechanicals. Further, the Tomasis charge interest rates of up
to 11%, far above the rate for subprime loans (Kotlowitz, 2009). Reminiscent of the condi-
tions creating the subprime foreclosure crisis in the rst instance, the Tomasis sell their
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contracts to other out-of-state investors in order to nance additional rounds of property
investment. The Tomasis have been sued for selling properties to investors in conditions
that would not pass inspection and without clear title (MacDonald, 2011). The Tomasis
have also been criticized by activists and public ocials in Cleveland and Detroit for the
blighted condition of their properties. The Tomasis’ handling of former REOs contributed
to the staggering 92% tax-reversion rate for properties acquired by Destiny Ventures.
Blue Spruce Entities, another bulk buyer of REOs private sources in 2008 and 2009,
sold only 52% of its massive inventory. This entity has absolutely no public presence, so
I am left to speculate as to whether Blue Spruce intended to hold these properties, either
for contract sales or rentals, or whether it overextended itself in the Detroit market. Blue
Spruce paid an average of $831 per property for its inventory of nearly 1,000 properties.
Of the properties Blue Spruce managed to sell, 76% went to investors. Based on a review
of court documents and news articles, Blue Spruce appears to have had an arrangement
with Go Invest Wisely (GIW) of Orem, UT, in which GIW purchased properties from
Blue Spruce the same day Blue Spruce acquired them from a bank. In turn, GIW sold the
homes on contract and sold the papers for the contract to investors in the US and Canada.
Reporting on GIW’s practices in Canton, OH, a 2010 news article stated,
Go Invest Wisely has not xed up its homes. Instead, it tried to put occu-
pants into them—quickly. Occupants were typically asked to sign 30-year
land contracts to buy a home for about $40,000, plus 10% interest. With that
completed, Go Invest tried to sell some of the occupied homes, as income-
producing property, to an investor in the US or Canada for $17,500, plus $1,000
down. The model enabled Go Invest to pocket as much as $17,500 on a house
it had bought for $1,000 (Botos, 2010).
GIW developed a reputation in several cities in the Midwest for the deplorable state
of its properties (Botos, 2010; Martin, 2009). For whatever reason, there are only a hand-
ful of transfers from Blue Spruce to GIW in Detroit. GIW did, however, acquire more
144
than 100 properties from Stonecrest, suggesting either shifting business arrangements
or regional specializations in the interactions among these investors. The eventual tax-
reversion of nearly all the properties that remained in Blue Spruce’s possession through
the study period (92%) provides further evidence that this company was in the business
of ipping properties, like Destiny Ventures, but that it failed to move its inventory. Of
course, ipping properties to other out-of-state investors hardly led to a better outcome.
Of the properties sold by Destiny Ventures (n=484), 66% were subsequently repossessed
for back taxes.
Bryce Peters Financial Corporation, the fourth largest buyer of privately owned REOs,
was a front for Blaine Murphy, who has since been convicted for ling fraudulent property
records in Cleveland. Murphy operated in Ohio, Michigan, Missouri, and Texas using
various LLCs. The Cuyahoga County Oce of the Prosecutor (2013) described Murphy’s
scheme in a press release:
The scam existed in two phases. First, acquisitions were made with little or no
regard for the condition of each property. In his quest to make a fast prot,
Murphy ignored property code violations and payments of taxes at the ex-
pense of these communities in Cuyahoga County. Secondly, Murphy sold
these properties in bulk or individually for a quick prot to various buyers,
essentially in the same manner as these properties were acquired.
Murphy was an acquaintance of O’Dell Barnes, who gained national media attention
for his massive REO acquisitions (Hagerty, 2007). Barnes, based in South Carolina, was
a mentor to Murphy and other REO speculators. George Kastanes–who, along with his
wife, served as the principles for Paramount Land Holdings—was Barnes’ attorney.
Murphy acquired 767 REOs in Detroit between 2007 and 2009, buying many of them
from CitiMortgage, Chase, Wells Fargo, HSBC, and US Bank. Murphy paid roughly $200,000
for properties for which a sales amount of at least one dollar was recorded (n=639), equiva-
lent to $311 per property. Five hundred twenty-one of Murphy’s acquisitions were subject
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to tax foreclosure while Bryce Peters was either still the owner of record, and 203 addi-
tional properties reverted to the County due to back taxes after being sold by Murphy.
Altogether, 94% of Murphy’s acquisitions were eventually subject to tax foreclosure.
Investors based in the Detroit region also speculated in REO properties in the city,
though no one Michigan-based entity purchased as spectacular a number as the investors
described above. Innovative Property Solutions (aka WTOTW Homes), based in South-
eld, MI, was the sixth-largest buyer of privately owned REOs, and it was a top-ten buyer
from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Altogether, Innovative Property Solutions acquired
more than 500 REOs. Reuters (2007) spoke with the principle of Innovative Property So-
lutions, David Ehrlichman, about his approach:
While the market is down, property auctions in the Detroit area are the stomp-
ing ground of people like . . . Dave Ehrlichman, 27, who buy small family
homes valued at around $80,000 to $90,000 for up to $15,000 then “ip” them—
sell them quickly on the market for around $40,000.7
My database shows that Innovative Property Solutions purchased REOs in Detroit
from 2007 to 2011, with the majority of its acquisitions occurring in 2008 and 2009. In-
novative Property Solutions paid an average of $9,275 per home. By the end of the study
period, it had sold roughly half of its inventory for approximately $30,000 per property.
Innovative Property Solutions made most of its sales to individuals (55%) and small in-
vestors (67%), suggesting that its position as a local actor may have made it more accessi-
ble to prospective owner-occupants and mom-and-pop investors. Like larger, out-of-state
operations, however, Innovative Property Solutions acquired a large number of properties,
sight unseen, and took a triage approach to dealing with its inventory. Those properties
that could be ipped were ipped; the rest they allowed to be repossessed for back taxes.
While Innovative Property Solutions was still the owner of record 102 homes were subject
7While this particular story focuses on foreclosure auctions, investors like Ehrlichman follow an iden-
tical approach in acquiring REOs.
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to tax foreclosure.8
Some investors in REO properties are based overseas, or serve as proxies or intermedi-
aries for overseas investors, but none were nearly as active in Detroit as Ron Mackie, the
principle of Right Buy Properties and Exit Strategy LLC (Guttersohn, 2013).9 Investment
brochures produced by these companies suggest Mackie’s operations were based in either
London or Singapore, though court documents state he was a Michigan resident. Mackie
purchased large numbers of bank-owned properties in Detroit and Florida and sold them
to investors in Australia, Singapore, and the UK with promises of annual net yields of
15% and 100% returns on initial investments. These yields were certain, sales brochures
state, given strong demand for rental property, rebounding property values, employment
growth, and massive government investment in Detroit. According to one brochure,
The model . . . was honed in Detroit where there were more disadvantaged
families per capita than any other U.S. city. With a seemingly never end-
ing supply of good quality houses, the U.S. government were committed to
pumping billions of dollars into local economies and communities: all that
we required was front-end investment and a lot of hard work on the ground
(InvestUS, n.d.).
Cicada Investments, one of Mackie’s downstream shell corporations, oered investors
a £27,500 package that ostensibly gave investors clear title to a refurbished property for
which a pre-screened tenant had already been secured. Another Mackie operation, In-
vestUS, focused on ipping properties, seeking investment capital to ip properties to
8Sixty-ve more were subject to tax foreclosure after Innovative Property Solutions had sold them, per-
haps reecting diculties on the part of overly-optimistic homebuyers and small investors upon realizing
scale of required repairs, a problem compounded by having already paid an inated amount for a ipped
property. To reiterate a limitation of this research noted in the methods section, some parties coded as
individuals are in reality investors who had purchased no more than one property in a calendar year in
Detroit. In some instances, individuals located out-of-state purchased properties from investors like Inno-
vative Property solutions as investment properties. This is the case for at least a handful of properties sold
to likely individuals that were subsequently subject to tax foreclosure.
9Mackie is a principle of several other companies involved in real-estate investment, including InvestUS
(based in Singapore) and Cicada Investments (based in London). REOs purchased by Right Buy and Exit
Strategy are frequently signed over to Investus and Cicada prior to being sold to overseas investors.
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qualied low-income Detroit residents (or other investors) and reinvest the returns in yet
more REOs to be ipped.
While details concerning the performance of Mackie’s operations are wanting, over-
seas news reports, court cases, and internet forums relate stories of investors failing to
receive payment. In June 2014, a Singapore-based reporter wrote,
Angry investors here are demanding answers from the operators of a United
States investment scheme. More than 200 people here could be aected, with
$64.8 million yet to be paid back by the scheme, called The Exit Strategy . . .
Returns have been fully paid from June to October 2012, but those who put
in money from November 2012 have faced problems. Some have yet to get
payments due six months ago (Zhuo, 2014).
Overseas investors have attempted to charge Mackie with fraud related to failure to make
payment and misrepresentations concerning municipal liens, but claimants’ places of res-
idence prohibited them from bringing legal action against Mackie in the US, where Mackie
appears to have established legal residence (“Coast Equities, LLC v. Right Buy Properties,
LLC et Al,” 2015).
In a November 2015 investor update on its website, Exit Strategy oers investors an
explanation for its delays in payment:
Various legal cases have impacted on the project’s ability to perform. Most
recently, legal issues have postponed clear title exchanges, and reduced the
project’s ability to turn over properties, through ipping, following rehab
and tenancy. Initially, the Exit Strategy entities contracted with a project
company, Right Buy Properties LLC (RBP). RBP received loans from the Exit
Strategy entities, and ran the project’s acquisitions, construction and property
sales. However, the project unfortunately failed under RBP’s management.
As a result, the directors of the Exit Strategy entities sued RBP for a consider-
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able sum of money. . . the basic nature of the fraud was that RBP charged the
project for refurbishments that never occurred. The project team is working
hard to rectify all the previous failings by RBP, and the project is now more
settled (“Coast Equities, LLC v. Right Buy Properties, LLC et Al,” 2015).
Though seemingly logical, this explanation is complicated by the fact that Mackie is
identied with both operations. One investment brochure refers to Mackie as the founder
of Exit Strategy and the CEO of Righty Buy Properties. In any event, Mackie was either
ill-equipped to act on his intentions or he intentionally defrauded international investors
of large sums of money. Regardless of whether Mackie’s poor performance in satisfying
investors is due to incompetence or fraud, the implications are clearly negative for the
properties purchased by Mackie’s companies.
In total, Mackie acquired nearly 500 REOs in Detroit between 2010 and 2013—and
roughly 150 more from other REO investors—with the largest annual number of acquisi-
tions occurring in 2012. Mackie acquired roughly 200 REOs from HUD, 150 from Fannie
Mae, 100 from private sources, and 23 from Freddie Mac. Mackie was HUD’s largest
buyer and the fth largest buyer from Fannie Mae. Mackie purchased REOs at an av-
erage of $8,700 from HUD, $8,900 from private sources, $10,300 from Fannie Mae, and
$11,500 from Freddie Mac. These prices, though still very low, are substantially higher
than the prices paid by out-of-state investors in 2008 and 2009, reecting the slowing of
mortgage foreclosures, particularly among private entities, and reductions in the overall
supply of REOs. Mackie made few sales, only about 60, the vast majority of which were
Quit Claim Deeds to foreign investors, almost certainly participants in the Exit Strategy or
another of Mackie’s operations. More properties likely have been committed to Mackie’s
investors, but the deeds have not (yet) been recorded. It is uncertain whether and how
many of Mackie’s properties are tenanted rather than vacant, though according to the
MCM survey, between 40 and 45% of Mackie’s properties were vacant during the winter
of 2013-2014, more than one year after Mackie made the bulk of his acquisitions. The
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prevalence of tax delinquency among Mackie’s properties further belies his companies’
claims of quickly returning Detroit properties to productive use. Roughly 25% of the REOs
Mackie acquired were eventually subject to tax foreclosure either while Mackie remained
the owner or after a sale that occurred without clearing delinquent property taxes.
Harbour Portfolio, owned and operated by Charles Vose III, of Dallas TX, purchased
REOs exclusively from Fannie Mae and was Fannie Mae’s largest buyer. Nationwide, Har-
bour acquired nearly 7,000 REOs in cities throughout the Midwest and Southwest, nearly
all from Fannie Mae. According to a New York Times investigation of Harbour,
Harbour, which raised more than $60 million from wealthy investors, was the
single largest buyer of foreclosed homes from Fannie Mae’s bulk sale program
from 2010 to 2014, which the mortgage giant used to unload more than 20,000
homes that were hard to sell. The homes were bought by Harbour for an
average of $8,000 each in cities like Akron, Detroit and Flint (Goldstein &
Stevenson, 2016b).
The New York Times reports Harbour’s business model is predicated on selling proper-
ties via land contract, making no repairs prior to sale. Lawsuits brought against Harbour
by parties who had entered into land contracts with Harbour suggest it is preying on
inner-city households with limited means by charging exorbitant interest rates and strip-
ping buyers of as many legal protections as possible. Further, while Harbour retains the
power to evict buyers for failing the bring their properties into habitable condition within
four months, Harbour itself is unresponsive to the numerous code violations levied against
it in cities nationwide. Harbour’s practices are thus likely to exacerbate vacancy, turnover,
and deterioration in the neighborhoods in which they are active.
Harbour purchased 376 Detroit REOs between 2011 and 2013, acquiring the bulk, more
than 200 properties, in 2011. According to my database, Harbour paid Fannie Mae $778,000
for these properties, or roughly $2,000 per property. My database contains 170 records of
sales made by Harbour, most of them made to investors of various sizes (77%). The largest
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single buyer from Harbour is Peter Bluebird LLC (aka Direct Properties LLC) of Las Ve-
gas, a company which was the fourth largest buyer at the 2013 auction of tax-reverted
properties in Detroit. My database shows Harbour making few contract sales, counter to
what I would have expected given media accounts of the widespread nature of Harbour’s
contract sales, but the absence of contract sales in my database reects the absence of
legal requirements for these contracts to be recorded in the local land records. More than
half of Harbour’s acquisitions (54%) have since been repossessed due to property tax delin-
quency. Half of these repossessions occurred while Harbour was still the owner of record.
According to the MCM survey, 54% of Harbour’s properties were vacant in the winter of
2013-2014. Of the 376 REOs purchased by Harbour in Detroit, 216 are on the BRTF list
of blighted properties, 61% of which have either been demolished or are slated for demo-
lition at public expense. The other 39% are potentially rehabable, but require additional
investment to mitigate the deterioration caused by Harbours’ destructive practices.
The second largest buyer from Fannie Mae is HomeSolutions Properties (HSP), based
in Northport, NY. Like many other out-of-state investors, such as Blue Spruce Entities
and Stonecrest, there is little publicly available information concerning HSP. An internet
search shows HSP was active in Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, in addition to Michigan,
but the true scale of their operations is unclear. The size of their acquisitions in Detroit
suggests HSP had a bulk purchasing arrangement with Fannie Mae (n=278), and bulk
buyers generally operate in multiple locations. According to a presentation prepared for
HSP’s realtors, HSP employs four strategies for property disposition:
• Contract sales (i.e., land contracts) using their own sta
• Package sales to investors
• Sales using local real estate agents to list and sell properties
• Online sales via Craig’s List and Bid4Assets (HomeSolutions Properties, n.d.)
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Regardless of sales method, HSP seeks sales within 60 days of acquiring title, indicat-
ing HSP’s sole purpose was ipping homes. HSP acquired nearly 300 REOs in 2008 and
roughly 40 in 2009, paying, on average, $1,300 per property. A large number of properties
were sold to HSP by Fannie for $600 each. HSP sold the bulk of its inventory during the
study period (68%), but it took a surprisingly long time for HSP to makes these sales given
HSP’s intent to ip properties. The median time to sale was 724 days, nearly two years.
Also surprising is the fact HSP sold many properties at very low prices. The median sale
price was just $1,826; HSP sold 55 properties for more than $5,000 and just 19 for more
than $10,000. Through the end of the study period, the dierence between what HSP had
paid for its properties ($265,000) and what it made from sales ($860,000) was $595,972, a
disappointing return if one deducts carrying costs. HSP made 59% of its sales to individ-
uals, though many of these buyers were actually out-of-state investors, likely purchasing
properties on Craig’s List. Fully 75% of HSP’s properties were eventually repossessed due
to delinquent property taxes, 22% of these properties were repossessed while HSP was
still the owner of record. 65% of HSP’s properties were on the BRTF’s blight list, with 39%
of HSP’s properties either demolished or agged for demolition. Given these outcomes,
it is likely that HSP purchased REOs sight unseen and severely overestimated the market
for distressed properties in Detroit, leading it to ooad properties at re-sale prices and
withhold property taxes on its remaining inventory.
In third place among Fannie Mae’s buyers is a collection of entities operated by Vi-
sion Property Management (VPM) of Columbia, SC and its CEO, Alex Szkaradek. VPM’s
website states that it is “the country’s largest provider of lease-to-own properties,” but it
also sells properties for cash (Vision Property Management, n.d.). VPM and the multiple
LLCs operating on its behalf acquired roughly 200 REOs from Fannie Mae between 2011
and 2013, paying, on average, $1,500 per property. Through the end of the study period,
VPM sold 40 properties at an average price of $6,700, though it had likely entered land
contracts with a larger number of buyers. The listings on VPM’s website oer additional
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insight into its practices. VPM purchased 12739 Hamburg St from Fannie Mae in January
2013 for $351 and recently listed it for a cash purchase price of $3,000 in as-is condition
(“Vision Property Management,” n.d.). Though this is an extremely low purchase price,
the property requires substantial repair. The website includes several photos of the prop-
erty, one of which shows a missing rear bay window, meaning the property is open to the
elements. The website for MCM includes a January 2014 image of the photo in which a
sign posted to a boarded window advertising the property for $150 down and $90 a month
is clearly visible, though the nal sale price for a contract deal is unclear. This property is
located on a block where the City of Detroit and the Michigan Land Bank have demolished
numerous structures, begging the question why, if Fannie Mae was willing to write down
the mortgage debt of $85,000 to $350, it wouldn’t simply donate the property to the land
bank along with a contribution toward its demolition. Given the location and condition
of the property, it is improbable that a buyer would want either the property or the lot.
According to the MCM survey, 56% of VPM’s properties were vacant in winter of 2013-
2014. Further, the BRTF reports 57% of VPM’s properties have either been demolished or
are slated for demolition at public expense, and 34% of the properties still owned by VPM
through the end of the study period reverted to the county for back taxes.
Closely following VPM in acquiring REOs from Fannie Mae is Coseo Properties Inc.
(CPI) of San Diego, CA, which purchased nearly 200 properties from Fannie Mae using
several dierent LLCs in 2010 and 2011 (CPI purchased a total of 215 REOs from various
sources). A 2013 media statement details the scale and scope of their operations:
In the last three years, Coseo Properties acquired, rehabilitated, leased, and
successfully sold nearly 3,000 single-family homes around the country. In
Michigan, alone, CPI acquired some 700 homes and has since converted 150
homes to rental properties. CPI is denitely an opportunist investor. Today,
in its constant eort to operate ahead of the mainstream, CPI is focusing ex-
clusively on investments in Detroit Metro (Business Wire, 2013).
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Like other bulk buyers, CPI paid a small average amount per property, just $1,500. By
the end of the study period, CPI had sold 75% of its inventory at an average price of $4,800.
It sold a larger share of properties to individuals, 24%, than most bulk buyers, and many of
the “individuals” identied in the dataset actually appear to be local households, not out-
of-state investors buying properties on Craig’s List. Among bulk buyers, it sold the largest
share of properties with clear title (30%), evidenced by the use of Warranty Deeds. Many
of CPIs properties, however, were repossessed for delinquent property taxes, particularly
among the properties it sold to investors (67% tax-reversion rate among properties sold
to investors as opposed to 31% reversion rate for properties sold to individuals). In total,
44% of the properties CPI eventually became tax-reverted, and 52% of the former REOs CPI
failed to sell by the end of the study period were also subject to tax foreclosure. According
to the MCM survey, 43% of VPM’s properties were vacant in winter of 2013-2014, and
among all properties handled by CPI, 33% are marked by the BRTF as demolished or slated
for demolition.
While Fannie Mae indeed disposed of a large number of properties through bulk pur-
chase arrangements with large out-of-state investors, it also sold a number of properties
to the Michigan Land Bank Fast Track Authority and the DLBA, placing both entities
among Fannie Mae’s largest buyers. Like land banks operating elsewhere, the primary
function of these two entities is to acquire, assemble, and dispose of public property in a
manner likely to result in the productive use or reuse of those properties. According to
media releases, Fannie Mae sold 44 REOs to the DLBA in 2014 for a nominal fee while also
contributing funding for the demolition of 18 of those properties (Gallagher, 2014).
HUD’s second largest buyer after Ron Mackie was EZ Access Funding, based in New-
port Beach, CA. EZ Access purchased 128 REOs from HUD in 2008 and 2009 (EZ Access
purchased 172 REOs total in Detroit from various sources). Among properties for which
sales record a transaction amount of at least one dollar, EZ Access paid HUD on average
$1,800 per property. One of the principals of EZ Access, Marc Tow, was sentenced to ve
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years in prison in Cuyahoga County for defrauding investors under the pretense investors’
money would be used to repair and tenant the large number of properties acquired by EZ
Access from HUD. Instead, EZ Access absconded with investors’ money and left the prop-
erties they acquired from HUD to deteriorate. As of November 2013, the City of Cleve-
land and the Cuyahoga Land Bank had demolished more than 60 of the 190 properties
purchased by EZ Access in Cuyahoga County (Editorial Board. cleveland.com, 2013). Of
the 128 properties sold by HUD to EZ Access in Detroit, 89% have since been repossessed
due to delinquent property taxes. Of the 172 total REOs EZ Access purchased in Detroit,
74% are on the BRTF list of blighted properties. Of the properties on the blight list, 60% of
them have either been demolished or are slated for demolition at public expense. Given
these negative trends in CPI’s inventory, it begs the question whether CPI entered the
market for distressed properties fully intending to support neighborhood development—
an objective clearly marked out in their mission statement—but became overwhelmed,
or whether CPI deliberately pursued a triage approach to handling their properties, like
many of the bulk buyers discussed above.
HUD’s fourth and fth largest purchasers, KHTJ Properties and Metro Property Group
(MPG), are Detroit-based entities that collaborated in a global Ponzi scheme. These two
entities are are also among Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 20 largest buyers. KHTJ Prop-
erties, operated by Keith H. Travis, Jr., of Detroit, MI, quit claimed the majority of its REO
acquisitions to Metro Property Group, based in Dearborn, MI. MPG, in turn, sold its sub-
stantial inventory of mortgage- and tax-reverted properties to overseas investors, making
fraudulent promises to tenant and manage the properties for the absentee owners. In
short course,
investors were told virtually the same thing: The tenant was evicted and
caused signicant damage to the homes. The investors were billed for evic-
tions that never happened, ned for housing violations and were given es-
timates of the required repairs, upwards of $13,500, according to the suit
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(Neavling, 2013).
In total MPG and KHTJ purchased 239 REOs from various sources between 2010 and
2013, though this is likely an underestimate given the numerous LLCs and family member
names used to acquire properties. MPG and KHTJ paid, on average, roughly $11,000 per
property, and they sold 85% of their inventory at an average price of $42,000 per property
to overseas investors.10 Many of of these properties have likely experienced deterioration
due to extended vacancy periods and lack of maintenance. Nearly half (47%) of the REOs
acquired by MPG and KHJT are on the BRTF’s list of blighted properties, and 33% were
recorded as vacant on the MCM survey of property conditions.
Given the small size of Freddie Mac’s inventory in Detroit, it is impossible for any
one buyer to have acquired hundreds of properties from them, but two of the bulk buyers
already discussed, Ron Mackie and Dave Ehrlichman are among Freddie’s ve largest
buyers, along with locally based MPG at number ve. Freddie Mac’s largest buyer at
44 properties, Charles Lee of Las Vegas, NV, also purchased 84 properties from private
sources. Fully 100% of Lee’s properties entered tax foreclosure, 77% of them while he was
still the owner of record.
7.2 Discussion
This look at the practices of the largest buyers of REO properties in Detroit and the
outcomes associated with their properties supports claims that large out-of-state investors
harmed properties and neighborhoods through their opportunistic, short-sighted, negli-
gent, and often criminal handling of REOs. The GSEs, HUD, and private sources all had
bulk purchasing arrangements with investors intent on ipping properties and making
predatory contract sales rather than engaging in sustainable business practices likely to
10MGP acquired approximately 1,600 properties in Wayne County since 2009, the vast majority coming
from the Wayne County tax foreclosure auctions, where MPG acquired numerous properties for just $500.
These properties were also ipped to overseas investors at prices up to $50,000.
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support and strengthen neighborhood conditions. These large investors have deeply ex-
acerbated problems initiated by the mortgage foreclosure crisis by creating widespread
churn in the housing market, selling properties to absentee owners making fraudulent
representations about property management and maintenance, and clouding title by l-
ing fraudulent deeds. In turn, these practices are likely to have discouraged owners and
residents of neighboring properties from investing in their homes, further increasing va-
cancy rates. Investor practices downloaded responsibility for these former REOs to the
city and county government, through tax-reversion and demolition, after investors ex-
tracted prots from the destruction of Detroit properties. In the case of properties that
had been sold to investors by the GSEs and HUD, this destruction was eectively pub-
licly subsidized given the government takeover and recapitalization of the GSEs and the
enormous discounts federal entities gave to large-scale speculative investors.
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Table 7.1: Top 20 Buyers of REOs from Private Entities, 2005–2013
Buyer Location REOs Share ofall sales
Share of sales
to investors
Paramount Land Holdings Gilbert, SC 1,010 2.84% 3.81%
Destiny Ventures, SB
Holdings
Tulsa, OK 991 2.79% 3.74%
Blue Spruce Entities Rapid City, SD 923 2.59% 3.48%
Bryce Peters Financial Corp. Reno NV 767 2.16% 2.89%
Stonecrest Investments San Jose, CA 344 0.97% 1.30%
Innovative Property
Solutions
Southeld, MI 340 0.96% 1.28%
LWBR LLC, MDJ LLC Silver Spring, MD 327 0.92% 1.23%
Homsales, Inc. San Diego, CA 301 0.85% 1.14%
National Asset Management
Group
Las Vegas, NV 232 0.65% 0.88%
Phoenix Real Estate Detroit, MI 113 0.32% 0.43%
Dade LLC Macomb, MI 102 0.29% 0.38%
CRN Management Chicago, IL 99 0.28% 0.37%
Eric and Sheila Tomasi Sherman Oaks, CA 98 0.28% 0.37%
Ron Mackie United Kingdom 87 0.24% 0.33%
Urban Development
Solutions Group
Troy, MI 87 0.24% 0.33%
Innovative Holdings Group Orange County, CA 85 0.24% 0.32%
Laker Group Livonia, MI 85 0.24% 0.32%
Charles Lee Las Vegas, NV 84 0.24% 0.32%
G8 Capital Fund Ladera Ranch, CA 83 0.23% 0.31%
Oliver Property Holdings Eastpointe, MI 74 0.21% 0.28%
Total Investor Sales 6,232 17.52% 23.51%
Sources: Author’s calculations from CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds
(2014).
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Table 7.2: Top 20 Buyers of REOs from HUD, 2005–2013
Buyer Location REOs Share ofall sales
Share of sales
to investors
Ron Mackie United Kingdom 204 2.19% 4.48%
EZ Access Funding Newport Beach, CA 128 1.38% 2.81%
Isaac Taylor Detroit, MI 44 0.47% 0.97%
KHTJ Properties Detroit, MI 40 0.43% 0.88%
Metro Property Group Dearborn, MI 36 0.39% 0.79%
S & J Real Estate Investments Detroit, MI 34 0.37% 0.75%
Capital One Funding Corp. Southeld, MI 32 0.34% 0.70%
Steven Mackey St Petersburg, FL 32 0.34% 0.70%
Elite Investment Homes Shelby Twp, MI 28 0.30% 0.61%
James Toma Farmington Hills, MI 27 0.29% 0.59%
Daniel H Gabriel Property
Management
Lapeer, MI 23 0.25% 0.50%
MI Housing & Renovation Farmington Hills, MI 23 0.25% 0.50%
BAB Holdings, Bazzi
Ventures
Dearborn, MI 21 0.23% 0.46%
AMA Property Management,
Amadeg & Associates
St Clair Shores, MI 19 0.20% 0.42%
Brian Schieferstein Sterling Heights, MI 19 0.20% 0.42%
Innovative Property
Solutions
Southeld, MI 17 0.18% 0.37%
Detroit Residential
Opportunity Fund
Livonia, MI 16 0.17% 0.35%
Dream Star Properties Oak Park, MI 16 0.17% 0.35%
AMG Holdings Dearborn, MI 16 0.17% 0.35%
Platinum Investment Group Ephraim, UT 16 0.17% 0.35%
Total Investor Sales 791 8.50% 17.37%
Sources: Author’s calculations from CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds
(2014).
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Table 7.3: Top 20 Buyers of REOs from Fannie Mae, 2005–2013
Buyer Location REOs Share ofall sales
Share of sales
to investors
Harbour Portfolio Dallas, TX 376 3.25% 5.21%
Homesolutions Properties Northport, NY 278 2.40% 3.86%
Vision Property
Management
Columbia, SC 204 1.76% 2.83%
Coseo Properties, Inc. San Diego, CA 195 1.69% 2.70%
Ron Mackie United Kingdom 151 1.31% 2.09%
Innovative Property
Solutions
Southeld, MI 106 0.92% 1.47%
Michigan Land Bank Lansing, MI 100 0.86% -
S & J Real Estate Investments Detroit, MI 87 0.75% 1.21%
Metro Property Group Dearborn, MI 67 0.58% 0.93%
Eric and Sheila Tomasi Sherman Oaks, CA 61 0.53% 0.85%
Detroit Residential
Opportunity Fund
Livonia, MI 60 0.52% 0.83%
Salem One Dearborn, MI 60 0.52% 0.83%
Detroit Land Bank Authority Detroit, MI 53 0.46% -
SWE Homes MI Bellaire, TX 48 0.41% 0.67%
Smart Homes Investments Vancouver, BC 41 0.35% 0.57%
KHTJ Properties Southeld, MI 30 0.26% 0.42%
Mount Moriah Community
Development Corporation
Detroit, MI 30 0.26% -
Stonecrest Investments San Jose, CA 28 0.24% 0.39%
BC REO Fund Clearwater, FL 27 0.23% 0.37%
Hartwell Mortgage Group Delaware 27 0.23% 0.37%
Total Investor Sales 2,029 17.54% 25.50%
Sources: Author’s calculations from CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds
(2014).
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Table 7.4: Top 20 Buyers of REOs from Freddie Mac, 2005–2013
Buyer Location REOs Share ofall sales
Share of sales
to investors
Charles Lee Las Vegas, NV 44 1.84% 3.03%
Ron Mackie United Kingdom 25 1.05% 1.72%
Innovative Property
Solutions
Southeld, MI 16 0.67% 1.10%
Detroit Residential
Opportunity Fund
Livonia, MI 11 0.46% 0.76%
Metro Property Group Dearborn, MI 10 0.42% 0.69%
Domas Holdings Baton Rouge, LA 8 0.34% 0.55%
Eastlawn LLC Detroit, MI 8 0.34% 0.55%
Marcus Johnson Royal Oak, MI 8 0.34% 0.55%
Rayford Frye Southeld, MI 7 0.29% 0.48%
Grandmont-Rosedale
Development Corp.
Detroit, MI 7 0.29% -
Manna Development Corp. Detroit, MI 7 0.29% 0.48%
Platinum Investment Group Ephraim, UT 7 0.29% 0.48%
Trademark Assets Redford Twp, MI 7 0.29% 0.48%
BAB Holdings, Bazzi
Ventures
Dearborn, MI 7 0.29% 0.48%
Downer Development Detroit, MI 6 0.25% 0.41%
Eddie Dubose Sherman Oaks, CA 6 0.25% 0.41%
Fat Mammas Real Estate Perris, CA 6 0.25% 0.41%
Homesales Inc. San Diego, CA 6 0.25% 0.41%
Tyler Durden Mt Clements, MI 6 0.25% 0.41%
Innovative Holdings Group Orange County, CA 5 0.21% 0.34%
Total Investor Sales 207 8.67% 13.79%
Sources: Author’s calculations from CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds
(2014).
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CHAPTER VIII
The Pace of REO Sales
This chapter examines the duration of properties in REO inventories, focusing on dif-
ferences among federal and private entities in terms of the time between completed mort-
gage foreclosure and sale. Previous research of this issue found that the rate at which REO
properties exited inventory rose precipitously between 2007 and 2008, when federal and
private entities were contending with newly swollen inventories of mortgage-reverted
properties (Immergluck, 2012; Y. S. Lee & Immergluck, 2012). According to these stud-
ies, many of the properties being sold at such a fast rate during this time were going to
investors, particularly in lower-income neighborhoods. As a result, municipalities were
unable to make adequate use of NSP funding for acquiring foreclosed properties (Coulton
et al., 2008; Immergluck, 2012). This swift sale of properties to investors is linked to neg-
ative outcomes for the neighborhoods in which these former REO properties are located,
as evidenced in prior research and in other chapters of this dissertation (Ford et al., 2013;
Coulton et al., 2008; Hwang, 2015).
Previous studies of REO dispositions are predicated on the assumption that the pace of
REO sales is primarily a function of price. Parties selling distressed properties are viewed
as being motivated to sell their inventory as quickly as possible, with the proviso that
they are simultaneously motivated to maximize short-term returns (Shilling, Benjamin, &
Sirmans, 1990). Lenders and other parties responsible for selling REOs are thus expected to
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set prices based on an analysis of net present value (NPV), which involves the integration
of numerous property- and location-specic factors in determining whether it is more
remunerative to hold or sell a property (Immergluck, 2012; Theologides, 2010). Properties
located in areas where home values are declining or expected to decline are expected to
be priced to sell more quickly than properties in areas where home price are stable, rising,
or expected to rise.
While this assumption concerning the relationship between expectation, price, and
time-in-inventory is reasonable, several supply-side characteristics of federal and private
entities are likely also inuential in determining the duration of REO properties. Y. S.
Lee and Immergluck (2012), in explaining their nding that the GSEs sold properties at a
quicker pace than either private entities or HUD, speculated this dierence was largely
due to eciencies born of standardization and centralization, as well as pressure from
the FHA to accelerate sales to promote liquidity. Many privately held REO properties,
on the other hand, are sold by a decentralized network of servicers lacking the discretion
to set and move prices in the eld. Lowering prices on properties purchased with loans
later incorporated into securitized trusts can be complicated by the numerous investor
groups having interest in these properties and the diering levels of risk to which each
is exposed. Investors purchasing bottom-level tranches have little to no incentive to have
properties priced at a loss, as this can eectively wipe out their investment (Y. S. Lee &
Immergluck, 2012). Many large servicers, however, have discretion over REO sales prices,
as set out in their Pooling and Servicing Agreements (PSAs). The process through which
HUD acquires REO properties can signicantly add to its disposition times, particularly
the delayed transfer of properties from mortgage servicers to HUD. The U.S. Government
Accountability Oce (2013) found that the national average time between foreclosure sale
and the initial valuation, which occurs once a property is ready to be listed, was 184 days
for HUD, while the comparable gures for the two GSEs was just 66 and 69. 1
1The duration between foreclosure sales and valuation is expected to be longer in Michigan, however,
as valuation cannot occur until after the expiration of a six-month redemption period. These periods are
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While previous research has focused on the potential risks posed by rapid sales of ge-
ographically concentrated REOs to investors, there is also reason to be concerned about
excessive holding times for REO properties, particularly those owned by HUD. What these
two issues, fast and excessively slow sales have in common is the increased likelihood of
vacancy, vandalism, and deterioration—the primary mechanisms though which foreclo-
sures generate negative spillovers (U.S. Government Accountability Oce, 2011). In this
chapter I argue that congressional pressure to reduce inventory and the FHFA’s emphasis
on the portfolio perspective in overseeing the GSEs led Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to
rapidly dispose of inventory in Detroit as their inventory grew, making few, if any repairs
(Dixon, 2011). These sales practices, in turn, greatly increased the likelihood of those
properties being sold to investors, many of whom would allow them to remain vacant
and deteriorate. Second, I argue that HUD’s divided approach to taking control of prop-
erties after foreclosure greatly increased their time in inventory, during which time they
sat vacant and unattended (see Figure 8.1 for median days between foreclosure and sale).
Third, I will argue these problems are most severe in the City of Detroit in comparison to
its suburbs. The GSEs’ concerns over nancial safety and soundness, I argue, inuenced
their downward valuation of REOs in Detroit, even in the city’s strong neighborhoods.
8.1 Data and Methods
In order to compare the role the type of institution owning a given REO property has
on time-to-sale, I employed a series of Cox proportional hazards models, using both the
Detroit-specic database and the Regional database of post-foreclosure pathways. Pro-
portional hazards models are a type of survival analysis, the dening aspect of which is
that they take time to an event as the dependent variable. Unlike logistic regression, which
also involves the prediction of a dichotomous outcome, survival analysis allows for and
frequently extinguished before the end of six months, however, by servicers’ delivery of adavits of aban-
donment.
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takes advantage of information from censored observations, i.e., observations which may
or may not have experienced the event of interest after the end of the study period. The
reasons for the use of regression analysis in the rst place is the fact that time to sale is
a function of many variables, including the year of the foreclosure and the character and
location of the property. Descriptive statistics may reect systematic dierences in the
type and location of properties in federal and private entities portfolios. I use regression
analysis in this chapter to control for those confounding factors.
One of the key assumptions of proportional hazards models is precisely that the haz-
ards are proportional, which means that the hazard ratio, or the ratio of the instantaneous
rate of occurrence of an event, for any two subjects who are characterized by dierent sets
of covariates depends only on the value of those covariates and not on time. Proportion-
ality can be assessed via plots of the survival curves to assess whether the curves for any
two strata remain proportional over time. By tting a proportional hazards model taking
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and HUD as dummy variables—with private entities being the
reference category—I found that the curves were proportional through at least the rst
half of the study period, but they lost proportionality later. Some of the curves crossed
paths in the nal years of the study period, indicating a clear violation of the assumption of
proportional hazards. A common approach for addressing non-proportionality in data is
to include time as an interaction term. This approach for overcoming non-proportionality
ts well with my interest in examining time-variant dierences in the pace of disposition
among federal and private entities.
The dependent variables included in these models closely resemble those included in
the logistic regression of investor purchase on a set of dummy variables coded to sep-
arately capture the interaction of seller and time, or, in the case of the regional model,
to separately capture the interactions of seller, time, and location. In the present case, I
interact seller with the year of foreclosure, not the year of sale, though they may be the
same. The data used to perform these analyses includes every REO property in my two
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databases from years 2005 to 2013. This is also a departure from the logistic regression
analysis of investor purchase, which included only properties that entered REO through
the end of 2012 to reduce any potential biases due to censored observations.
8.2 Detroit-Only Models
Table 8.1 presents the results of the model tted with sales from (1) all residential areas
in Detroit, (2) strong neighborhoods, and (3) other neighborhoods for years 2005 to 2013.
The values in the columns are the hazard ratios. A hazard is the rate at which events
occur, in the present case, an REO sale. For dummy variables, a hazard ratio is the ratio
of the hazard for one level of a variable to the hazard of the reference category. Values
larger than 1 such indicate a greater likelihood of being sold in the next unit of time, while
values smaller than 1 indicate a lesser likelihood of being sold in the next unit of time.
Consistent with the ndings of Y. S. Lee and Immergluck (2012), I nd a steady increase in
the hazard ratio for the year of foreclosure relative to 2005 from 2006 through 2008. The
hazard ratios for the year 2008 indicator (“shdyear2008”) is 1.5 in model 1 and 1.6 in model
2, meaning that properties that entered REO inventory in 2008 are predicted to sell at half
again (1.5 times faster) the rate of properties that entered REO in 2005. The coecient for
2009 is not signicant, while the coecients from 2010 through 2012 indicate a slowing
of the rate of disposition prior to a substantial year-over-year increase in the hazard rate
in 2013. The slower pace of sales after 2009, I would argue, reects reduced pressure to
ooad properties as inventories shrank during the previous years of rapid sales, as well
as, perhaps, improvements in risk-based pricing and expectations regarding home price
appreciation (Reindl & Tanner, 2016).
In terms of the coecients for federal entities, the hazard ratios for the GSEs are sta-
tistically signicant and well above 1 for most years, even exceeding 2 in both 2009, 2010
and 2012, meaning GSE properties were selling twice as fast as privately held REOs dur-
ing those years. While the parameter estimates above 1 for the GSEs be explained in part
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by the greater standardization of the enterprises’ sales practices point out by Y. S. Lee
and Immergluck (2012), I argue the accelerated time indicated by the hazard ratios for the
GSEs from 2009 through 2012 reects the sharp increase in the pace of REO starts for the
enterprises. This is the period during which congressional pressure to accelerate sales
would have had a measurable impact in the annual rate of sales for the two GSEs.
The hazard ratios for HUD, on the other hand, are statistically signicant and less
than 1 through 2009, as expected, though the ratios climbed from roughly 0.39 in 2007 to
0.92 in 2009. It should be noted, however, that the pace of private entities’ sales of REOs
slowed from 2008 to 2009 and that the coecient for HUD in 2009 reects a narrower gap
between HUD and private entities as the pace of the private entities’ sales slowed. For
years 2010 to 2012 the hazard ratios for HUD are statistically signicant and just above
1 for the citywide model, while they were only signicant in the strong neighborhoods
model in 2010 and 2012, and signicant only in 2011 in the other neighborhoods model.
Just as with the rise in the hazard ratio for HUD from 2008 to 2009, however, these above
1 values for 2010 through 2012 must be interpreted along with the coecients for private
entities (same as the foreclosure year), which continued to fall after 2008. In sum, these
coecients are consistent with my claim that HUD-owned properties, overall, sold at a
substantially slower pace than other other REOs. These dierences were greatest between
HUD and private entities between 2005 and 2008, after which the slowing pace of sales of
privately owned REOs closed the distance between private entities and HUD. The dier-
ence between HUD and the GSEs remained quite large, even after the overall slowing of
the pace of sales after 2009.
In addition to these indicators of year of entry and type of seller, several other covari-
ates are signicant, though the magnitudes of these hazard ratios’ dierence from 1 are
quite small. Among the variables controlling for property characteristics, oor area has
a small negative impact on time-to-sale in models 1 and 2. Among variables estimating
the eect of neighborhood-level housing market indicators, both poverty rate and me-
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dian household income have a negative impact on time-to-sale in model 1, while median
household income alone is signicant in model 2. Census tract owner-occupancy rate, on
the other hand, exerts a positive impact on the sales rate in models 1 and 2. The spatial
log of home sale prices is signicant in models 1 and 2 and positive, though the practical
dierence is very small. Longitude (x) is also signicant across models, exerting small
negative impact on the sale rate with increasing distance to the west.
8.2.1 Low-Value Properties
Prior research in Atlanta found that low-value properties, dened as those with an
estimated value of less than $30,000, were at a a greater risk of being sold more rapidly
by the two GSEs, as well as HUD. Y. S. Lee and Immergluck (2012) speculated that HUD
dealt more aggressively with low-value properties than higher-value properties. Given
what I had discovered about diculties in transferring properties from servicers to HUD
after foreclosure in Detroit and Cleveland, I was curious whether HUD would actually
have sold any category of properties at a quicker pace than private entities. Table 8.2
presents the results of the proportional hazards models using only low-valued properties,
dened as those having an assessed value in the lowest quartile of the dataset (< $23,340).
The hazard ratio for Fannie Mae in 2010 in strong neighborhoods is noticeably larger
here than in Table 8.1, moving from 2.54 to 2.80. Similarly, the hazard ratio for the entry
year with the largest hazard ratio for Freddie Mac, 2009, moves from 2.64 to 3.20 when
examining just lower-value properties in strong neighborhoods. Looking at the indicators
for HUD, there are no indications of the drastic change in direction of eect as seen found
by Y. S. Lee and Immergluck (2012). What I found, rather, is modest increase in the hazard
ratio from 2010 to 2012, suggesting that there may indeed be a small interaction between
assessed value and ownership by HUD in explaining time-to-sale. Outside of the changes
in the peak years for the GSEs in model 2 and the increase in hazard ratios for HUD in
models 1 and from 2010 and 2012, however, few indicators exhibit meaningful changes
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between these two tables, which is consistent with the nding that assessed value does
not have a statistically signicant relationship with time-to-sale.
8.3 Regional Model
In order to examine dierences across space in the Detroit metropolitan area, I t
the data in my regional database of post-foreclosure pathways to a proportional hazards
model where year of entry is interacted with seller, as in the Detroit-only model, as well
as location, specically, location in one of three areas: (1) strong neighborhoods in the
city of Detroit, (2) inner-ring suburbs, and (3) outer-ring suburbs. The denition of these
areas is discussed in Chapter IV. Thus, the independent variables included in the regional
proportional hazards model of time-to-sale are similar to those included in the regional lo-
gistic regression model of investor acquisition, but, as with the Detroit-only model, seller
is interacted with year of entry, not year of sale. In addition to the indicator variables
reecting each combination of entry year, seller, and location, the model also estimates
the main eect of location and year. I also t a second model including the interaction
of entry year and location to capture annual dierences in the pace of REO sales across
space.
Table 8.3 presents the results for these two models. The hazard ratios for annual ef-
fects in model 1 are signicant and positive in 2007 and 2008, as in the Detroit-only model,
but the hazards ratios are also signicant and positive for years 2011 through 2013, which
is not consistent with the Detroit-only model. This discrepancy is likely explained by
dierences in the geography and time of REO accumulation in the Detroit metropolitan
area. While the number of completed mortgage foreclosures peaked in Detroit in 2007,
after which the annual number of foreclosures fell precipitously, the annual number of
foreclosures in inner- and outer-ring suburbs rose greatly in 2007, but did not peak until
2010. This dierence, in turn, is likely explained by there having been a larger share of
private-label subprime loans originated in Detroit than in suburban locations, where loans
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acquired by the GSEs, which were more likely to have been underwritten in conventional
terms, constituted a larger share of originations. The later surge in foreclosures in the sub-
urbs, then, reects the spreading of the foreclosure crisis to the overall economy, thereby
impacting holders of conventional loans. Model 2, which includes interaction terms for
year and location, has negative hazard ratios for years 2010 through 2012, which in this
model are to be interpreted as the annual eects for properties located in Detroit’s strong
neighborhoods. Interaction terms for entry year and location are positive and signicant
for each year in inner-ring suburbs, with the hazard ratios climbing from a negligible
1.09 in 2007 to 1.77 in 2012. A similar pattern is observed in outer-ring suburbs, with
coecients climbing from 1.10 in 2009 to 1.61 in 2012.
With regard to the hazard ratios for the dummy variables capturing each combination
of entry year, seller, and location, the annual values for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
are quite consistent across location. The two GSEs possess statistically signicant and
positive values, with the exception of the term for Freddie Mac’s 2013 foreclosures in
inner-ring suburbs. The hazard ratios for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are at their highest,
all above 2.0, across locations in 2010, corresponding to the national peak in REO starts
for the enterprises in that year (with the single exception that the largest value for Freddie
Mac is for 2009). The hazard ratios for HUD are generally signicant and less than 1, with
the exception of some values above 1 in 2005 and 2006, when HUD sales were relatively
scarce. The results for the covariates for property- and neighborhood-level characteristics
are quite similar to those of the Detroit-only model, the primary dierence being the
positive eect of assessed value on time-to-sale.
8.4 Discussion
During the mortgage foreclosure crisis, federal and private entities alike repossessed
vast numbers of residential properties. Previous research indicates the sudden growth of
these entities’ inventories created pressure to rapidly shed properties from inventory, par-
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ticularly lower-valued properties in central-city, majority-minority neighborhoods (Coul-
ton et al., 2008; Immergluck, 2012; Y. S. Lee & Immergluck, 2012). This research contributes
to the small literature on the pace of REO sales by examining the determinants of time-to-
sale across several years, including both the peak years of the foreclosure crisis and the
start of the housing market recovery. The ndings here are largely congruent with past re-
search, particularly in the nding of an acceleration of the pace of REO sales though 2009
and substantial supply-side eects on time-to-sale. I nd the two GSEs to be strongly as-
sociated with a rapid increase in time-to-sale during the years in which they absorbed the
largest amount of inventory, 2009 though 2012, which lags roughly two-to-three years
behind the period during which private entities absorbed and disposed of their largest
numbers. Thus, at least in the Detroit metropolitan area, it appears there were two over-
lapping, but staggered waves of rapid property disposition, rst by private entities, second
by the GSEs. This claim nds support elsewhere in this dissertation, where I discuss the
timing and nature of bulk sales in Detroit.
It is important to note, however, that rapid sales do not necessarily equate to investor
purchases, particularly after 2009 when First Look programs were launched, providing
local governments, eligible nonprots, and prospective homebuyers a limited window to
bid on foreclosures owned by federal entities and participating private entities, free from
competition from investors. Rapid sales times then might reect parties taking advantage
of this program, though this is impossible to ascertain from available data. Figure 8.2 of-
fers a simple visualization of the relationship between buyer type and entry year. It shows
the median number of days between foreclosure and sale for each category of buyer by
the year in which properties were foreclosed. It shows that the median days between fore-
closure and sale for individuals did indeed cross over the line for large investors between
2008 and 2009, with individuals purchasing properties that entered REO in 2009 after a
shorter period of time than large investors. Investors of other sizes, however, had lower
median days between foreclosure and sale for every year except for 2011.
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Ownership by HUD, unlike the GSEs, is associated with substantially slower sales
times, particularly prior to 2010. Starting in 2010, however, HUD is linked to a slight
increase in the rate of sales relative to private entities, although the dierences are so
small as to be practically insignicant. Looking at low-valued properties alone, however,
the magnitude of the dierences between HUD and private entities increases consider-
ably, with properties entering HUD’s inventory in 2012 being predicted to sell 45% more
quickly than those entering private inventory that year, although still at a slower rate
than either of the GSEs. Based on interviews and government audits of HUD’s sales per-
formance (U.S. Government Accountability Oce, 2013), I suspect this shift between very
slow sales times and more rapid sales times is a function of early diculties HUD encoun-
tered in receiving properties from servicers after foreclosure. This likely created a signif-
icant backlog of inventory waiting to be received by HUD. Once HUD took possession
of these properties, HUD likely experienced pressure to rapidly dispose of its inventory,
particularly its holdings of low-value properties. This idea is reinforced by the number of
bulk transactions HUD made in Detroit, including the sale of roughly 200 homes to Ron
Mackie between 2010 and 2013 (see Table 7.2).
Another contribution of this research is a nuanced examination of the pace of fore-
closure sales across metropolitan space over an expansive time period. I nd substantial
dierences in the pace of REO sales across space and time, reecting dierent patterns of
foreclosures between central city and suburban locations. While the pace of sales slowed
overall in Detroit after 2009, it began to climb rather sharply in suburban locations during
this period, as the subprime mortgage crisis penetrated the overall economy and higher-
income households and holders of conventional mortgages began to experience foreclo-
sure. Above and beyond these somewhat diverging annual trends for central-city and
suburban locations, properties owned by the GSEs are associated with a more rapid sales
time between 2010 and 2012, across all locations. Sales times for HUD are also largely
negative relative to times for private entities in a given location. The faster pace of sales
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in suburban locations, particularly in the outer suburbs, I would argue, stems less from
the the GSE’s desire to shed properties in these locations at re-sale prices—indeed, REO
sale prices in these locations are far higher than those in the City of Detroit—but rather
from stronger demand from prospective owner-occupants and individual investors for
properties in those locations.
Previous research on the pace of REO sales was motivated by a concern over the rapid
channeling of foreclosures to investors, thereby precluding local governments and non-
prots from purchasing these homes using NSP funding and putting them to productive
use. Further. the rapid sale of concentrated foreclosure is linked to vacancy and blight.
Faster sale times are generally interpreted as indicative of property dumping, and, there-
fore, negative. Slower sales times, on the other hand, are viewed as reecting owners’
decisions to incur higher carrying costs and set higher prices. In other words, longer sales
times are viewed as emblematic of greater interest in a given property. As discussed above,
however, slower sales times are also a function of federal entities’, specically HUD’s,
procedural diculties in receiving properties from servicers after foreclosure. Properties
sitting longer on the market, particularly in places like Detroit, are highly susceptible to
deterioration. In these instances, longer sale times might lead to equally low sales prices,
and generally only speculators are willing to purchase such properties, as they likely re-
quire signicant improvements. This scenario is highly likely for HUD, which has a policy
of not repairing properties prior to sale (U.S. Government Accountability Oce, 2013).
The next chapter takes up this issue through its examination of the impact on home sale
prices of nearby foreclosures based on their duration in inventory.o
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Figure 8.1: Median Days between Foreclosure and Sale, Detroit, 2006–2013. Sources: Core-
Logic (2010, 2014).
Table 8.1: Hazard Ratios for Proportional Hazards Model of Time-to-Sale in Detroit 2005–
2013
Dependent variable:
survival_time
Detroit Strong Outer
(1) (2) (3)
FANNIE2005 1.052 (0.051) 1.027 (0.065) 1.107 (0.083)
FANNIE2006 1.362∗∗∗ (0.041) 1.321∗∗∗ (0.053) 1.462∗∗∗ (0.066)
FANNIE2007 1.201∗∗∗ (0.036) 1.137∗∗∗ (0.045) 1.324∗∗∗ (0.058)
FANNIE2008 1.622∗∗∗ (0.030) 1.552∗∗∗ (0.037) 1.763∗∗∗ (0.052)
FANNIE2009 2.067∗∗∗ (0.037) 2.141∗∗∗ (0.045) 2.014∗∗∗ (0.065)
FANNIE2010 2.429∗∗∗ (0.038) 2.539∗∗∗ (0.046) 2.195∗∗∗ (0.068)
FANNIE2011 1.763∗∗∗ (0.043) 1.806∗∗∗ (0.051) 1.655∗∗∗ (0.079)
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FANNIE2012 2.158∗∗∗ (0.054) 2.350∗∗∗ (0.065) 1.792∗∗∗ (0.097)
FANNIE2013 1.011 (0.133) 0.825 (0.169) 1.431 (0.222)
FREDDIE2005 1.052 (0.100) 1.115 (0.132) 0.977 (0.153)
FREDDIE2006 1.353∗∗∗ (0.084) 1.397∗∗∗ (0.102) 1.287∗ (0.147)
FREDDIE2007 2.104∗∗∗ (0.065) 2.053∗∗∗ (0.079) 2.229∗∗∗ (0.117)
FREDDIE2008 1.936∗∗∗ (0.050) 1.699∗∗∗ (0.059) 3.110∗∗∗ (0.095)
FREDDIE2009 2.456∗∗∗ (0.066) 2.638∗∗∗ (0.075) 1.847∗∗∗ (0.143)
FREDDIE2010 2.089∗∗∗ (0.095) 2.129∗∗∗ (0.103) 1.961∗∗ (0.273)
FREDDIE2011 1.784∗∗∗ (0.098) 1.828∗∗∗ (0.106) 1.439 (0.274)
FREDDIE2012 2.610∗∗∗ (0.069) 2.884∗∗∗ (0.080) 2.026∗∗∗ (0.138)
FREDDIE2013 1.075 (0.170) 1.085 (0.196) 1.037 (0.340)
HUD2005 0.434∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.447∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.403∗∗∗ (0.076)
HUD2006 0.362∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.369∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.357∗∗∗ (0.062)
HUD2007 0.392∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.391∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.397∗∗∗ (0.060)
HUD2008 0.549∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.541∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.567∗∗∗ (0.059)
HUD2009 0.921∗∗ (0.038) 0.862∗∗∗ (0.044) 1.058 (0.072)
HUD2010 1.080∗ (0.041) 1.092∗ (0.049) 1.055 (0.080)
HUD2011 1.106∗∗ (0.051) 1.074 (0.059) 1.214∗∗ (0.098)
HUD2012 1.142∗ (0.068) 1.198∗∗ (0.080) 1.017 (0.136)
HUD2013 0.579 (0.363) 0.237∗∗ (0.586) 3.588∗∗∗ (0.474)
shd_year2006 0.962∗ (0.020) 0.944∗∗ (0.026) 0.989 (0.031)
shd_year2007 1.267∗∗∗ (0.019) 1.287∗∗∗ (0.025) 1.246∗∗∗ (0.030)
shd_year2008 1.504∗∗∗ (0.023) 1.597∗∗∗ (0.031) 1.382∗∗∗ (0.038)
shd_year2009 0.969 (0.038) 1.139∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.757∗∗∗ (0.063)
shd_year2010 0.638∗∗∗ (0.042) 0.697∗∗∗ (0.057) 0.586∗∗∗ (0.070)
shd_year2011 0.702∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.787∗∗∗ (0.059) 0.617∗∗∗ (0.074)
shd_year2012 0.682∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.716∗∗∗ (0.066) 0.699∗∗∗ (0.084)
shd_year2013 1.348∗∗∗ (0.090) 1.555∗∗∗ (0.110) 1.124 (0.166)
SHDspat_lag5k_ln_zgm 1.020∗ (0.011) 1.065∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.978 (0.016)
X_norm 0.911∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.930∗∗ (0.031) 0.901∗∗∗ (0.037)
Y_norm 0.925∗ (0.042) 0.910∗ (0.057) 0.862∗ (0.078)
lat.2 0.928 (0.124) 0.921 (0.142) 0.925 (0.417)
long.2 1.028 (0.084) 1.068 (0.113) 0.908 (0.160)
latXlong 1.205 (0.155) 0.934 (0.195) 1.385 (0.337)
med_hm_val_zgm 1.006 (0.010) 0.993 (0.013) 1.021 (0.018)
pov_rate_zgm 0.978∗∗ (0.009) 0.989 (0.013) 1.010 (0.018)
own_occ_zgm 1.056∗∗∗ (0.010) 1.060∗∗∗ (0.013) 1.025 (0.016)
med_hh_inc_zgm 0.950∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.951∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.986 (0.033)
assessed_val_ln_zgm 1.001 (0.005) 1.001 (0.006) 0.998 (0.009)
oor_area_ln_zgm 0.971∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.965∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.978∗∗ (0.009)
Observations 54,627 36,002 18,625
R2 0.130 0.142 0.114
Max. Possible R2 1.000 1.000 1.000
Log Likelihood −493,865.800 −310,056.200 −151,605.200
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Wald Test (df = 47) 7,259.380∗∗∗ 5,267.220∗∗∗ 2,157.200∗∗∗
LR Test (df = 47) 7,632.176∗∗∗ 5,518.174∗∗∗ 2,245.249∗∗∗
Score (Logrank) Test (df = 47) 7,798.619∗∗∗ 5,676.615∗∗∗ 2,335.767∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Sources: City of Detroit Assessor (2014), CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County
Register of Deeds (2014).
Table 8.2: Hazard Ratios for Proportional Hazards Model of Time-to-Sale in Detroit Low-
Value Properties 2005–2013
Dependent variable:
survival_time
Detroit Strong Outer
(1) (2) (3)
FANNIE2005 1.158 (0.103) 1.016 (0.198) 1.234∗ (0.121)
FANNIE2006 1.566∗∗∗ (0.090) 1.602∗∗ (0.190) 1.589∗∗∗ (0.103)
FANNIE2007 1.417∗∗∗ (0.080) 1.391∗ (0.176) 1.446∗∗∗ (0.090)
FANNIE2008 1.544∗∗∗ (0.061) 1.284∗∗ (0.106) 1.733∗∗∗ (0.075)
FANNIE2009 1.816∗∗∗ (0.077) 1.676∗∗∗ (0.129) 1.901∗∗∗ (0.097)
FANNIE2010 2.469∗∗∗ (0.071) 2.794∗∗∗ (0.111) 2.236∗∗∗ (0.092)
FANNIE2011 1.820∗∗∗ (0.067) 1.929∗∗∗ (0.094) 1.680∗∗∗ (0.096)
FANNIE2012 1.907∗∗∗ (0.087) 2.167∗∗∗ (0.126) 1.706∗∗∗ (0.120)
FANNIE2013 1.043 (0.214) 0.702 (0.345) 1.402 (0.286)
FREDDIE2005 1.105 (0.211) 1.313 (0.506) 1.041 (0.233)
FREDDIE2006 1.229 (0.215) 1.752 (0.504) 1.179 (0.237)
FREDDIE2007 2.008∗∗∗ (0.156) 2.851∗∗∗ (0.321) 1.857∗∗∗ (0.179)
FREDDIE2008 2.388∗∗∗ (0.102) 1.590∗∗∗ (0.172) 3.299∗∗∗ (0.127)
FREDDIE2009 2.116∗∗∗ (0.172) 3.912∗∗∗ (0.244) 1.417 (0.246)
FREDDIE2010 1.440 (0.310) 1.395 (0.371) 1.823 (0.583)
FREDDIE2011 1.797∗∗∗ (0.200) 2.314∗∗∗ (0.236) 1.079 (0.386)
FREDDIE2012 2.659∗∗∗ (0.116) 3.167∗∗∗ (0.158) 2.225∗∗∗ (0.173)
FREDDIE2013 0.988 (0.302) 0.641 (0.450) 1.568 (0.411)
HUD2005 0.379∗∗∗ (0.111) 0.407∗∗∗ (0.188) 0.368∗∗∗ (0.138)
HUD2006 0.355∗∗∗ (0.095) 0.347∗∗∗ (0.172) 0.355∗∗∗ (0.114)
HUD2007 0.398∗∗∗ (0.090) 0.420∗∗∗ (0.155) 0.383∗∗∗ (0.111)
HUD2008 0.539∗∗∗ (0.071) 0.525∗∗∗ (0.103) 0.533∗∗∗ (0.099)
HUD2009 0.937 (0.086) 0.770∗∗ (0.133) 1.011 (0.115)
HUD2010 1.139∗ (0.079) 1.270∗∗ (0.116) 1.028 (0.114)
HUD2011 1.226∗∗ (0.080) 1.217∗ (0.106) 1.290∗∗ (0.123)
HUD2012 1.295∗∗ (0.110) 1.450∗∗ (0.149) 1.170 (0.168)
HUD2013 1.169 (0.432) 0.223 (1.018) 5.504∗∗∗ (0.494)
shd_year2006 0.992 (0.041) 0.997 (0.087) 0.989 (0.046)
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shd_year2007 1.188∗∗∗ (0.040) 1.179∗∗ (0.083) 1.191∗∗∗ (0.045)
shd_year2008 1.432∗∗∗ (0.047) 1.642∗∗∗ (0.094) 1.336∗∗∗ (0.056)
shd_year2009 0.902 (0.075) 1.280∗ (0.147) 0.761∗∗∗ (0.091)
shd_year2010 0.542∗∗∗ (0.078) 0.568∗∗∗ (0.151) 0.546∗∗∗ (0.095)
shd_year2011 0.593∗∗∗ (0.074) 0.642∗∗∗ (0.140) 0.594∗∗∗ (0.095)
shd_year2012 0.603∗∗∗ (0.084) 0.585∗∗∗ (0.155) 0.647∗∗∗ (0.107)
shd_year2013 1.032 (0.152) 1.228 (0.230) 0.895 (0.219)
SHDspat_lag5k_ln_zgm 0.988 (0.018) 1.036 (0.043) 0.964∗ (0.021)
X_norm 0.939 (0.047) 1.032 (0.091) 0.879∗∗ (0.060)
Y_norm 0.848∗ (0.086) 0.823 (0.157) 0.884 (0.128)
lat.2 0.973 (0.215) 0.863 (0.296) 1.478 (0.551)
long.2 0.889 (0.185) 0.453∗∗ (0.327) 1.376 (0.242)
latXlong 0.970 (0.340) 1.087 (0.583) 1.173 (0.563)
med_hm_val_zgm 0.989 (0.018) 0.983 (0.031) 0.982 (0.026)
pov_rate_zgm 0.998 (0.020) 0.982 (0.040) 0.983 (0.027)
own_occ_zgm 1.035∗ (0.019) 1.033 (0.042) 1.031 (0.023)
med_hh_inc 1.000 (0.00000) 1.000 (0.00000) 1.000 (0.00000)
assessed_val_ln_zgm 0.996 (0.009) 1.001 (0.013) 0.993 (0.014)
oor_area_ln_zgm 0.958∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.906∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.982 (0.013)
Observations 13,655 5,034 8,621
R2 0.107 0.127 0.104
Max. Possible R2 1.000 1.000 1.000
Log Likelihood −101,001.400 −30,981.370 −62,332.370
Wald Test (df = 47) 1,489.460∗∗∗ 676.110∗∗∗ 934.150∗∗∗
LR Test (df = 47) 1,540.304∗∗∗ 686.553∗∗∗ 947.953∗∗∗
Score (Logrank) Test (df = 47) 1,590.972∗∗∗ 726.795∗∗∗ 1,014.763∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Sources: City of Detroit Assessor (2014), CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County
Register of Deeds (2014).
Table 8.3: Hazard Ratios for Proportional Hazards Model of Time-to-Sale in Detroit Tri-
County Area 2005–2013
Dependent variable:
survival_time
(1) (2)
FANNIE_det2005 6.958∗∗∗ (0.180) 6.316∗∗∗ (0.181)
FANNIE_det2006 1.580∗∗∗ (0.067) 1.438∗∗∗ (0.068)
FANNIE_det2007 1.355∗∗∗ (0.050) 1.295∗∗∗ (0.051)
FANNIE_det2008 1.468∗∗∗ (0.037) 1.380∗∗∗ (0.038)
FANNIE_det2009 1.681∗∗∗ (0.034) 1.603∗∗∗ (0.035)
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FANNIE_det2010 2.643∗∗∗ (0.031) 2.639∗∗∗ (0.033)
FANNIE_det2011 1.714∗∗∗ (0.029) 1.851∗∗∗ (0.032)
FANNIE_det2012 1.353∗∗∗ (0.032) 1.565∗∗∗ (0.034)
FANNIE_det2013 1.050 (0.040) 1.293∗∗∗ (0.042)
FANNIE_inner2005 6.073∗∗∗ (0.170) 6.829∗∗∗ (0.170)
FANNIE_inner2006 1.527∗∗∗ (0.054) 1.705∗∗∗ (0.056)
FANNIE_inner2007 1.627∗∗∗ (0.038) 1.712∗∗∗ (0.039)
FANNIE_inner2008 1.317∗∗∗ (0.028) 1.379∗∗∗ (0.029)
FANNIE_inner2009 1.383∗∗∗ (0.023) 1.375∗∗∗ (0.024)
FANNIE_inner2010 2.641∗∗∗ (0.020) 2.626∗∗∗ (0.021)
FANNIE_inner2011 1.838∗∗∗ (0.019) 1.800∗∗∗ (0.020)
FANNIE_inner2012 1.315∗∗∗ (0.020) 1.271∗∗∗ (0.021)
FANNIE_inner2013 1.038 (0.025) 0.989 (0.025)
FANNIE_outer2005 7.326∗∗∗ (0.193) 7.292∗∗∗ (0.195)
FANNIE_outer2006 1.775∗∗∗ (0.072) 1.758∗∗∗ (0.076)
FANNIE_outer2007 1.875∗∗∗ (0.044) 1.841∗∗∗ (0.046)
FANNIE_outer2008 1.432∗∗∗ (0.031) 1.453∗∗∗ (0.033)
FANNIE_outer2009 1.249∗∗∗ (0.025) 1.318∗∗∗ (0.026)
FANNIE_outer2010 2.224∗∗∗ (0.023) 2.254∗∗∗ (0.024)
FANNIE_outer2011 1.691∗∗∗ (0.021) 1.667∗∗∗ (0.022)
FANNIE_outer2012 1.164∗∗∗ (0.022) 1.125∗∗∗ (0.023)
FANNIE_outer2013 0.878∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.828∗∗∗ (0.029)
FREDDIE_det2005 7.525∗∗∗ (0.354) 6.878∗∗∗ (0.354)
FREDDIE_det2006 2.183∗∗∗ (0.141) 1.990∗∗∗ (0.141)
FREDDIE_det2007 1.635∗∗∗ (0.087) 1.561∗∗∗ (0.087)
FREDDIE_det2008 2.640∗∗∗ (0.061) 2.490∗∗∗ (0.061)
FREDDIE_det2009 2.323∗∗∗ (0.060) 2.233∗∗∗ (0.061)
FREDDIE_det2010 2.233∗∗∗ (0.074) 2.231∗∗∗ (0.075)
FREDDIE_det2011 1.871∗∗∗ (0.094) 1.995∗∗∗ (0.095)
FREDDIE_det2012 1.962∗∗∗ (0.081) 2.328∗∗∗ (0.082)
FREDDIE_det2013 1.351∗∗∗ (0.063) 1.758∗∗∗ (0.066)
FREDDIE_inner2005 5.081∗∗∗ (0.172) 5.714∗∗∗ (0.173)
FREDDIE_inner2006 2.143∗∗∗ (0.080) 2.387∗∗∗ (0.081)
FREDDIE_inner2007 2.025∗∗∗ (0.056) 2.145∗∗∗ (0.056)
FREDDIE_inner2008 2.122∗∗∗ (0.040) 2.215∗∗∗ (0.040)
FREDDIE_inner2009 1.947∗∗∗ (0.033) 1.930∗∗∗ (0.034)
FREDDIE_inner2010 2.442∗∗∗ (0.028) 2.427∗∗∗ (0.029)
FREDDIE_inner2011 1.964∗∗∗ (0.026) 1.927∗∗∗ (0.027)
FREDDIE_inner2012 1.380∗∗∗ (0.028) 1.334∗∗∗ (0.029)
FREDDIE_inner2013 1.045 (0.034) 0.993 (0.034)
FREDDIE_outer2005 8.918∗∗∗ (0.183) 8.850∗∗∗ (0.185)
FREDDIE_outer2006 2.834∗∗∗ (0.107) 2.806∗∗∗ (0.110)
FREDDIE_outer2007 2.080∗∗∗ (0.061) 2.043∗∗∗ (0.062)
FREDDIE_outer2008 2.032∗∗∗ (0.039) 2.062∗∗∗ (0.040)
FREDDIE_outer2009 1.824∗∗∗ (0.034) 1.930∗∗∗ (0.034)
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FREDDIE_outer2010 2.349∗∗∗ (0.028) 2.379∗∗∗ (0.029)
FREDDIE_outer2011 1.821∗∗∗ (0.027) 1.798∗∗∗ (0.028)
FREDDIE_outer2012 1.195∗∗∗ (0.029) 1.154∗∗∗ (0.030)
FREDDIE_outer2013 0.875∗∗∗ (0.036) 0.821∗∗∗ (0.037)
HUD_det2005 3.763∗∗∗ (0.354) 3.389∗∗∗ (0.354)
HUD_det2006 0.955 (0.072) 0.864∗∗ (0.074)
HUD_det2007 0.704∗∗∗ (0.088) 0.646∗∗∗ (0.089)
HUD_det2008 0.506∗∗∗ (0.063) 0.482∗∗∗ (0.063)
HUD_det2009 0.486∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.461∗∗∗ (0.024)
HUD_det2010 0.625∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.602∗∗∗ (0.030)
HUD_det2011 0.755∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.771∗∗∗ (0.035)
HUD_det2012 0.621∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.684∗∗∗ (0.039)
HUD_det2013 0.545∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.639∗∗∗ (0.042)
HUD_inner2005 3.691∗∗∗ (0.183) 4.152∗∗∗ (0.184)
HUD_inner2006 1.126∗∗ (0.055) 1.263∗∗∗ (0.057)
HUD_inner2007 0.767∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.830∗∗∗ (0.051)
HUD_inner2008 0.550∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.577∗∗∗ (0.039)
HUD_inner2009 0.523∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.537∗∗∗ (0.021)
HUD_inner2010 0.819∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.815∗∗∗ (0.026)
HUD_inner2011 0.915∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.901∗∗∗ (0.026)
HUD_inner2012 0.689∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.669∗∗∗ (0.026)
HUD_inner2013 0.713∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.679∗∗∗ (0.028)
HUD_outer2005 2.953∗∗∗ (0.354) 2.939∗∗∗ (0.355)
HUD_outer2006 1.241∗∗ (0.106) 1.231∗ (0.109)
HUD_outer2007 0.913 (0.088) 0.897 (0.089)
HUD_outer2008 0.586∗∗∗ (0.060) 0.582∗∗∗ (0.061)
HUD_outer2009 0.560∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.575∗∗∗ (0.039)
HUD_outer2010 0.854∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.879∗∗∗ (0.043)
HUD_outer2011 0.922∗ (0.044) 0.915∗∗ (0.045)
HUD_outer2012 0.638∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.621∗∗∗ (0.039)
HUD_outer2013 0.677∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.638∗∗∗ (0.040)
shd_year2006 0.991 (0.015) 0.917∗∗∗ (0.023)
shd_year2007 1.193∗∗∗ (0.015) 1.163∗∗∗ (0.022)
shd_year2008 1.392∗∗∗ (0.015) 1.301∗∗∗ (0.024)
shd_year2009 1.118∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.992 (0.030)
shd_year2010 0.984 (0.017) 0.790∗∗∗ (0.030)
shd_year2011 1.276∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.941∗ (0.031)
shd_year2012 1.402∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.933∗∗ (0.032)
shd_year2013 1.624∗∗∗ (0.019) 1.503∗∗∗ (0.036)
new_clust1 1.156∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.932∗∗ (0.030)
new_clust2 1.192∗∗∗ (0.014) 1.087∗∗ (0.037)
SHDspat_lag5k_ln_zgm 0.992∗ (0.005) 0.981∗∗∗ (0.005)
county_cat1 1.025∗∗∗ (0.008) 1.026∗∗∗ (0.008)
county_cat2 0.992 (0.008) 0.994 (0.008)
med_hm_val_zgm 1.005 (0.007) 1.006 (0.007)
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pov_rate_zgm 0.970∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.970∗∗∗ (0.004)
own_occ_zgm 1.004 (0.004) 1.003 (0.004)
med_hh_inc_zgm 0.975∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.976∗∗∗ (0.008)
assessed_val_ln_zgm 1.008∗ (0.004) 1.016∗∗∗ (0.004)
oor_area_ln_zgm 0.933∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.932∗∗∗ (0.004)
shd_year2006:new_clust1 1.170∗∗∗ (0.034)
shd_year2007:new_clust1 1.088∗∗ (0.033)
shd_year2008:new_clust1 1.223∗∗∗ (0.034)
shd_year2009:new_clust1 1.253∗∗∗ (0.038)
shd_year2010:new_clust1 1.414∗∗∗ (0.038)
shd_year2011:new_clust1 1.559∗∗∗ (0.039)
shd_year2012:new_clust1 1.769∗∗∗ (0.040)
shd_year2013:new_clust1 1.224∗∗∗ (0.045)
shd_year2006:new_clust2 1.100∗∗ (0.041)
shd_year2007:new_clust2 1.003 (0.040)
shd_year2008:new_clust2 0.988 (0.041)
shd_year2009:new_clust2 1.103∗∗ (0.044)
shd_year2010:new_clust2 1.249∗∗∗ (0.044)
shd_year2011:new_clust2 1.393∗∗∗ (0.045)
shd_year2012:new_clust2 1.605∗∗∗ (0.046)
shd_year2013:new_clust2 1.013 (0.051)
Observations 157,559 157,559
R2 0.123 0.125
Max. Possible R2 1.000 1.000
Log Likelihood −1,676,663.000 −1,676,437.000
Wald Test 20,952.490∗∗∗ (df = 100) 21,376.910∗∗∗ (df = 116)
LR Test 20,666.990∗∗∗ (df = 100) 21,118.750∗∗∗ (df = 116)
Score (Logrank) Test 22,179.700∗∗∗ (df = 100) 22,635.650∗∗∗ (df = 116)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Sources: City of Detroit Assessor (2014), CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County
Register of Deeds (2014).
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Figure 8.2: Median Days between Foreclosure and Sale, Detroit, 200–2013. Sources: City
of Detroit Assessor (2014), CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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CHAPTER IX
Spillovers of Current and Former REO Properties
The foreclosure crisis resulted in a massive number of home foreclosures in cities and
metropolitan areas across the U.S. Foreclosed properties often sit vacant and susceptible to
deterioration and vandalism, which, in turn, can discount the sale price of nearby homes.
Previous research has largely conrmed this relationship, nding evidence of sizable neg-
ative externalities generated by foreclosures (Harding et al., 2009; Ihlanfeldt & Mayock,
2014; Immergluck & Smith, 2006a; Schuetz et al., 2008). A number of these studies exam-
ine the relationship between the duration of foreclosure—i.e., the length of time between
foreclosure and sale—and nearby home sale prices, but the relationship between the spe-
cic institutions owning REOs and nearby home price discounts is unknown. These dif-
ferences, however, can eect the REO durations, as shown in Chapter VIII, as well as
maintenance levels and type of buyer, as shown in Chapter VI. This chapter addresses
this gap in the literature by examining the impact of ownership by federal and private
entities on home sale prices, taking into account the length of time properties have been
in REO inventory. The GSEs, HUD, and private entities each have separate infrastruc-
tures for handling properties. The GSEs’ systems are characterized in government audits
by a relative degree of standardization and centralization, particularly in comparison to
HUD, which only takes control of properties after lengthy procedural diculties work-
ing with servicers to convey properties (U.S. Government Accountability Oce, 2013).
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HUD has also been charged with poor oversight of contractors responsible for property
preservation, increasing the possibility of unsold, vacant HUD-owned properties harming
nearby home sale prices (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Oce
of Inspector General, 2012). Private entities exhibit variation in terms of the standard-
ization of their procedures for maintaining and marketing properties, but several reports
have found private entities poorly maintain properties in inner-city neighborhoods (Dane,
Ramchandani, & Bellows, 2013–2014; National Fair Housing Alliance, 2014a).
In addition to testing for the impact of the type of institution owning a given foreclo-
sure on nearby home prices, I also examine the potential spillover eects of properties af-
ter they exit REO status. Further, I distinguish between former REO properties purchased
by individuals and properties purchased by investors. Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2014), in
their study of spillovers in several Florida counties, found that properties purchased by
investors produced a short-term negative spillover, while properties purchased by indi-
viduals appeared to have no eect on nearby home values. In the Detroit, context, where
investor activity is pervasive and frequently speculative, it is likely investor purchases
impose long-term negative spillover eects.
9.1 Literature Review
Prior studies have not examined the possibility of REO spillovers being mediated by
the type of institution responsible for them, i.e., ownership by a federal or private entity,
and only one other study has considered dierences in spillovers between former REOs
purchased by investors and those purchased by homeowners (Ihlanfeldt & Mayock, 2014).
Further, prior research has not adequatly considered dierences between central-city and
suburban locations in terms of these impacts (Kobie & Lee, 2011). There are, however, a
number of recent studies of the impact of nearby foreclosures on home sale prices. Taken
as whole, these studies nd that foreclosures impose negative externalities that diminish
with distance and time. As research on this topic has grown, so too has the sophistication
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of analytical strategies used to estimate the direct eects of foreclosure on property values.
In addition, researchers have paid increasing attention to dierences in the externalities
imposed by foreclosures based on where properties stand in relation to the foreclosure
process.
One of the earliest and most inuential studies of this issue was conducted by Immer-
gluck and Smith (2006a). To test their hypothesis that foreclosures—by leading to vacancy
and deterioration—impact nearby property values, the authors employed a hedonic model
to regress the sale price of single-family residential properties in 1999 in Chicago on the
number of nearby foreclosure lings—used as a proxy for completed foreclosures—and a
battery of property- and neighborhood-level covariates. To estimate the distance-decay
of the eect of proximate foreclosures, the authors constructed two variables of central
interest: the number of foreclosure lings occurring within an eighth of a mile and the
number of lings occurring within one quarter of a mile, all issued in the two years prior
to the year of sale. The authors created two separate count variables for each of these two
distances: the number of lings on conventional mortgages and the number of lings on
government-insured mortgages. Based on their results, the authors estimated that each
additional foreclosure of a conventional mortgage occurring within an eighth of a mile is
associated with 0.9% reduction in sale price. After controlling for the number of foreclo-
sures located within one eighth of a mile of a given sale, foreclosures occurring between
one eighth and one quarter of a mile were not predicted to have an impact on home val-
ues. Filings on government-insured mortgages were not found to have an impact at any
distance. While subsequent studies’ ndings are largely consistent with those of Immer-
gluck and Smith (2006a), some key methodological limitations have been identied. Since
Immergluck and Smith (2006a) examine property values at just one point in time, the au-
thors are unable to control for localized trends in home prices. As foreclosures are more
prevalent where neighborhood property values are lower, the failure to account for local-
ized trends raises the prospect of an endogeneity problem. Further, this study captures
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just the immediate eect of a foreclosure ling, which could possibility dier over time.
Schuetz et al. (2008) addressed the limitations of cross-sectional studies of foreclosure-
related externalities in their research on the impact of foreclosure lings on home sale
prices in New York City between 2000 and 2005. The authors identify foreclosure lings
near sales of non-distressed residential properties and sort them based on time and dis-
tance thresholds, specically, for each time period of, rst, 0 to 18 months prior and, sec-
ond, 18 or more months prior, the authors count the number of lings occurring within
0 to 250 feet, 250 to 500 feet, and 500 to 1,000 feet of a given home sale. The authors
employed a hedonic model regressing sale prices on these time- and distance-based indi-
cators of the number of nearby foreclosure lings on home sale prices, as well as a battery
of property characteristics and spatial-temporal xed eects. To account for the possible
non-linear impact of the number of nearby foreclosures and home sale prices, the authors
regressed home sale prices not only on the count of nearby lings, but also on dummy
variables indicating dierent intervals of foreclosure counts. The authors found evidence
of a threshold eect, whereby a small number of nearby foreclosures may not depress
home values, but a large number may have a substantial impact. The authors also found
that foreclosure-related externalities linger beyond 18 months, suggesting these impacts
last beyond foreclosure completion or sale.
Subsequent studies furnish additional evidence that price discounts depend on the
status of a given property with regard to the foreclosure process and that they persist
through time. Lin et al. (2007), in their study of home sale prices in Chicago in 2003
and 2006, estimated an additional nearby foreclosure occurring within two years would
depress 2006 sale prices by nearly 9%.1 While the impact of foreclosures diminished after
two years, spillovers persisted up to ve years. Harding et al. (2009), who used a repeat
sales method to study spillovers in seven metro areas, found that the largest discounts
1Nearby sale prices were less impacted by foreclosures in 2003, indicating the importance of housing
cycles in predicting foreclosure-related externalities. The very high estimate of spillovers in 2006 is likely
due to the study’s failure to control for local home price trends.
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were imposed by nearby properties that were in the phase of foreclosure three months
prior to the foreclosure sale. They estimated each additional property situated at this point
in the foreclosure processes located within 300 feet of a non-distressed sale decreased
the price by 1.2%. The authors additionally found that the price discount stabilized for
properties that were between foreclosure sale and REO sale, but persisted a year beyond
the REO sale. Kobie and Lee (2011), in their study of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, found that
price discounts attributable to nearby foreclosures were greatest for properties that had
experienced a completed foreclosure auction (Sheri’s sale) within the two years prior
to sale. Kobie and Lee (2011) were also the rst to compare spillovers in central city and
suburban areas, as most prior studies examined entire counties or MSAs. The authors
found that spillovers were larger in the suburbs than in Cleveland, with each additional
Sheri’s sale on the same block face as a sale imposing a discount of 3% in the suburbs
and 2% in the city. The authors also found that properties that had been in the foreclosure
process for at least 360 days created spillovers, but only in the suburbs.
While a number of studies consider the impact of pre-foreclosures and REOs on home
prices, there are very few that examine spillovers generated after the REO sale. As noted
above, Harding et al. (2009) found that spillovers persisted more than a year after sale. Ih-
lanfeldt and Mayock (2014), in a study of 10 large counties in Florida, oer the only study
of dierences between former REOs purchased by investors and homeowners in terms of
the spillovers they generate. The authors found both current REOs and former REOs sold
to investors were found to depress nearby property values, but the negative impact of
investor-purchased REOs was found to fall below the impact of existing rental properties
within three years. Former REOs purchased by owner-occupants did not create a dis-
count. The authors attribute these ndings to owner-occupants’ acquisition of properties
in better overall condition and their greater likelihood of making rapid and substantial
improvements compared to investors (Rohe & Stewart, 1996). On the other hand, the au-
thors argue, investor acquisitions are not be feared as much as thought given their smaller
186
impact on property values relative to existing rental units. A yet smaller number of stud-
ies examines the relationship between categories of REO buyers and subsequent property
conditions, which have the potential to impact nearby home values. Looking at REOs in
Boston, Hwang (2015) found that REOs purchased by owner-occupants were less likely
to be linked to code violations and property condition related service requests than those
purchased by investors.
This chapter extends the literature on foreclosure-related externalities by separately
testing for spillovers generated by REOs owned by the GSEs, HUD and private entities.
As previous research indicates, externalities are more likely to be generated by REOs than
pre-foreclosures. REOs are nearly always vacant, and when they are inadequately secured
and maintained they can create a stigma eect harming nearby home values. Federal and
private entities have separate systems for maintaining and marketing REOs with poten-
tially dierent consequences for the susceptibility of their inventory to deterioration. The
GSEs have more streamlined systems for managing and marketing their inventory than
HUD and the they also have stronger tools for overseeing contractors (U.S. Government
Accountability Oce, 2013; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Of-
ce of Inspector General & Federal Housing Finance Agency. Oce of Inspector Gen-
eral, 2013). As shown in the previous chapter, properties remain in HUD’s inventory for
longer intervals due to procedural delays in transferring foreclosed FHA-insured proper-
ties to HUD, increasing their susceptibility to deterioration. Thus, spillovers generated
by HUD-owned properties might increase the longer they have been in inventory. In
addition to current REOs, I test for spillovers generated by former REOs, sorting them
into those purchased by investors and those purchased by homeowners. A large share
of investors in REO properties, particularly in Detroit and places like it, are speculators
seeking to ip properties or rent them without making improvements. These properties
are thus quite likely to generate negative spillovers. Properties purchased by homeowners
are much likely to be occupied and regularly maintained, thus reducing their likelihood
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of discounting nearby home prices. A number of studies examining the share of REOs
acquired by investors in recent years are predicated on the assumption investor acquisi-
tion, in the aggregate, is likely harmful to neighborhoods (Kim & Cho, 2016; McMillan &
Chakraborty, 2016; Pfeier & Molina, 2013). This chapter puts this assumption to the test.
9.2 Analytic Strategy
To estimate the impact of current and former REO properties on the value of nearby
residential properties, I employ several hedonic models regressing home sale prices on
a series of terms measuring the number of current and former REOs occurring within
one eight of a mile and within one eighth and one quarter of a mile, as well as a series
of property- and neighborhood-level control variables. Following Immergluck and Smith
(2006a), I use distance bands of zero to one-eighth of a mile and one-eighth to one-quarter
of a mile of a given property in counting the number of current and former REOS. Current
REOs are sorted into those that have been in REO fewer than 365 days, and those that have
been in REO 365 or more days. Former REOs are sorted into those exited REO fewer than
365 days from the date of home sale (0 to 1 year), those that exited between 365 and 729
days (1 to 2 years), those that exited between 730 and 1,094 days (2 to 3 years), and those
that exited for any longer period of time (3 or more years). In addition, I t the model
with a series of control variables for property- and neighborhood-level characteristics,
including census tract-year xed eects. I estimated hedonic regression models for both
Detroit and the Detroit metropolitan areas. I have grouped Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
together given the smaller number of properties handled by Freddie and the diculties
this presents for estimating parameters using regression analysis.
It is important to note, however, that this approach is limited by a selection problem,
wherein it is impossible for me to fully account for dierences in the properties repos-
sessed by federal agencies and private entities and subsequently purchased by investors
or owner-occupants. My control variables are limited to general property characteristics
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and spatial coordinates, which means that I lack ne-grained information about individual
properties that might inuence whether or not they enter the inventory of one entity or
another or are purchased by investors or homeowners. For example, I lack data on prop-
erty conditions and outstanding liens, both of which inuence buyers’ decisions. These
factors could plausibly explain externalities for some properties, not the nature of the
party that owned them.
9.3 Detroit-Only Model
I obtained home sale data from the CoreLogic data grant. I include only arm’s length
home sales valued between $500 and $800,000 located in Detroit’s strong neighborhoods.
I derive counts of REOs adjacent to home sales from my Detroit-only REO database. Data
needed for the property level covariates were derived from the City of Detroit Assessor
data. Table 9.1 presents descriptive statistics for the count variables of nearby current and
former REOs. This table shows that the count variables have larger values in the outer
distance-band, between one-eighth and one-quarter mile. They also show the number of
nearby REOs in inventory longer than one year is signicantly less than the the number of
nearby REOs in inventory less than one year, with more properties having larger numbers
of nearby REOs owned by HUD for more than one year than nearby REOs owned by the
GSEs for more than one year. The descriptives also indicate many variables are heavily
right-skewed.
Table 9.2 presents the results of the hedonic regression where the count variables of
current and former REOs are the variables of interest. Among REOs active for fewer than
12 months, no variables possess negative coecients, while the variables for the count of
REOs within one-eighth mile owned by HUD and the GSEs are positive and signicant,
although quite small in magnitude. The coecient for nearby properties owned by the
GSEs for under a year may be interpreted as indicating each additional property owned
by the GSEs in the rst distance-band increases sale prices by 1%, while the comparable
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value for HUD is only 0.5% and just 0.1% for privately owned REOs. These coecients
suggest that nearby properties recently conveyed to the GSEs exert a modest protective
eect, which is likely due to these properties having recently been cleaned and secured. As
expected, the eect diminishes with distance; none of the variables in the second distance
band are signicant. REOs that have been in inventory for more than 12 months, however,
impose a larger discount on sale prices, with HUD-owned homes imposing the greatest
discount. Older REOs private inventories impose the largest discount after HUD, but
only in the nearest distance-band, indicating a more localized contagion eect for those
properties compared to HUD’s older inventory. Properties in the GSEs’ inventories longer
than 13 months also impose a localized discount, though considerably less so than either
HUD or private entities. This potentially could reect the smaller number of properties
remaining in the GSEs’ inventory after 12 months, but it also seems likely that the GSEs’
unsold inventory declined in condition at a slower rate than other homes due to greater
oversight of contractors responsible for property preservation.
Turning to the coecients for former REOs purchased by owner-occupants, the num-
ber of nearby properties purchased within 12 months of a given home sale generate a pos-
itive spillover in both distance bands. Nearby properties purchased between one and two
years prior to a given home sale have a similar impact. Properties purchased by owner-
occupants between two and three years prior to a home sale continue to have a positive
impact, though the spillover is much smaller. Properties purchased by individuals three
or more years prior have no impact on home prices. These ndings suggest nearby prop-
erties recently purchased by owner-occupants have the greatest positive impact on home
prices. The diminished inuence of properties purchased by owner-occupants three or
more years after sale may also reect the fact that these sales are necessarily concentrated
in the later years of the study period, when home prices declined at a less precipitous rate.
Nearby former REOs purchased by investors 12 or fewer months before a given home
sale—and located in the second distance band, i.e., between one-eighth and one-quarter
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mile—are predicted to impose a modest discount. The coecient for investor-owned prop-
erties purchased 12 or fewer months before a given home sale, but located in the nearest
distance band, e.g., within one-eighth mile, however, is not signicant. This is likely a
function of the larger average number of properties in this category in the second distance
band. Properties purchased by investors between one and two years prior to a nearby non-
distressed sale do not impact sale prices, but those owned for two or more years impose
a discount, with the greatest discount imposed by nearby properties purchased 3 or more
years prior to sale. Taken as a whole, the coecients for former REOs purchased by in-
vestors indicate these properties impose a greater discount with time, likely as properties
purchased by ippers, milkers, and other types of speculators suer an increasing amount
of deterioration due to deferred maintenance, vacancy, and neglect.
The model including the counts of current and former REOs possesses the advantage
that coecients can be interpreted as the marginal eect of an additional current or for-
mer REO within the two distance bands. It seeks unlikely, however, that each additional
foreclosure would have the same eect, i.e., intuition and prior research suggests impacts
may be non-linear (Schuetz et al., 2008). Further, the data are highly skewed, challenging
the assumption of linearity required for OLS regression. Following Schuetz et al. (2008),
therefore, I estimate two additional regression models: one indicating the simple pres-
ence or absence of nearby current or former REOs, and a second model grouping counts
of current and former REOs into classes roughly corresponding to “few” or “more” REOs.
Table 9.6 shows the results of the model including simple indicators of presence or
absence of nearby REOs. As seen in the table, using dummy variables generates both
more and less intuitive results, specically with regard to the relative size of coecients
for each of the two distance bands. For REOs active for less than 12 months, the size
of the coecients in the one-eighth to one-quarter mile band are all substantially larger
than those in the one-eight mile range. This reects the much larger number of properties
at a greater distance from most home sales, and is consistent with coecients obtained
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by Schuetz et al. (2008). The coecients for active REOs owned for 12 or more months
are more intuitive, with larger coecients for closer properties. Among former REOs,
properties purchased by both individuals and investors within one year of a given home
sale are positively associated with home values. Properties owned by investors between
one and three years impose an increasingly negative discount, while properties owned
by investors for three or more years are not associated with a discount. This may reect
the fact that investor-acquired properties are less harmful as they may have been sold
to a more responsible party, passed into public ownership, or demolished. Properties
purchased between one and two years prior by an owner-occupant continue to have a
positive eect on home values, but those owned between two and three years impose a
discount, though it is less than half the discount imposed by investors.
Table 9.4 presents the results of the model including the counts of “few” and “more”
nearby current and former REOs. The denition of few and more diers based on distance.
“Few” properties in the closed distance band equals 1–2 properties, while “more” means 3
or more. “Few” in the second distance band equals 1–5 properties, while “more” refers to 6
or more. These results provide modest evidence of non-linear eects, with the indicators
for “more” properties having substantially larger coecients than those for “few,” with a
few instances of “more” variables being signicant were the corresponding “few” variables
are not. For example, “few” REOs in GSE inventory 12 months or less and within one-
eighth mile is not signicant, while the coecient for “more” is highly signicant. Active
REOs in HUD inventory more than 12 months continue to impose the strongest discount
in this model as well, with HUD and private entities exhibiting a strong non-linear eect
in the nearest distance band. HUD alone, however, continues to impose discounts in the
outer distance-band after controlling for nearby REOs. The coecients for former REOs
continue to show that REOs acquired by investors between two and three years prior to
a nearby home sale impose the most signicant discounts.
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9.4 Regional Model
To examine the impact of current and former REOs on home prices across the De-
troit tri-county area, I applied the same set of models to REO and non-distressed home
sales using the RealtyTrac data for Detroit’s strong neighborhoods and inner- outer-ring
suburbs. These results are presented in Tables 9.5, 9.6, and 9.7. The key nding here
is that spillovers are larger in suburban locations, particularly the outer-ring suburbs.
This is consistent with prior research arguing central-city housing markets in places like
Detroit have internalized occurrences like foreclosure (Kobie & Lee, 2011). In the outer
suburbs, the estimated discount imposed by each additional HUD-owned property within
one-eighth mile is roughly 5.5%, which is a substantial penalty (see Table 9.5). The corre-
sponding values for Detroit and the inner-ring suburbs are far smaller. It is important to
note, however, that there are far fewer FHA-insured properties and HUD-owned homes
in the outer-ring suburbs than in the other two locations, suggesting that while the penal-
ties imposed by nearby HUD homes in the outer suburbs may be high, they are also likely
idiosyncratic and a reection of the diculties of tting a linear relationship between the
count of nearby HUD homes and nearby sale prices. These wide dierences between the
outer suburbs and the other two locations persist, however, in the models estimating the
non-linear impact of REOs on home prices (See Tables 9.6 and 9.7). The coecients for the
disaggregated non-linear model suggest that the impact of just one to two nearby homes
that have been in HUD’s inventory for over 12 months impose roughly the same discounts
as any number of HUD homes in the outer suburbs. In Detroit’s strong neighborhoods
and the inner-ring suburbs, however, discounts appear to mount after only a certain num-
ber of HUD properties are present, indicating a threshold eect (cf., Schuetz et al., 2008).
With regard to former REOs, the coecients for nearby REOs owned by investors are
generally signicant across locations and models.
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Table 9.2: Estimated Linear Impact of REOs on Nearby Sale Prices in Detroit’s Strong
Neighborhoods
Dependent variable:
price_ln
active_01_hud_near 0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)
active_01_hud_far 0.001 (0.001)
active_01_gse_near 0.010∗∗∗ (0.001)
active_01_gse_far 0.002∗ (0.001)
active_01_lender_near 0.001∗ (0.001)
active_01_lender_far 0.001 (0.0004)
active_12_hud_near −0.034∗∗∗ (0.004)
active_12_hud_far −0.011∗∗∗ (0.003)
active_12_gse_near −0.013∗ (0.008)
active_12_gse_far 0.005 (0.005)
active_12_lender_near −0.028∗∗∗ (0.003)
active_12_lender_far 0.004∗∗ (0.002)
former_01_individuals_near 0.016∗∗∗ (0.003)
former_01_individuals_far 0.008∗∗∗ (0.002)
former_01_investors_near −0.002 (0.002)
former_01_investors_far −0.010∗∗∗ (0.001)
former_12_individuals_near 0.014∗∗∗ (0.003)
former_12_individuals_far 0.012∗∗∗ (0.002)
former_12_investors_near −0.003 (0.002)
former_12_investors_far −0.001 (0.001)
former_23_individuals_near 0.008∗∗ (0.004)
former_23_individuals_far 0.007∗∗ (0.003)
former_23_investors_near −0.006∗∗ (0.002)
former_23_investors_far −0.001 (0.001)
former_3plus_individuals_near 0.003 (0.003)
former_3plus_individuals_far 0.002 (0.002)
former_3plus_investors_near −0.013∗∗∗ (0.001)
former_3plus_investors_far −0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)
oor_area_ln_zgm 0.187∗∗∗ (0.006)
lot_size_ln_zgm 0.059∗∗∗ (0.005)
age_cat2 0.188∗∗∗ (0.014)
age_cat3 0.170∗∗∗ (0.015)
age_cat4 0.226∗∗∗ (0.016)
age_cat5 0.213∗∗∗ (0.035)
age_cat6 0.189 (0.129)
season_cat2 −0.071∗∗∗ (0.011)
season_cat3 −0.060∗∗∗ (0.013)
season_cat4 −0.445∗∗∗ (0.017)
Observations 60,340
197
R2 0.713
Adjusted R2 0.709
Residual Std. Error 0.783 (df = 59366)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Census tract xed eects not shown. Sources: City of Detroit Asses-
sor (2014), CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
Table 9.3: Estimated Non-Linear Impact of REOs on Nearby Sale Prices in Detroit’s Strong
Neighborhoods
Dependent variable:
price_ln
active_01_hud_near_any 0.051∗∗∗ (0.017)
active_01_hud_far_any 0.062∗∗∗ (0.023)
active_01_gse_near_any 0.027 (0.025)
active_01_gse_far_any 0.049 (0.052)
active_01_lender_near_any −0.009 (0.024)
active_01_lender_far_any −0.044 (0.047)
active_12_hud_near_any −0.044∗∗∗ (0.010)
active_12_hud_far_any −0.019∗ (0.011)
active_12_gse_near_any −0.040∗∗∗ (0.010)
active_12_gse_far_any −0.006 (0.010)
active_12_lender_near_any −0.062∗∗∗ (0.011)
active_12_lender_far_any 0.022 (0.016)
former_01_individuals_near_any 0.036∗∗∗ (0.010)
former_01_individuals_far_any 0.089∗∗∗ (0.012)
former_01_investors_near_any 0.086∗∗∗ (0.012)
former_01_investors_far_any 0.124∗∗∗ (0.015)
former_12_individuals_near_any 0.024∗∗ (0.012)
former_12_individuals_far_any 0.014 (0.016)
former_12_investors_near_any −0.037∗∗∗ (0.014)
former_12_investors_far_any −0.001 (0.018)
former_23_individuals_near_any −0.041∗∗∗ (0.014)
former_23_individuals_far_any −0.018 (0.019)
former_23_investors_near_any −0.097∗∗∗ (0.018)
former_23_investors_far_any −0.193∗∗∗ (0.027)
former_3plus_individuals_near_any 0.010 (0.021)
former_3plus_individuals_far_any 0.014 (0.022)
former_3plus_investors_near_any 0.001 (0.025)
former_3plus_investors_far_any −0.039 (0.028)
oor_area_ln_zgm 0.197∗∗∗ (0.006)
lot_size_ln_zgm 0.063∗∗∗ (0.005)
198
age_cat2 0.203∗∗∗ (0.014)
age_cat3 0.185∗∗∗ (0.015)
age_cat4 0.245∗∗∗ (0.017)
age_cat5 0.217∗∗∗ (0.035)
age_cat6 0.213∗ (0.127)
season_cat2 −0.087∗∗∗ (0.012)
season_cat3 −0.084∗∗∗ (0.014)
season_cat4 −0.497∗∗∗ (0.019)
Observations 60,340
R2 0.709
Adjusted R2 0.705
Residual Std. Error 0.789 (df = 59366)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Census tract xed eects not shown. Sources: City of Detroit Asses-
sor (2014), CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
Table 9.4: Estimated Disaggregated Non-Linear Impact of REOs on Nearby Sale Prices in
Detroit’s Strong Neighborhoods
Dependent variable:
price_ln
active_01_hud_near_1to2 0.032∗ (0.017)
active_01_hud_near_3plus 0.102∗∗∗ (0.020)
active_01_hud_far_1to5 0.060∗∗∗ (0.023)
active_01_hud_far_6plus 0.151∗∗∗ (0.029)
active_01_gse_near_1to2 0.015 (0.025)
active_01_gse_near_3plus 0.076∗∗∗ (0.029)
active_01_gse_far_1to5 0.059 (0.051)
active_01_gse_far_6plus 0.091 (0.056)
active_01_lender_near_1to2 −0.009 (0.025)
active_01_lender_near_3plus 0.016 (0.027)
active_01_lender_far_1to5 −0.028 (0.047)
active_01_lender_far_6plus −0.005 (0.050)
active_12_hud_near_1to2 −0.034∗∗∗ (0.010)
active_12_hud_near_3plus −0.131∗∗∗ (0.018)
active_12_hud_far_1to5 −0.024∗∗ (0.011)
active_12_hud_far_6plus −0.067∗∗∗ (0.020)
active_12_gse_near_1to2 −0.037∗∗∗ (0.010)
active_12_gse_near_3plus −0.016 (0.035)
active_12_gse_far_1to5 −0.0003 (0.010)
active_12_gse_far_6plus 0.029 (0.070)
active_12_lender_near_1to2 −0.040∗∗∗ (0.011)
199
active_12_lender_near_3plus −0.118∗∗∗ (0.014)
active_12_lender_far_1to5 0.015 (0.015)
active_12_lender_far_6plus −0.019 (0.019)
former_01_individuals_near_1to2 0.029∗∗∗ (0.010)
former_01_individuals_near_3plus 0.063∗∗∗ (0.015)
former_01_individuals_far_1to5 0.083∗∗∗ (0.012)
former_01_individuals_far_6plus 0.101∗∗∗ (0.018)
former_01_investors_near_1to2 0.075∗∗∗ (0.012)
former_01_investors_near_3plus 0.105∗∗∗ (0.015)
former_01_investors_far_1to5 0.113∗∗∗ (0.014)
former_01_investors_far_6plus 0.122∗∗∗ (0.019)
former_12_individuals_near_1to2 0.022∗ (0.012)
former_12_individuals_near_3plus 0.047∗∗∗ (0.016)
former_12_individuals_far_1to5 0.018 (0.016)
former_12_individuals_far_6plus 0.063∗∗∗ (0.021)
former_12_investors_near_1to2 −0.029∗∗ (0.014)
former_12_investors_near_3plus −0.058∗∗∗ (0.018)
former_12_investors_far_1to5 −0.003 (0.018)
former_12_investors_far_6plus −0.050∗∗ (0.023)
former_23_individuals_near_1to2 −0.041∗∗∗ (0.014)
former_23_individuals_near_3plus −0.025 (0.019)
former_23_individuals_far_1to5 −0.013 (0.019)
former_23_individuals_far_6plus −0.016 (0.025)
former_23_investors_near_1to2 −0.083∗∗∗ (0.018)
former_23_investors_near_3plus −0.125∗∗∗ (0.022)
former_23_investors_far_1to5 −0.179∗∗∗ (0.027)
former_23_investors_far_6plus −0.227∗∗∗ (0.032)
former_3plus_individuals_near_1to2 0.015 (0.021)
former_3plus_individuals_near_3plus −0.051∗∗ (0.024)
former_3plus_individuals_far_1to5 0.005 (0.022)
former_3plus_individuals_far_6plus −0.062∗∗ (0.031)
former_3plus_investors_near_1to2 0.013 (0.024)
former_3plus_investors_near_3plus −0.062∗ (0.032)
former_3plus_investors_far_1to5 −0.040 (0.027)
former_3plus_investors_far_6plus −0.040 (0.036)
oor_area_ln_zgm 0.195∗∗∗ (0.006)
lot_size_ln_zgm 0.061∗∗∗ (0.005)
age_cat2 0.198∗∗∗ (0.014)
age_cat3 0.181∗∗∗ (0.015)
age_cat4 0.238∗∗∗ (0.017)
age_cat5 0.216∗∗∗ (0.035)
age_cat6 0.214∗ (0.128)
season_cat2 −0.078∗∗∗ (0.012)
season_cat3 −0.066∗∗∗ (0.014)
200
season_cat4 −0.460∗∗∗ (0.019)
Observations 60,340
R2 0.712
Adjusted R2 0.707
Residual Std. Error 0.786 (df = 59338)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Census tract xed eects not shown. Sources: City of Detroit Asses-
sor (2014), CoreLogic (2010), Wayne County Register of Deeds (2014).
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CHAPTER X
Conclusions and Policy Implications
In the preceding chapters I examined the post-foreclosure trajectory of REO proper-
ties in Detroit and the Detroit tri-county area from 2005 to 2013, a period that covers the
peak of the foreclosure crisis and its immediate aftermath. During this time, a substan-
tial number of properties were foreclosed and placed in REO inventory. These proper-
ties were concentrated in Detroit’s middle- and working-class neighborhoods, several of
which possessed strong or stable demand for housing in the years immediately preced-
ing the foreclosure crisis. While abundant research exists linking foreclosure to negative
neighborhood outcomes (see Chapter I), few studies have considered the role of the en-
tities responsible for these properties in inuencing whether foreclosures are more or
less likely to contribute to neighborhood decline. Federal entities, specically, HUD and
the GSEs, were responsible for large numbers of REOs during this period. These enti-
ties possessed twin, yet potentially contradictory mandates to (1) regain their nancial
footing after sustaining substantial losses and (2) promote homeownership and stabilize
the nation’s hardest-hit neighborhoods. Put dierently, federal entities had mandates to
simultaneously view their REO holdings through an aggregate, portfolio perspective, and
a neighborhood perspective that explicitly takes space into consideration. I examined the
degree to which what happened with properties passing through federal entities’ portfo-
lios was more or less likely to promote the second objective, that of neighborhood preser-
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vation, relative to outcomes for properties passing through the inventories of lenders and
servicers. A central assumption of this research is that private entities acted to maximize
their aggregate, portfolio-level returns. Given the massive accumulation of REOs and the
overcapacity of private entities’ disposition infrastructures, private entities are assumed
to have rapidly disposed of inventory in markets where prospects for home price appreci-
ation were limited, as found in prior research in Cleveland and Atlanta (Ford et al., 2013;
Immergluck, 2012). Federal entities, on the other hand, either possessed or later adopted a
number of programs and procedures intended to support homeownership and neighbor-
hoods with large numbers of foreclosures. This dissertation is addressed to the question
of what, if any dierences are observed between the post-foreclosure trajectory of REOs
coming out of federal and private inventories and what the implications of those trajecto-
ries are for middle- and working-class neighborhoods in cities like Detroit. In this chapter,
I summarize the central ndings of this dissertation and disuss their implications.
10.1 Central Findings
I evaluated outcomes for properties passing through federal and private inventories
using a number of criteria derived from past research. First, I evaluated the degree to
which federal entities were more or less likely to sell a property to an investor, all else
being equal. While investor activity is not inherently harmful, prior research identies a
number of problems with investor activity in neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates.
These problems include vacancy and blight stemming from property deterioration and
tax delinquency (Ford et al., 2013; Hwang, 2015). Examining descriptive statistics, I found
federal entities sold smaller shares of properties to investors, both across the Detroit tri-
county area and in the city’s strong neighborhoods alone, with HUD selling by far the least
amount. Applying regression to control for property characteristics and neighborhood
conditions, I found similar patterns. While the likelihood of private entities selling Detroit
REOs remained nearly at across the study period, hovering around a 70% probability of
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selling an average home in Detroit’s strong neighborhoods to an investor, the likelihood of
federal entities selling to an investor dropped over time, particularly during and after 2009.
This nding provides some evidence of the eectiveness of federal programs, particularly
the First Look program, in increasing homeownership opportunities in Detroit relative to
private entities. Dierences between the GSEs and private entities, however, were quite
small, particularly compared to the trends exhibited by HUD. Some of this is explained
by the GSEs use of bulk sales to dispose of inventory, which, in turn, is linked to these
entities’ pressures to focus on nancial safety and soundness (Dixon, 2011).
Both federal and private entities were far more likely to sell REOs located in inner- and
outer-ring suburbs to owner-occupants. This is certainly due, in part, to greater demand
from homebuyers in those areas and less competition from investors, but it is also likely
a function of the expectations federal and private entities have of these markets and their
willingness to hold properties to maximize returns in markets where home values are
viewed as likely to appreciate. This view was clearly not held for Detroit’s strong neigh-
borhoods, where lack of local knowledge may have led to greater investor involvement
than necessary.
A second criterion I used to examine the likelihood of REO outcomes in helping or
harming neighborhood conditions is the duration of properties in REO inventory. Prior
research has been concerned with rapid sales in lower-income and high-foreclosure neigh-
borhoods, impeding the ability of local entities to use NSP for acquiring foreclosed prop-
erties (Immergluck, 2012). My ndings are consistent with this research; they show a
rapid reduction in the duration of properties in inventory around 2008. Further, I found
that durations for the GSEs rapidly declined slightly later than durations for private en-
tities, which provides evidence the GSEs accelerated sales as their inventories swelled
after 2010. HUD, on the other hand, had far longer durations than the GSEs or private
entities, consistent with my expectation that HUD would take far longer to sell proper-
ties due to the time required for servicers to convey foreclosed FHA-insured properties to
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HUD. Rather than increasing the likelihood of sale to owner-occupants, these prolonged
durations likely led to greater rates of property deterioration.
The third criterion I used to examine the likelihood of REO outcomes in helping or
harming neighborhood conditions is the impact of nearby REO properties on home prices.
My ndings suggest that HUD’s older inventory is closely linked to discounted home
prices. While these discounts appear in Detroit’s strong neighborhoods, they were much
worse in outer-ring suburbs. This is consistent with research by Kobie and Lee (2011),
who found that nearby foreclosures imposed less of an impact on non-distressed sales
in the city of Cleveland than in the city’s suburbs. Given the predominance of FHA-
insured properties and HUD-owned homes in Detroit, however, the marginal eect of
these properties adds up to a massive depreciation of home values.
In addition, I compared the impacts of investor and owner-occupant acquisitions of
REOs. I found that REOs acquired by investors were more likely to be subject to tax fore-
closure than those purchased by owner-occupants, all things being equal. Further, former
REOS acquired by investors were more likely than those acquired by owner-occupants
to impose a discount on the sale price of nearby properties. These ndings oer at least
provisional validation for claims made in previous studies about the impact of investor
buyers.
10.2 Policy Implications
10.2.1 Improved Eorts to Prevent Foreclosures
While there are limits to what can be concluded from this study due to the limitations
of the data, my dissertation provides strong evidence that REOs, both while in inventory
and after sale to investors, are harmful to nearby home values. Completed foreclosures
are likely to remain vacant for extended periods of time, particularly for HUD due to the
lengthy period between REO acquisition and disposition for this agency. These vacant
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REOs are susceptible to deterioration and invite crime, which in turn erodes the con-
dence of nearby homeowners, encouraging them to disinvest and potentially move, con-
tributing to long-term negative neighborhood change. REOs purchased by some types
of investors may also remain vacant for extended periods of time, leading to the same
negative neighborhood outcomes. One way to curtail blight stemming from vacant REOs
is to prevent avoidable foreclosures in the rst instance. While foreclosure prevention is
a high priority for the GSEs and HUD, principally as a means of reducing carrying costs
and losses suered on REO sales, eorts at foreclosure prevention may need to be eval-
uated and amended to improve performance and ensure the largest number of avoidable
foreclosures are prevented, particularly in cities and communities where foreclosures are
concentrated and home values have not recovered, as is the case with Detroit.
This is not to say federal agencies have not taken important steps to improve fore-
closure prevention eorts since the onset of the mortgage foreclosure crisis. The GSEs
have undertaken a large number of foreclosure prevention actions, including those that
have allowed borrowers to retain their homes. Between September 2008 and April 2016,
the GSEs completed more than three million home retention actions, more than 60% of
which were permanent mortgage modications under the federal HAMP and Home Af-
fordable Renance Program (HARP) programs (Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2016b).
Although the number of home retention actions taken by the GSEs have decreased since
the early 2010s, so too have the overall number of foreclosure starts and seriously delin-
quent loans. Much of this improvement is due to the recovery of home prices in many
housing markets.
Despite the declining number of foreclosure starts nationally, numerous cities have
not experienced the same improvements in home prices and continue to possess neigh-
borhoods with large numbers of underwater borrowers, seriously delinquent mortgages,
and REO properties. In recognition of this fact, the FHFA and the GSEs, in partnership
with the NCST, a national nonprot experienced in neighborhood stabilization eorts,
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launched the Neighborhood Stabilization Initiative (NSI), which expands on the GSEs’
existing mechanisms for preventing foreclosures and disposing of REOs in the nation’s
hardest hit neighborhoods. The City of Detroit and Cook County, IL (which contains
Chicago), were selected as sites to pilot the NSI in 2014. As part of the NSI, the GSEs
oer borrowers greater reductions in monthly mortgage payments than previously avail-
able (MyCity Modication), potentially reducing monthly payments by as much as 60%.
These modications operate by reducing interest rates, adding past due balances to the
mortgage principal balance, and extending loan terms up to 40 years (Fannie Mae, n.d.;
Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2015). At the time FHFA announced the NSI, critics
charged that modications, even such enhanced modications, were inadequate for pre-
venting additional foreclosures in cities like Detroit, where many borrowers were and
remain underwater, with some sources reporting as many as 40% of Detroit homeowners
being underwater (Benson, 2014). According to one Detroit-based activist,
The program’s “enhanced” MyCity Modications will only reduce interest
rates and lengthen the loan term up to 40 years for those who qualify. A lower
interest rate is always welcome, but if it’s still applied to a grossly inated loan
balance over 40 years, many struggling homeowners will give up on such a
“take-it-to-the-grave” mortgage and walk away (Babson, 2014).
In response to such criticisms and public protests of FHFA policy, the FHFA ultimately re-
versed its position on principal reduction in April 2016 (Federal Housing Finance Agency,
2016a). These reductions are available to seriously delinquent underwater borrowers
whose loans are owned by the GSEs. Given the recency of this principal reduction pro-
gram, it remains to be seen how many borrowers are able to participate. One area of con-
cern is the incentive structure for servicers, who are ultimately responsible for enrolling
underwater homeowners in these plans. In the past, critics have charged servicers with
foreclosing in instances where borrowers were eligible for modications. Reasons for this
include the additional time and eort required by servicers for modications (Thompson,
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2009). Principal reduction programs should be thoroughly evaluated in Detroit and other
areas with concentrations of underwater borrowers to assess whether such program are
maximizing the enrollment of eligible borrowers.
In order to reduce their credit risks and, secondarily, further reduce the number of
avoidable foreclosures, the GSEs and HUD in recent years have engaged in the bulk sale
of seriously delinquent loans to investors prior to foreclosure. In addition to clearing
liabilities from the portfolios of federal agencies, these sales are ostensibly designed to
help borrowers avoid foreclosure by placing these loans in the hands of private investors,
who have greater exibility in helping borrowers to remain in their homes or work out
alternatives to foreclosure (Goldstein, 2014; Perlberg et al., 2015). The seriously delinquent
loans included in these pools are located throughout the country, covering a wide swath of
housing markets, but many are concentrated in distressed housing markets where home
values have not recovered (Edelman, Zonta, & Rawal, 2016). In 2010, HUD rst introduced
the Distressed Asset Sale Program (DASP) to auction pools of seriously delinquent home
loans in danger of foreclosure (Edelman et al., 2016; Goldstein, 2016). Freddie Mac created
a similar auction program in 2014, followed by Freddie Mac in 2015. Through early 2015,
HUD alone had sold roughly 100,000 loans through the DASP program (Perlberg et al.,
2015). The GSEs have sold far fewer to date, but the size of their pools have grown with
each oering. Fannie Mae’s fth and most recent sale included 7,900 loans, while its
previous pool included approximately 6,500 loans (Fannie Mae, 2013b).
In the rst years of DASP, HUD allowed only private investors, such as private equity
rms and hedge funds to bid on pools of seriously delinquent loans. Large corporate in-
vestors like the Blackstone Group dominated these auctions. Housing activists and inves-
tigative reporters found that some of the buyers of the rst pools of distressed loans were
accelerating the pace of foreclosure, rather than increasing the number of home retention
actions (Goldstein, 2015; Perlberg et al., 2015; Sen, 2015). Mounting pressure from activists
and their allies led HUD in April 2015 to change its policies and allow nonprots to also
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bid on these pools of loans, among other changes, including the requirement that buyers
evaluate whether delinquent borrowers were eligible for government mortgage modica-
tion programs. HUD has also set a target of selling 10% of delinquent loans to nonprots
and government entities. While these provisions to increase the number of sales to non-
prots and government entities and requirements for buyers to work harder to modify
delinquent loans are sound improvements over past policy, these distressed loan sales re-
quire continued examination to ensure they do not harm neighborhoods the way REO
bulk sales have in cities like Detroit. Although HUD’s requirements for investor buyers
are detailed and incorporate critical lessons learned from the foreclosure crisis, HUD has
few enforcement mechanisms. Prohibiting investors who fail to meet the requirements
of DASP from participating in future sales is certainly important, but likely not incentive
enough to insure buyers make good-faith eorts to do their best to help borrowers avoid
foreclosure and, when that is not possible, sell properties to owner-occupants. HUD, at
least, is amending its policies in response to community and political pressures. The GSEs
have yet to take these criticisms into account in their loan sale programs. These agencies,
however, cannot rely on economic incentives alone to ensure that investors are working
with borrowers on home retention actions (Edelman et al., 2016).
The results of this study support a number of recommendations made in recent works
examining the implications of distressed note sales (Edelman et al., 2016; Goodman &
Magder, 2016), including:
• Ensure investors do not walk away from properties they move through foreclosure.
Walkaways add to abandonment and vacancy, erode neighborhood conditions, and
impose additional costs on municipalities. This study links large investors to alarm-
ingly high rates of tax foreclosure and blight, so enforcement is required to prevent
buyers of pooled loans from reproducing these negative neighborhood outcomes.
• Ensure investors exhaust all possible foreclosure prevention options, including prin-
cipal reduction, before foreclosure. These pools of distressed loans are sold to in-
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vestors at a substantial discount, which provides them with greater exibility in
allowing for modications including principal reduction.
• Prohibit investors from oering unsustainable modications, which may be de-
signed to fail to provide investors the appearance of propriety while allowing them
to recover properties for prot-maximizing purposes.
• Ensure that foreclosures are adequately marketed to prospective homebuyers to
sustain neighborhood owner-occupancy rates. HUD requirements already require
foreclosures to be sold via a “First Look” program like that oered for REOs, increas-
ing the opportunities for homebuyers and nonprots to purchase homes. Buyers’
adherence to those requirements should be strictly monitored. Prior audits of “First
Look” have found the possibility of REO fraud, wherein brokers and listing agents
throw barriers in the way of homebuyer participation, favoring investor buyers.
Such fraud should be guarded against in note sale programs.
• Create strong neighborhood stabilization standards. For example, require that in-
vestors, after foreclosure, comply with vacant property registration ordinances and
property codes, adequately maintain their properties, and stay current with local
property taxes. HUD has already taken positive steps in this direction with the
creation of Neighborhood Stabilization Outcome (NSO) loan sales, which contain
loans concentrated in distressed housing markets. Investors in these pools are re-
quired to keep 50% of borrowers in their homes or satisfy an equal number of actions
intended to help stabilize neighborhoods, including sales to owner-occupants, hold-
ing properties for rental, and donating properties to land banks (U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development, 2015a). These actions support several of the
recommendations itemized above.
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10.2.2 Improved Eorts to Retain Occupants of Foreclosed Homes
In those instances where foreclosure is unavoidable, there are a number of actions that
could be taken by federal and private entities to improve neighborhood outcomes. In the
case of foreclosed homes with occupants, it may be preferable to retain those occupants
and sell the properties to buyers willing and able to retain them as renters or buyers on
a lease-to-own plan. In markets like Detroit, where investor activity in the market for
foreclosures outweighs homebuyer activity, selling occupied properties can be benecial
not only for the occupants, but also for neighborhoods by reducing the number of vacant
properties. Investors can also benet from the sale of occupied properties because their
rental revenue would already be secured (Been & Glashausser, 2009). The practices of
federal and private entities, however, encourage the eviction of occupants as part of the
process of preparing REOs for retail sales. The rules governing how federal agencies treat
occupancy of foreclosed homes, however, allow leeway for keeping occupants in place.
While it is standard practice for lenders to convey foreclosed FHA-insured properties to
HUD vacant, federal regulations allow HUD to have properties conveyed with occupants
when certain conditions are met (Bratt, 2016). Specically, HUD allows lenders to convey
occupied properties in those instances where it is “in the Secretary’s interest,” which are
when:
• Occupancy of the property is essential to protect it from vandalism from time of
acquisition to the time of preparation for sale
• The average time in inventory for HUD’s unsold inventory in the residential area
in which the property is located exceeds six months
• With respect to multi-unit properties, the marketability of the property would be
improved by retaining occupancy of one or more units
• The high cost of eviction or relocation expenses makes eviction impractical (“Con-
veyance of Occupied Property, 24 CFR 203.670,” 1996; “Criteria for Determining the
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Secretary’s Interest, 24 CFR 203.671,” 1996).
Findings from this study suggest that the rst two criteria may be met, particularly the
second criteria. HUD, therefore, should direct servicers of soon-to-be-foreclosed FHA-
insured properties in distressed housing markets to take steps to retain occupants, where
possible. After conveyance, HUD might prioritize sale of these occupied properties to
investors or nonprots willing to retain these occupants as renters or lease-to-own buyers.
The GSEs’ policies regarding conveyance of foreclosed properties had, until December
of 2014, allowed tenants of foreclosed properties to remain as renters during and after
the foreclosure period. Enacted in 2009, Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (PTFA),
until its expiration, was the only source of federal protection for tenants of foreclosed
properties. The PTFA had provided most renters with the right of at least 90 days’ notice
before being required to vacate (“Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 111–
22 §701,” 2008). The law also stipulated that tenants must be allowed to stay through the
length of their leases, except in cases where homes were sold to owner-occupants or leases
were immediately terminable by the state. Although this law has expired, in 2014, the
FHFA decided to change its policies to allow foreclosed borrowers, or a third-party acting
on their behalf, to purchase their homes at fair-market value (Federal Housing Finance
Agency, 2014a). Prior to this policy change, foreclosed borrowers were required to pay
the full balance of their mortgages to repurchase their homes. This policy change has the
potential to prevent further properties from becoming vacant and should be supported by
eorts to connect homebuyers with nonprots working to retain occupants of foreclosed
properties. Barriers to the cooperation of the GSEs’ with nonprots acquiring properties
for neighborhood stabilization eorts should be identied and addressed. Congress should
also revisit the possibility of extending the PTFA to increase opportunities for tenants of
foreclosed homes to remain in place as long as possible.
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10.2.3 Improved Eorts to Maintain Properties to Neighborhood Standards
The ndings of this dissertation support calls made elsewhere for federal and private
REO owners to improve their oversight of contractors responsible for maintaining proper-
ties to neighborhood standards (National Fair Housing Alliance, 2014a, 2014b). Although
this study does not directly show that REO owners failed to maintain their properties
to such standards, it does show that REO properties were closely linked to blight viola-
tions and nearby home price discounts. Both vacancy and under-maintenance are likely
responsible for these linkages. Possible steps that could be taken by federal agencies to
improve maintenance include the prohibition of contractors who fail to demonstrate ad-
equate maintenance from being awarded future federal contracts.
10.2.4 Improved REO Sales Practices
When foreclosure is unavoidable and there are no current occupants, or where cur-
rent occupants are unable or unwilling to remain or nd assistance to remain in their
homes, foreclosures must then be sold unoccupied. As shown in this dissertation, fed-
eral and private entities alike sold large shares of REOs to investors, often with negative
consequences for neighborhoods. Some investors, particularly large national investors,
acquired substantial numbers of REOs with what seems to have been the intention of
proting o properties they could quickly rent or sell and allowing others to lapse into
tax foreclosure. Properties abandoned by investors remain vacant for extended periods,
harming homeowner condence and incurring additional costs for cities. Investors linked
to these negative outcomes should be prohibited from purchasing REOs, particularly REOs
owned by federal entities. The GSEs and HUD should work with local governments na-
tionwide to collect information on code violations and tax delinquency for investor buy-
ers, regardless of whether they have previously purchased REOs. The usefulness of this
information, however, may be limited by investors’ practice of hiding behind multiple
Limited Liability Corporations (LLCs). An investor may sidestep rules prohibiting them
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from bidding while possessing outstanding tax liens, for instance, simply by bidding using
a new LLC. To anticipate these maneuvers, federal agencies might require bulk and cash
buyers not purchasing homes for primary residence to fully disclose their identity. The
U.S. Department of the Treasury recently established such a rule for investors in high-end
real estate in Manhattan and Miami (Story, 2016). Such rules might fruitfully be extended
to the low-end of the housing market to prevent further acquisitions by harmful investors
(Capps, 2016).
A second recommendation for improving outcomes related to REO sales is to prohibit
federal and private entities from selling highly deteriorated low-value properties. Federal
and private alike have demonstrated a willingness to sell highly distressed properties to
speculators and other bad buyers in Detroit. Institutional ownership of such properties,
particularly when ownership is by a federal agency, presents an opportunity to address
neighborhood blight, perhaps through demolition or donation to a land bank. By sell-
ing these properties to private investors, REO owners exacerbate blighted conditions by
allowing these distressed properties to sit in disrepair for extended durations. Federal
agencies have taken some positive steps in this direction, both in Detroit and other cities
with high foreclosure rates. A notable achievement in this regard is the agreement Fannie
Mae and HUD, along with a number of national servicers, reached with the CCLRC in
2009 to periodically oer pools of low-value properties for $1 along with a small contri-
bution toward demolition costs (Fujii, 2015). This achievement likely beneted from the
existence of an established infrastructure for land banking in Cleveland (Dewar, 2006).
Fannie Mae reached a similar agreement with the DLBA, but it was much later and for
far fewer properties (Gallagher, 2014). To build on these positive steps, federal agencies
should make such procedures for handling low-value properties the norm, not the ex-
ception to ordinary REO disposition. Donations or alternative disposition approaches for
low-value properties should occur before they are placed on the market, where investors
can acquire them. For such a system to work best, federal agencies should communicate
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early and often with local entities capable of responsibly handling low-value properties,
e.g., land banks.
A third recommendation for federal entities is to evaluate the impacts of “as-is” sales
on the share of REOs purchased by homeowners. Although this dissertation does not
provide direct evidence of this practice dampening demand among prospective owner-
occupants, past studies have pointed out the risks associated with these sales and sug-
gested they might make such sales more attractive to investors than homebuyers (H.
Thomas, 2015). Prospective homebuyers might be more interested in purchasing REOs
if these sales had more of the guarantees typical of conventional real estate transactions.
Related to this point, federal agencies might better familiarize themselves with the strong
neighborhoods located within cities with overall distressed housing markets to make more
informed decisions about where to repair properties to increase the likelihood of sale to
a homebuyer. By undertaking these repairs, REO sellers should be able to adequately
represent property conditions at sale.
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